Duquesne University

Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Spring 5-8-2020

Friendship in the Digital Age: Implications from a Philosophy of
Communication Approach
Tiffany Petricini

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd
Part of the Communication Technology and New Media Commons, Critical and Cultural Studies
Commons, Mass Communication Commons, Other Communication Commons, Rhetoric Commons, and
the Social Media Commons

Recommended Citation
Petricini, T. (2020). Friendship in the Digital Age: Implications from a Philosophy of Communication
Approach (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1882

This One-year Embargo is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne
Scholarship Collection.

FRIENDSHIP IN THE DIGITAL AGE:
IMPLICATIONS FROM A PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION APPROACH

A Dissertation
Submitted to Department of Rhetorical and Communication Studies

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Tiffany Petricini

May 2020

Copyright by
Tiffany Petricini

2020

FRIENDSHIP IN THE DIGITAL AGE:
IMPLICATIONS FROM A PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION APPROACH

By
Tiffany Petricini
Approved March 20, 2020

________________________________
Dr. Janie Harden Fritz
Professor of Communication and
Rhetorical Studies
(Committee Chair)
________________________________
Dr. Erik Garrett
Associate Professor of Communication
and Rhetorical Studies
(Committee Member)
________________________________
Dr. Kristine Blair
Dean, McAnulty Graduate School of
Liberal Arts

________________________________
Dr. Richard Thames
Associate Professor of Communication
and Rhetorical Studies
(Committee Member)

________________________________
Dr. Ronald C. Arnett
Chair, Department of Communication
and Rhetorical Studies
Professor of Communication and
Rhetorical Studies

iii

ABSTRACT

FRIENDSHIP IN THE DIGITAL AGE:
IMPLICATIONS FROM A PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION APPROACH

By
Tiffany Petricini
May 2020

Dissertation Supervised by Janie Harden Fritz, Ph. D.
Friendship is a central relationship-style that grounds us. Much of the literature on the
effects of technology on our relationships, especially friendship, has taken a skeptical approach.
The notion of friendship is historically-situated, thus, it requires attention in each era and has
prompted questions throughout human history. Our time is no exception. Changing cultures and
redefinitions of basic human institutions have led us to our current moment, in which we are
experiencing a loud and continuing debate on the effect of technology on our lives.
Advancements in science have allowed us to understand our past and present in new ways.
Technology, too, has opened the door for new possibilities of encounter. From initial encounter
to our sense of we-ness, this text examines the possibilities and challenges of technology on our
friendships.
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Introduction: Friendship as a Communicative Phenomenon
A friend is a person with whom I may be sincere. Before him I may think aloud. I am
arrived at last in the presence of a man so real and equal, that I may drop even those
undermost garments of dissimulation, courtesy, and second thought, which men never put
off, and may deal with him with the simplicity and wholeness with which one chemical
atom meets another. –Ralph Waldo Emerson
For most of human history, philosophers have been investigating and pondering various
facets of friendship. Rake (1970) wrote, “Friendship is one of the eternally fascinating topics to
which great minds of every age turn with fresh interest” (p. 3). One of the earliest exercises in
grappling with the notion of friendship can be seen in Homer’s Odyssey. There are several
thorough works that have studied friendship over the course of human history. In his work
Friendship in the Classical World, Kanston (1997) discussed friendship in Homer’s work and
also examined friendship in multiple works from as early as the eighth century B.C. to the fourth
A.D. (1997). Reisman (1979), too, examined ancient works, including the Old Testament to
place the study of friendship into context historically. Plato discussed friendship in several of his
works including Lysis, Symposium, and Phaedrus and several contemporary scholars have
interpreted Plato’s work on friendship in more depth (Ferrari, 1992; Price, 1989; Reeve, 2006).
Friendship was a major focal point for Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics and of tertiary
importance in the Eudemian Ethics. Aristotle began his work on friendship in the Nicomachean
Ethics by saying that friendship “is either itself a virtue or connected with virtue” and made the
argument that friendship is imperative for human flourishing. Cicero would eventually, under
the influence of Aristotle and Plato, write an entire work on friendship, De Amicitia. Also
influenced heavily by Aristotle was Aquinas, who dedicated a large part of Summa Theologiae to
1

friendship. Montaigne wrote his essay On Friendship in the mid-1500s and Shakespeare, too, at
the turn of the 16th century was working with friendship themes. Several contemporary scholars
have examined these themes in Shakespeare’s works (Bloom, 2000; Waithe, 1986; Cox, 2008). .
Upon researching near any contemporary scholar, one will find some type of work related to the
nature of friendship, including Gadamer, C.S. Lewis, Foucault, Ricoeur, Derrida, Levinas,
Arendt, Nietzsche, to mention only a few.
The notion of friendship is historically-situated, thus, it requires attention in each era and
has prompted questions throughout human history. Our time is no exception. Changing cultures
and redefinitions of basic human institutions have led us to our current moment, in which we are
experiencing a loud and continuing debate on the effect of technology on our lives.
Advancements in science have allowed us to understand our past and present in new ways.
Technology, too, has opened the door for new possibilities of encounter. Throughout the ages,
friendship has been consistently recognized as a human good that facilitates human flourishing,
and as we are in an age of virtue contention, questions about the navigation of competing goods
and how they relate to friendship are pertinent.
Cultural Transformations
Related to cultural shifts and the redefinitions of human institutions, many friendship
scholars have recognized the unique challenges of our post-modern world related to friendships.
McPhee (1998), grounded in the work of Giddens (1979; 1981), noted we have a fragmented and
undermined sense of community. Kinship, too, has “become fragmented and less relied on”
which has elevated the necessity for friendship in our lives (McPhee, p. 98). Suttles (1970)
wrote, “Friendships are especially valued in a population where social contacts of outgrown the
bounds of kinship, neighborhood, age grades, workgroups, ethnicity, and social classes” (p. 96).
2

Allan (1998) pointed out that various areas of our social lives have gone through historical
transformations, like domestic life, work, employment, gender relations, community
involvement, etc. Friendship research in the 19 th century has tended to recognize the various
different social possibilities for relations (Naegle, 1958; Kurth, 1970).
Brain (1976) argued that there is a need to understand friendship “at times when our ideas
are becoming so fluid and changing,” particularly related to our “Western preconceptions of love
and friendship” (p. 10). Culture and our institutions are evolving, and we have arrived at an era
of virtue contention (Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, 2009; Fritz, 2013). This age is defined by
disagreement on most topics, particularly related to the good life. Arnett, Fritz, and Bell
explained that “our confidence in one universal sense of the ‘good’ is no longer normative” (p. 1)
and “Goods are often in conflict in this postmodern era of difference” (p. 4). The trio added that
“The application of those goods is then negotiated and enacted through discourse” and we see
this played out in the form of debate in the literature associated with the negative and positive
effects of technology on friendships and our ability to flourish.
There is no doubt that technological development has spurred radical shifts in the primary
relationships we have in our life. Shifts in communicative technology have thrust us into
difference as commonplace and have positioned us to experience alterity regularly. Even in the
80s, Gumpert and Cathcart noticed the revolutionary shifts in communication and technology.
They wrote that “The new media have altered our patterns of communication just as surely as the
ice age changed the contours of the land” (1986, p. 57). They added “The modern electronic
media have affected what we know, who and what we talk about, who talks to us, and who
listens. Our knowledge and store of information have been immeasurably increased” (p. 9).
Prior to the advent of technology, friendships were created and maintained with those in which
3

we were in close proximity (Adams, 1998). Technology made possible our ability to not only
meet but maintain relationships at a distance. While the restriction of physical presence on
friendship has now been removed, problematic romanticized ideals about friendships of the past
still are pervasive. O’Connor noted that even if two people made initial contact in each other’s
physical presence in the past, “maintaining already established relationships across distances was
difficult because contact was infrequent, expensive, or unsatisfying” (1998, p. 157). O’Connor
(1998) noted that “The assumption of physical co-presence made some sense in the technological
context in which these territorially-bound theories developed” (p. 157). Bakardjieva (2014)
explained that post web 2.0, in the world of social media, we are seeing friendship being
redefined, and challenged “on grounds of linguistic, cultural and ideological differences” (p.
270). This is no surprise from a communication ethics standpoint.
Technology Use Today
Today, technology use is standard and part of the everyday personal and professional
lives of most people in the Western world. It is important then to review exactly how technology
is being used and conceptualize some of the terms then to help contextualize the nature of this
project. According to a 2019 Pew Research Study, nearly all Millennials own a smartphone.
Roughly half also own tablets, and about 80 percent of millennials have broadband internet
access in their homes. Gen Xers have similar statistics, and the majority of Boomers have
smartphones, tablets, and broadband access. The Silent generation trails behind with under half
owning smartphones, tablets, and broadband internet. A staggering near-100 percent of
Millennials use the internet regularly, 20 percent of which go online from their smartphones
only.
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While there are multiple reasons that individuals go online, many are social media users.
Eight-six percent of millennials use social media (Pew Research, 2019). The majority of social
media users visit Facebook regulary, although other options for social media include Instagram,
Snapchat, and Twitter. Obar and Wildman (2015) noted the difficulty in defining social media
and likened it to a “moving target.” The pair noted four areas that all forms of social media
share:
1) They are Web 2.0 technology.
2) They depend on user-generated content.
3) They consist of individuals who are moderated by a larger organization.
4) They “facilitate the development of social networks online by connected a profile with
those of other individuals/groups” (p. 9).
Aichner and Jacob (2015) noted several types of social media. They listed:
1) Blogs
2) Business networks
3) Collaborative projects
4) Enterprise social networks
5) Forums
6) Microblogs
7) Photo sharing
8) Products/services review
9) Social bookmarking
10) Social gaming
11) Social networks
5

12) Video sharing
13) Virtual words
Kaplan (2012) differentiated mobile social media from standard social media forms. Mobile
social media, he argued, have location sensitivities and time sensitivities. He distinguished four
types.
1. Space-timers. Space-timer types of social media are those which are sensitive to both
time and space. An example of this is Foursquare.
2. Space-locators. Space-locator types of social media are sensitive to space but not time.
An example of this would be Yelp.
3. Quick-timers. Quick-timer types of social media are sensitive to type but not space.
Twitter and Facebook news feeds are examples of this.
4. Slow-timers. Slow-timer types of social media are neither time nor space sensitive.
Kaplan gives Youtube and Wikipedia as examples.
An important distinction in the above discussion is made with the mention of Web 2.0. is the
term used to signify the major transformation of internet culture after the year 2000. Blank and
Reisdorf (2012) have termed Web 2.0 “The Participatory Web.” Bakardjieva and Gaden (2012)
explained:
Although no scholarly consensus exists on the issue, the claim that a substantive
reconfiguration of the Internet has occurred in the beginning of the 2000s has settled
firmly in pubic common sense. The label tentatively chosen for the new turn in the
medium’s evolution is Web 2.0. (p. 399)
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The pair argued that “the hermeneutic utility of social networking sites” opens the door for new
horizons for our interactions and interpretations of others (p. 411). Web 2.0 technologies, they
argued, require creative labor. They added:
The creative labor that they invent in web 2.0 technologies and practices helps bloggers
and SNS participants to find new affinities and solidarities far outreaching their mediate
interaction circles. Not surprisingly, along with the vanity fair (of amassing friends and
posting fancy self-flattering pictures and stories) in an equally viable stream of Web 2.0
activities, users come together as a political force to resist the commercial imperatives, to
formulate civic concerns and mobilize for action. (p. 411)
Friendship and the Good
Friendship is deeply connected with human flourishing. A debate has been playing out
over the last several decades related to the ways in which technology has affected friendship.
Scientific advancements have shown this to be not just philosophically sound but also
empirically so. Many medical disciplines have turned to the study of friendship in the last
decade to make sense of the various ways in which friendships affect us and are affected by the
world. Johnson and Dunbar (2016) showed that there is a correlation between one’s pain
tolerance and the size of their social network. In another study in 2015, increased social network
size was correlated with a decrease in depression (Hill, Griffiths, & House). In older adults,
social relationship activities were linked with a decrease in cognitive decline (James, Wilson,
Barnes, & Bennett, 2011).
We are physiologically and emotionally affected by the quality and quantity of our
friendships. Rubin (1986) pointed out that not only do we agree that it is important to have and
7

maintain friendships, but that there is a social stigma attached to the lack of friends. She noted
that lacking friends in our culture is stigmatized and often a source of shame. She also highlights
the concern caregivers have for childhood friendships, that is, that parents are concerned with
their child’s ability to make friends. Signs of a child struggling to make friends is a
developmental warning to parents and educators, and a possible alert that the child may be
struggling with flourishing. Friends provide us with a plethora of developmental support.
Friends guide us through human development and help young adults transition from family life
into full-fledged members of the civil society. Ginsberg, Gottman, and Parker (1986) highlight
several other means of support that friends provide, including companionship, stimulation,
physical support, ego support, social comparison, and intimacy and affection.
Technological Considerations
It is no wonder then, that technology’s effects on friendship have become some contested
in our current moment. Some scholars have argued that technology has negatively impacted
friendship and our ability to flourish. For example, one thread of research argues that technology
has had a negative impact on friendships or that mediated relationships are of poorer quality
(Valkenburg & Peter, 2009). Turkle’s (2011) popular work, Alone Together, argues that
technology is driving us inward at the cost of our relationships. Postman (2011), too, argues that
technology run amuck is destroying our very human nature and social relationships. In her work,
Bennett’s (2016) purpose was “to discover if (and how) eudemonia can continue to be associated
with the digital exchange of information and images, otherwise known as contemporary
friendship” (p. 245). Working from Elull, Bennett argued that technique diminishes face-to-face
communication. She wrote, “The quick, unobstructed access to one another has morphed in
short order from something used occasionally into the dominant mode of communication, often
8

eclipsing the natural reaction to have a conversation or spend time together” (p. 248). She
concluded that “media distance us from the other” (p. 255).
Cocking and Matthews (2000) also take a negative view of the effects of technology on
our friendships. They explained that the ability to share one’s experience online is limited. They
wrote, “Though we think internet ‘friendship’ is quite inferior to non-virtual friendship, we do
not think that it is necessarily bad in itself and indeed for some people, it clearly provides an
important good” (p. 224). However, the pair found technology to interfere with the ability to
flourish in the sense that “to the extent that my Net ‘friendships’ replace friendships I might well
have had non-virtually, this will subtract from the good of friendships” (p. 224). In addition to
the loss of face-to-face relationships, the pair also argued that the second problem associated
with friendship and technology is related to the lack of hermeneutic cues which we will address
in the following chapter. They wrote:
We claim that what is lacking here is not merely a partial, or marginal set of factors, but a
significant global loss and distortion of the real case. What is distorted and lost, in
particular, are important aspects of a person’s character and of the relational self
ordinarily developed through those interactions in friendship. (p. 231)
McFall (2012) was skeptical about the effects of technology on our friendships. From his
perspective, technology can help with virtue friendships that were formed outside of the
mediated realm, but “character-friendships cannot be created and sustained entirely through
technological mediation” (p. 221). The problem, McFall argued, is related to the “perceptual
and communicative elements” of virtue friendships that “cannot wholly be mediated
technologically” (p. 224). Particularly, he noted that this is due to the lack of shared activity.
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Other scholars are much more adamant that technology benefits our friendships. In her
work on relationships and social media, Chambers (2013) argued that new scholarship is
indicating that social media and the internet have created “important sites for cultivating personal
relationships” (p. 4).
Munn (2012), focusing solely on MMORPGs, addressed the shared activity argument and
while he agreed that “shared activity is a core element in the formation of friendships” he added
that “friendships can form in immersive virtual worlds as they do in the physical world” (p. 1).
For him, particularly, MMORPGs allow for two individuals to share activity in an online space.
Elder (2014), following an Aristotelian orientation, argued that “fulfilling friendships may occur
via social media because social media allows friends to share distinctly human activities such as
conversation and exchange of thoughts, mutual development of ideas, making art and playing
games” (p. 287). Briggle (2008) took a balanced approach and recognized that often, many of
the arguments making the case for technology as problematic or detrimental for our friendships
fail to address the numerous issues associated with friendship in a non-virtual environment. He
wrote that “offline relationships can be constrictive and insincere” and that mediated
communication “mitigates this problem by promoting the courage to be candid” (p. 71). He
added that online communication attracts a deliberativeness absent in many oral
communications.
Soraker (2012) charged us with considering whether “actual and virtual friendships differ
when it comes to enhancing our subjective well-being” (p. 209) and one aim of this project is to
enter the conversation through a phenomenological and philosophical framework. The hope is to
bypass issues surrounding the psychosocial goods of friendship that narrow us into the
deontological and utilitarian frameworks and instead can approach friendships in the
10

technological age from a communicative standpoint. Friendship is extremely deserving of our
time and effort as communication scholars. As Rawlins (2009) contended, friendship reaches
and impacts every part of our society and world.

Sigman (1998) claimed that communication

“produces and sustains” all human relationships and Rogers (1998) also emphasized
communication as the production center for relationships.
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the effects of technology on friendship as
experienced, informed by an attentiveness to the philosophy of communication. Particularly, this
project will explore the intersections of media ecology and the philosophy of technology,
rhetoric, interpersonal communication, and ethics. This is a task well-suited for the
communication discipline. While there is a significant amount of communication research in the
quantitative and qualitative scholarship, work in the media ecology, philosophical, and ethical
tracks is lacking.
Rationale for Philosophical and Ethical Approach
In Explorations in Media Ecology, there has been only one published article featuring
friendship. Bennett (2016) examined the “inefficiency of friendship” grounded in the work of
Ellul. There is a rich field of scholarship that examines the role of technology in friendships, yet
media ecology scholars have seemingly overlooked this important element of our lives. Bennett
noted that in our historical analyses, we must conclude that the meaning of friendship has shifted
In the interpersonal communication realm, Walther’s (1992) Social Information Processing
Theory (SIP) examined the effects of technology on relationship development. He suggested
that despite our lack of nonverbal cues in the mediated setting, relationships actually do develop,
although they do so at a much slower pace. In fact, individuals actually adapt their
communication patterns for the various mediums available. Walther extended this work later to
11

create the Hyperpersonal Model (1996). He argued that computer-mediated communication can
actually become hyperpersonal.
Hyperpersonal communication, Walther explained, can be more socially desirable (1996).
His model shows that we do tend to draw from stereotypes more via mediated-communication
and over attribute certain characteristics. In that same year, Parks and Floyd (1996) presented
their research and showed that it was not a question of whether relationships could develop—
they were developing. Walther and Parks in a 2002 article added to their earlier work and
reviewed multiple theories. They showed several benefits related to communicative
technologies, including improved mental health and well-being, access to more resources, more
expertise, more support, and the possibility to engage with others who are interested in the same
things we are, rather than those who are close to us.
While there is a substantial amount of research on technology and relationships, and
technology and friendship, there is little research at the phenomenological level on the shifts that
technology has caused in the experience of friendship. Friendships are hybridized in various
ways, to be discussed later, but at the contemporary level, the questions that have guided the
literature in friendship have centered on whether mediated friendship is possible, authentic, or
beneficial. In her work, Bennett (2016) grappled with understanding if friendship in our time is
“qualitatively different” and that is one aim of the research that will be presented in this project
(p. 245).
Difficult Definitions
One possible reason for such a lack of attentiveness from the various humanitiesgrounded communication traditions is the difficulty of concretely defining friendship. First,
there are different kinds of words to describe different kinds of friendly relations. Second, the
12

areas of central agreement throughout friendship literature are fuzzy and gray. Third, friendship
varies at both the macro and micro levels and is both a personal and social relationship. In
addition to the historical shifts, defining friendship is also elusive also, as Scult (1989) pointed
out, “there is no clear ‘object of investigation’ and therefore nothing to focus on as we work our
way around the hermeneutical circle” (p. 204). Here, he is responding to the point that
“friendships are” “extremely delicate and complex attempts at human bonding” with no “defined
nor any agreed-upon institutional rules or conventions” (p. 203). In attempting to define
friendship, one standard approach is to focus on what friendship is not. For example, friendship
is separate from kinship, although the two share several attributes. Allan (1979) explored the
way in which our roles shape our expectations about particular relationships. He explains that
kinship is institutionalized and formal but friendship is not. In the case of family, we have
bloodlines or pedigrees and family is institutionally protected in Western culture. Laws are in
place that specifically are designed to define kin relations.
Typological Differences and Areas of Fuzzy Agreement
Several scholars are quick to point out that there is a difference between friendship and
friendly relations and that we currently have many words to approach friend-type relationships
(Gareis, 1999; Bakardjieva, 2014; Kurth, 1970). Scott (2014) noted, “For the exacting language
user, terms such as acquaintance, casual friend, close friend, and best friend offer the promise of
differentiation” (p. 432). Technology has only complicated in the issue, as now “friending” is a
verb in which online social media profiles are linked. There are several agreed-upon elements
that help us approach friendship. Rawlins in his work Friendship Matters (1992), showed us that
friendships: persist in both public and private, are voluntary, maintain a spirit of equality, have a
mutual involvement for shared social reality, and contain some type of affective ties. Thomas
13

(1993) highlighted that friendships have relatively little structure and the central features are
“voluntary self-disclosure, reciprocity, positive mutual regard” and autonomy (p. 63). Suttles
(1970) explained that liking is likely to occur when two are similar in status. Dreher (2009)
described several common features of friendship:
1. It is done of both party's own free will.
2. There is normally no sexual element.
3. There is unlikely to be physical attraction, unlike in a love relationship.
Like Rawlins, Suttles argued that friendships are voluntary, personal, and generalized. Emmeche
(2019) acknowledged the central elements of friendship, adding that similar interests, common
experiences, affection, and care are imperative. Ginsberg, Gottman, and Parker (1986) argued
that intimacy and affection are central to all friendships across the lifespan and that these two
qualities are what differentiate close and distant friends.
Contextual Variations of Friendship
Another problem with definitional attempts is related to the fact that our friendships are
contextually dependent. They vary by culture, gender, age and many other factors (Gudykunst,
1989; Liu & Yang, 2016; Fritz, 1997). Rawlins (1992) discussed the changing nature of
friendships over the course of the lifespan. Childhood friendships are centered on coordinated
play and grounded in proximity. As we develop, he explained that our friendships shift from
momentary physical playmates to friendships grounded in mutuality and understanding. Allan
(1998) wrote, “Changes in friendship patterns develop across the life-course as people’s
responsibilities, commitments, and opportunities alter” (p. 72). In the Nicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle recognized the changes in friendship over the course of the lifespan and associated this
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with changes in the underlying ends sought (e.g. pleasure, utility). Westmyer (1996) noted,
“Friendships can exist between older and younger people; differences in sex do not necessarily
constitute an obstacle for friendship, socio-structural boundaries can be overcome by friendship
and, moreover, friendships between individuals with completely different cultural backgrounds
are conceivable” (p. 411). Dreher (2009) pointed out that friendship defies barriers based on age,
sex, socio-structures, and culture. In all of these categories, while the literature shows that
typically friends are similar in these above categories such as gender, age, and culture—they are
not limiting, and individuals of different ages, sexes, and cultures can and do become friends.
Despite cultural and temporal variations, friendship is universal (Brain, 1976).
Traditional literature on friendship cannot account for or the above variations, fuzzy
arenas, and variations from person to person and place to place. Literature has tended fall into
one of three themes. Some threads of research paint friendship as a relationship. While
friendship is a relationship, these perspectives, in my opinion, tend to objectify the nature of
friendship and cause a shift in our thinking. We conceive of friendship as a tangible thing that
we can hold and possess. As such, it creates an idealized notion of friendship at both the macro
and micro levels. At the macro-level, it creates unrealistic views about expectations for others
and fails to recognize the dynamic nature as friendship. At the macro-level, it leads to
romanticized notions about friendship that are inattentive to the historical moment. Other
theories frame friendship as a process, many times a developmental process. While I do not
reject the excellent research that examines the developmental life stages and the various types of
friendships, and appreciate that this approach overcomes the static-orientation of the relationship
views of friendship, these views are problematic because friendship as process seems to invoke
an expectation of a final form. Friendship as a communicative phenomenon recognizes that each
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friendship has a unique story, and friendship, in general, is part of an ongoing human
conversation that will always need to be revisited. A third thread imagines friendship as an
achievement. In these accounts, friendship must be earned, fought for, or won. Friendship is
much more than a trophy, an end, and these accounts endanger the good of friendship and instead
quash the important element of particularity within the friendship itself.
Friendship as Communicative Phenomenon
To overcome the above problems, this dissertation frames friendship as a communicative
phenomenon. It is created, sustained, managed, produced, and reproduced via various forms of
communicative work. Framing it in such a way allows us to work through the different areas and
recognize the historically situated and evolving nature of friendship. Also, it follows a long
tradition which begins with Aristotle.
Friendship as a communicative phenomenon involves various kinds of communicative
work. For one, there is the communicative work of identification. Rawlins (2009) showed us
that we use language to identify our friends, and we typify characteristics of what we anticipate
as being associated with a ‘friend’ and apply it within our everyday encounters with others.
Within these friend types, we have very different types of communicative work. Helm (2010)
for example argued that among types of friendship, the major differences are grounded in the
conceptualization of the friendship itself the two have (which may even be implicit). Westmyer
(1996), too, recognized the differences at the communicative level related to types of friendship.
She explains “friendship is primarily symbolically constructed, i.e. that it is formed by means of
constructive processes based on a collegiately shared symbolism with a repertoire of culturally
defined categories” (p. 408).

As we frame friendship as a communicative phenomenon, then,

the necessity for categorization of types diminishes. Rawlins (2009) focused on storytelling and
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dialogue as essential activities of friendship. Whether explicit or implicit, Communication is the
base from which all friendships emerge. Sigman (1998) pointed out that it is solely through
communication that relationships, in general, are produced and sustained. Thomas (1993)
highlighted unless we interact with another person, it’s impossible to know if a friendship is even
possible. Rogers (1998) explained that communication is formative in relations.
Rawlins (2009) argued that “Friendships emerge among the personal, relational, and
cultural narratives of our lives negotiated within a host of stories already in progress” (p. 47). He
continues, “Friendships are ongoing narrative achievements reflexively shaping our identities,
convictions, participation, and possibilities (p. 47). Rawlins' work grounds friendship in the
communicative realm. This dissertation follows his work to argue that friendship is a
communicative phenomenon. Part of this project is to examine how it is that this naming can
take place sans reification of the term. Rawlins explains that “we produce the category of
‘friend’ in our daily lives through the people we choose to describe by that term (and negatively
through the people to whom we refuse to apply it)” (2009, p. 25). Framing friendship as a
communicative phenomenon allows us to avoid the difficulties encountered in attempting to
define the essence of friendship in addition to the earlier problems encountered in different types
of friendship. Framing friendship as a communicative phenomenon also allows us to attend to
the current work from a historically-mindful perspective, a process that is essential to projects
within the philosophy of communication. Arnett (2010) wrote:
Philosophy of communication engages particulars contingent on a particular situation, a
particular moment, and a particular public contribution to public opinion. Philosophy of
communication does not give us unquestioned assurance; it is tested by public opinion
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offered as a philosophy of communication road map that details the particulars and
temporal suggestions for engaging those particulars. (p. 58)
A goal of this project is to offer a road map that explores the particulars of friendship and
temporal suggestions for engaging those particulars.
Laas (2018) argued that definition work is problematic as it draws us away from the
ethical and practical implications of friendship. Laas (2018) noted, “real definitions, like other
kinds of definitions, are linguistic entities, and as such are unavoidably historically contingent on
the definer’s circumstances, goals, and theoretical commitments” (p. 123). Rather than center
on the definitional characteristics, honing in on a communicative framework allows us instead to
dedicate the inquiry at hand to uncovering the qualitative differences at the phenomenological
level with an overall goal to understand friendship in our current moment.
Operating from an Aristotelian framework, this dissertation assumes that friendship is
necessary for human life. For Munn (2012), a central element of friendship was “shared
activity” (p. 1). Elder (2014), drawing from Aristotle, argued that the hallmark of friendship is
the shared life, specifically, a communicative life. He wrote, that friends share “especially
reasoning together by sharing conversation and thoughts, and communal engagement in valued
activities” (p. 287). Meilaender (1981) explained that for Aristotle, the emphasis was on choice.
It is this grounding of friendship in choice, then, that places friendship in the middle of
deliberative work and communicative action. Aristotle wrote that friendship “is a thing most
necessary for life since no one would choose to live without friends” (1155a). Rawlins operates,
too, from an Aristotelian tradition. He explained that “in close friendship, we desire good things
to happen to our friend because we care about this particular person. The activities compassing
personal friendship occur for the most part in private settings out of public eyes and ears” (2009,
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p. 5). He continued that “For Aristotle true dyadic friendships also involve mutual well-wishing,
which includes reciprocated concern and actions to benefit each friend. They jointly experience
the gratifications of their friendship” (p. 5). It would be difficult to find anyone who would
argue that friends do not improve our life.
Staging friendship as a communicative phenomenon also offers the possibility for
epistemic, ontological, and metaphysical confirmation of being. Branden (1993) explains that
through friendship, there emerges a “psychological visibility” that is a “metaphysical
experience” (p. 66) and helps separate friendship from kinship and romantic ties, in the sense
that friendship as emerging communicatively and maintained through communication places it in
a different tier. Kinship and romantic relationships biological underpinnings. C.S. Lewis
(1960) wrote that true friendship is difficult to come by. He explains “Friendship is—in a sense
not at all derogatory to it—the least natural of loves; the least instinctive, organic, biological,
gregarious and necessary” (p. 88). Thomas (1993) explained that there are also communicative
differences between friendships and parent-child relationships in addition to the biological
elements. They are related to the “manifestation of choice,” there is no authority of one over the
other, and “enormous bond of trust” (p. 49).
Aristotle discussed the nature of relationships like husband and wife and son and father—
he said that they are different because the ‘work’ is different. He wrote, “because the work, and
therefore the excellence, of each of these is different, and different therefore are the causes of
their feeling Friendship” (1171a). All relationships require communicative work, but for
friendship, the relationship is produced and maintained solely through communication.
Another central notion related to communicative work and friendship is tied to sharing
with. Soraker (2012) wrote, “If we break the somewhat abstract notion of friendship into
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constitutive elements, one clear indication of the value of friendships comes from the value of
having someone to share with” (p. 215). The idea of sharing with is a central theme within this
dissertation. The sharing of time, space, place, experiences, thoughts, conversations, feelings,
etc. will all be explored. For Soraker, sharing with particular is grounded in communication.
Soraker wrote, “research indicates that one of the most significant determinants of well-being
lies in the ability to share one’s positive and negative experiences with others” (p. 215). Liu
(2010) advocated from an Aristotelian perspective to show that shared activity is a necessary
component of friendship and “this activity has a phenomenal character perhaps more akin to
sense perception than to intellectual apprehension” (p. 585). Munn (2012), too, interpreted
shared activity to be central to Aristotle’s conceptualization of friendship. This shared activity
will be developed throughout this work. Shared activity is a sharing with, particularly grounded
in the communicative world.
In addition to the sharing with component of friendship, another important
communicative element of most interpretations of friendship is for the sake of. Cooper (1980)
wrote, “To wish for someone else’s good for his sake entails (perhaps means) wishing for his
good not as a means to one’s own (or anyone else’s) good” (p. 310). Munn (2012) wrote,
“mutual caring is the idea that each friend cares for the other and does so for the sake of the
other, not themselves” (p. 2). We act not because it is reciprocal, nor for the sake of the
friendship, but for the friend in their particularity.
Friendship as a communicative phenomenon opens the door for rhetorical and
communication ethics approaches, due to the role of narrative in developing our character. For
various reasons, story-telling between friends is a key component in shaping who we are as
persons. Rawlins (1992) wrote that “In telling each other our stories, friends con-construct the
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ongoing personal and social significance of our endeavor, setbacks, accomplishments, and
hopes” (p. 47) and this, too, connects with the sharing with. Friendship as the highest virtue, and
the path to all other virtues, is also manifested through the practice of communicative virtues.
Sokolowski (2002) wrote:
The ability to engage in friendship, the virtue of friendship, requires that we possess the
other virtues, both the individual virtues and the virtue of justice. We have to be morally
good in all the other ways in order to be able to enjoy true friendship. If we are
intemperate or cowardly, for example, we will find that our intemperance or cowardice
will prevent us from even thinking about someone else’s good, or they may make us
think wrongly about what is good for our ‘friend.’ (p. 260)
Chapter Overviews
The project ahead embraces the tradition of the unity of contraries. It explores the
various ways in which specific parts give rise to revelations of the whole related to friendship.
Chapter Two—Encounter: Persons and the Origins of Friendship
Chapter two begins from the point this introduction ended, examining friendship as a
communicative phenomenon between persons that is created, sustained, managed, produced, and
reproduced via various forms of communicative work in which the persons do good things for
and with the other. All human relations begin with meeting. Alfred Schutz, Austrian
phenomenologist, places intersubjectivity at the center of all social relations. Numerous scholars
have worked with and from Schutz’ work, particularly drawing relevance to the importance of
his work in understanding communicative action. We take for granted that others exist and that
they exist in the way that we exist. We also take for granted that their bodies exist. Our world is
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peopled. When we encounter the bodies of others in our world, they are given to us in their
originary presence. However, their consciousness is not presented but appresented. In the
paradigmatic communicative setting, one’s spatial presence is used as a source for entering or
penetrating their subjective experience as well as their givenness in speech. Encounter is the
communicative phenomenon in which persons enter into a communicative common environment.
As such, it is not dependent on the face-to-face setting and can occur via technology.
Chapter Three—Particularity and Personhood: Humanizing the Friend Through Voice
Chapter Three explores the tension between encounter and particularity. We have the
potential to encounter hundreds if not thousands of others on any given day. Friendship emerges
from a tension that arises between encounter and particularity. Particularity is the reciprocal
recognition of the other’s unique consciousness (interiority) through voice within a context of
belief. Voice, in the context of this project, is the expression of one’s interiority. Corey Anton
proposes a triadic structure of intentionality and using this, the conclusion is drawn that
particularity arises when we mundanely dwell in the voice of our friends, in their givenness.
Particularity, also, is not dependent on the face-to-face setting and can occur via technology.
Chapter Four—Dialogue and Digitization: The Language of Friendship
Dialogue and digitization and their role in friendship are the topics chapter four explores.
In the last decade of his life, Walter J. Ong explored the nature of hermeneutics in a digital
world. Throughout his career, he was concerned with depersonalization. Ong’s work was
influenced by Martin Buber’s philosophy. While there is no explicit connection between Alfred
Schutz and Buber, there are some basic tenets of their work that may arise from their Jewish
upbringing. The voices of all three philosophers unite to inform this chapter, specifically to
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show that the Other in friendship emerges as a result of a unity of contraries, specifically
between dialogue and digitization. Human thought is binary and “breaks down” the Other.
Language is hermeneutic and dialogue is the “building up” of the Other. Dialogue is imperative
for friendships in that it is the practice from which particularity arises, and that it is necessary for
the co-creation of meaning of the friendship itself. In our digital age, the presence of the other
can be hermeneutic and as such, mediated communication is more conducive to
depersonalization than spoken. While mediated communication creates more challenges, it does
not make friendship impossible.
Chapter Five—Time and Space: Altered Dimensions of Friendship
The next chapter begins with Giddens’s argument that Social systems have been extended
in time and space. For most of human history, friendships were limited to those in which we
were in close proximity. As communication technologies have evolved, our perceptions and
experience of time and space have changed. Friendship is connected to time in two ways.
Friends must share the same historical moment. Second, friendship is extended duration,
perceived as continuous duration although experienced as fragmented and discrete. Traditionally
friendship has been linked to space, although research indicates that lack of shared space is not a
barrier. Through the social dimensions of time and space, intimacy surfaces. Intimacy depends
on communicative choices. Specifically, the choice: to communicate, to communicate with you,
of how to communicate, and to communicate in a way that is unique to our friendship.
Chapter Six—Sunaisthesis: The Synecdochical Activity of Friendship
The final unity of contraries, sunaisthesis, is the activity in which two friends become a
“we.” This is the focus of the sixth chapter. Sunaisthesis is central to Aristotle’s work on
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friendship; therefore, it is the center of all of his political philosophy. April Flakne argues that
the translations of Aristotle’s term were inaccurate. Interpreting both Eudemian Ethics and
Nicomachean Ethics, she argued that the term derived from suzen (the shared life) and aesthesis
(perception). Sunaisthesis is living, perceiving, and doing together.
Chapter Seven—Conclusion: A Virtue Ethics Approach
Friendship is a requirement for the good life. Teleological and deontogical frameworks are not
as well-suited for the task of examining the effect of technological practices on our friendships as
virtue ethics and communication ethics approach. An attentiveness to historicity, the particulars,
and the communicative practices that inform the goods of friendship are explored. Each chapter
theme has a related discussion and conclusion related to the overall notion of virtue ethics.
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Encounter: Persons and the Origins of Friendship
“One’s friends are that part of the human race with which one can be human.”
– George Santayana
All human encounter is communicative. Even if we never exchange words with another
person, due to the intersubjective nature of our lifeworld, all encounter presupposes a
communicative world. To be human is to be with other humans. Therefore, a relevant starting
point for our investigation into the communicative phenomenon of friendship is at the beginning
of all human relationships, encounter. As a starting point to all human relationships, however
fleeting, encounter is essential for friendship. An awareness of the existence of the other is the
foundational starting point. This awareness is brought into being through communicative work
and performance. This chapter will draw heavily from the work of Alfred Schutz, who inspired a
plethora of works on human relationships. Through these works, I will show that corporeal
presence is not required in today’s world for encounter, and so, as the fundamental step to
friendship formation at the phenomenological level, then, encounter is our first step in all human
relations and not only can but does occur in many various mediated settings in today’s world.
Grinnell (1983) showed that Schutz, through his systematic analysis of social relations
“arrived at the originating point involving intersubjectivity” (p. 185) and this chapter will follow
that tradition. Carrington (1979) pointed out, through Schutz, that all social relations are
essentially based on the possibility of communication. Barber (2018) noted that Schutz’ work
influenced formative scholars in multiple disciplines. Sociologist John O’Neill’s work on the
lived body experience drew from Schutz (O’Neill, 1974). Schutz was a close friend of the
phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch, bonded by their intellectual inquiries and refuge from World
War II (Grathoff, 1989). Lester Embree, a phenomenologist and student of Gurwitsch, has
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published numerous works about and influenced by Schutz (Embree, 1988; 2013; 2015; Embree
& Barber, 2017). Schutz was extremely influential for the work of sociologist Harold Garfinkel,
father of ethnomethodology and his student Peter Berger (Psathas, 2004). Berger would go on to
work with Luckmann, another student of Schutz to write The Social Construction of Reality
(1996). Natanson's phenomenological and philosophical works were extremely influenced by
his teacher (Natanson, 1986).
Several contemporary scholars are working through Schutz to finish pressing inquiries in
today’s world. Knoblauch, specifically, has opened Schutz’ work to the world of communication
studies (2001; 2013). Phenomenologists have typically neglected Schutz’ work on
communication (Knoblauch, 2013). Bakardjieva (2005; 2014) has worked through Schutz to
advance an understanding of social relationships and friendships in the internet age. Zhao (2004;
2015; 2006; 2005; 2007; Zhao & Elesh, 2008) is a major Schutz scholar who has expanded
Schutz’ works and advanced his theories in our modern digital age-related to time, space and
knowledge in social relationships. Informed by the above secondary literature, this chapter also
draws from Schutz’ major works. On Phenomenology and Social Relations, originally published
in 1932 is Schutz’ first major work. It also draws from all four volumes of Collected Papers.
Schutz and Intersubjectivity
All human encounter is communicative and to show how we will start with the
beginning. Schutz began his explanation of our basic human experience grounded in Husserl’s
claim that we in our bodies are the center of all inquiries into consciousness. We cannot remove
the thought from the person who experiences thought (1970a). Schutz explained that “the
personal self rather than the thought has to be treated as the immediate datum” (1970a, p. 57).
This personal self then does not doubt, in our everyday life, our existence nor the existence of the
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surrounding world. Schutz writes that we “accept as unquestionable the world of facts which
surrounds us as existent out there” (p. 58). This is the natural attitude. The world in which we
operate on an everyday basis, the world in which we plod through life without pause to question
or doubt the existence of self and others, is our everyday lifeworld. We may choose to suspend
our belief in these existences, also known as “bracketing,” but in doing so we cease to be flowing
in the usual stream of our consciousness of the natural attitude. All of our relations with other
human beings begin with this starting point of the natural attitude of everyday existence.
We come to a particular attentiveness when we suspend our belief in the foundations of
existence, we also lose our ability to still be within that existence. There is a particular lack of
attentiveness we perform to live with others that Schutz addressed. Schutz (1970a) wrote,
“Attention a la vie, attention to life, is, therefore, the basic regulative principle of our conscious
life” (p. 68). Particularly, Schutz argued that there is a “plane of consciousness of highest
tension originating in an attitude of full attention to life and its requirements” and he called this
“wide-awakeness” (Schutz, 1970a, p. 69). He wrote that “Only the performing and especially the
working self is fully interested in life and, hence, wide-awake” (p. 69). The lack of attention to
the fragility of life and our unquestioning everyday existence is attention to life.
When Schutz argued that our taken-for-grantedness of the existence of others is part of
our everyday existence, this is essential for our understanding of his project. Our world is
naturally intersubjective (1970a). He wrote, “If we retain the natural attitude as men among
other men, the existence of others is no more questionable to us than the existence of an outer
world” (1970a, p. 163). He added, “The world of my daily life is by no means my private world
but is from the outset an intersubjective one, shared with my fellow men, experiences and
interpreted by others; in brief, it is a world common to all of us” (p. 163). Gurwitsch in the
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introduction to Collected Papers III wrote, “We do not, each one of us, experience the life-world
as a private world; on the contrary, we take it for a public world, common to all of us, that is, for
an intersubjective world” (1970a). Natanson wrote in the introduction to Collected Papers I
(Schutz, 1973) that “‘the common-sense world,’ ‘world of daily life,’ ‘every-day world’ are
variant expressions for the intersubjective world experienced by man within what Husserl terms
the ’natural attitude’” (p. xxvii). This is not only the center of our investigation of friendship, but
this is the center for all social action. Natanson wrote that within the natural attitude, all persons
make sense of their worlds, themselves and others (Schutz, 1973). We live in a peopled-world,
and in this peopled-world, even our friendships are often without question. In addition to taking
our world for granted, we also take it for granted that the others we take for granted also take
their worlds for granted. Gurtwitszch called this reciprocity of taken-for-grantedness a
“thorough-going reciprocity” and explained that this was the reason we “can act and work” with
others at all (Schutz, 1970a, p. xiii). This acting and working with others includes
communicative action and work.
Corporeality
Another part of our natural attitude is the actual taken-for-grantedness of the bodies of the
other, and there is a particular relevance here to the inquiry into the ways in which technology
has affected friendship. At the time of Schutz’ work, and later in the extensions of his work with
Luckmann, the media that shaped their phenomenological theories were radically different from
today. Then, the primary way that one encountered another in the routine of everyday life was in
their physical presence. All relationships were bound by space for most of human history.

So

although Schutz often seems to have given primacy to the face-to-face situation, as we will see,
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his emphasis was truly on the communication that occurs between two people rather than their
physical existence.
In 1973, Schutz and Luckmann highlighted the nature of nonverbal expressions in the
communicative process. Nonverbal expressions are culturally dependent and require us to draw
from our learned experience of the meaning of such expressions to interpret meaning. The store
of meaning we keep Schutz called our stock of knowledge. When we are in the presence of
another person, we assign meaning outside the realm of their intentional expression in nonverbal
gestures by interpreting it grounded in our stock of knowledge. This is a reciprocal process. He
wrote, “simultaneous with my lived experience of you, there is your lived experience which
belongs to you and is part of your stream of consciousness” (p. 169), and you have your lived
experience of me. He wrote, “All interpretation of this world is based upon a stock of previous
experiences of it, our own experiences and those handed down to us by our parents and teachers,
which in the form of ‘knowledge at hand’ function as a scheme of reference” (1970b, p. 72).
All of our experience is embedded in a larger historical context which shapes what it means for
us to know.
Our histories and ways of knowing, while shared and developed in relation to others, is
still unique to us. Schutz (1970a; 1970b) used Husserl’s notion of originary presence as a
starting point. Other human beings are both bodies in space and subjective experiencing beings.
They are both things and persons, or in Buber’s terms, Thou’s and Its. While the body of
another person is presented to us in originary presence, their subjective experience is impossible
to apprehend communicating. Understanding things is quite different than understanding
persons. Schutz (1973) noted that in the world of things grounded in Husserl, “the ‘Other’ also
appears as a corporeality, but as a corporeality which I apprehend as a body, and indeed as a
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body of another by a process of appresentive pairing” (p. 125). Schutz though departs from
Husserl and places our apprehension of the other in the mundane. He explained that we come
into understanding others by drawing from our stock of knowledge, which is derived from
interacting with others.
Schutz wrote, “their psychological life is not given to me in originary presence, merely in
co-presence, it is not presented but appresented” (1970a, p. 25). In the paradigmatic
communicative setting, that is, the face-to-face, one’s spatial presence is used as a source for
entering or penetrating into their subjective experience. Until though this is confirmed though,
through speech, we cannot be certain that our interpretations of those specific expressions are
correct. We can never be ultimately certain that our interpretation is correct. The interpretive
process relies on our stock of knowledge, grounded in our language system that has been
learned. Even when we encounter others within their spatial existence, their physical bodily
presence in a face-to-face situation, the body in space is relatively irrelevant—the focus is on
communication. Language, specifically, is the system of making meaning of our entire
lifeworld, not only our own world but the world we share with others and all cultural objects.
Schutz, working from Husserl, wrote:
A book is an outer object, a material thing. I see it as it appears to me, here on my desk,
to my right, etc.; but reading it, I am not directed toward it as an outer object but toward
the meaning of what is written therein: I ‘live in its meaning’ by comprehending it. The
same holds good for a tool, a house, a theater, a temple, a machine. The spiritual
meaning of all these objects is appresentationally apperceived as being founded upon the
actually appearing object which is not apprehended as such but as expressing its meaning.
And if we listen to somebody, we do not experience the meaning of what he says as
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something connected with the words in an external way, We take the words
apprehensively as expressing their meaning, and we live in their meaning by
comprehending what the Other means and the thought he expresses. (1973, p. 314)
Our bodily presence not required for the making of mutual meaning and all meeting is the coproduction of meaning in some way.
Communicative Common Environment
Schutz stated that with “mutual understanding and consent a communicative common
environment is thus established” and he added that within this communicative common
environment, the subjects “reciprocally motivate one another in their mental activities” (p. 315).
Schutz wrote, “It is, moreover, supposed that the mutual appresentational comprehension of
events in the Other’s mind leads immediately to communication” (p. 315). He continues that
“For each partner, the other’s body, his gestures, his gait, and facial expressions, are immediately
observable, not merely as things or events of the outer world but in their physiognomical
significance, that is, as symptoms of the other’s thoughts” (p. 16). In this explanation, Schutz is
drawing the significance of bodily presence. His point about being able to ascertain the
symptoms of thought is important, but it is not the role of the body that deserves primacy here,
but instead, the role of communication.
It is important to pause here to make clear that encounter does not require at all a
recognition of the unique individual with whom we share the communicative event. In our
everyday interactions, we may meet the mailperson, the bus driver, the teacher—and while we
interact with them and are able to understand them and comprehend them, there is no necessity at
all to recognize them as unique beings. Schutz (1976) outlined the specific way in which we
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encounter others in a face-to-face situation. He explained that first, “I must consciously pay
attention to a fellow-man, to a human being confronting me in person” (p. 24). This,
specifically, he called an “awareness”—a “Thou-orientation” (p. 24). He wrote:
the Thou-orientation is the pure mode in which I am aware of another human being as a
person. I am already Thou-oriented from the moment that I recognize an entity which I
directly experience as a fellow man (as a Thou), attributing life and consciousness to him.
(1970a, p. 185)
The face-to-face situation, Schutz explained, takes for granted the Thou-orientation (1976).
Each and every time we communicate, doing so requires a belief in the other as “an entity which
I directly experience as a fellow man” (1970a, p. 185). If we did not believe them to be a fellow
being capable of comprehending us, we would not reach out communicatively for a response in
the first place. This is an encounter. Encounters are moments in which we reach out
communicatively to others. If we revisit Schutz’ discussion on attention, remember that to be in
“an attitude of full attention to life and its requirements” means to be wide-awake (1970a, p. 69)
and that “Only the performing and especially the working self is…wide-awake” (p. 69).
Encounter emerges through the performing and working among others, specifically,
communicative work. It does not require a face-to-face situation. While a face-to-face situation
presupposes this situation, through language I can confirm that the other with whom I encounter
in a mediated setting is human (at least for now, in our age, where no meaningful artificial
intelligence has been known to pass the Turing Test).
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Possibilities for Encounter
Because encounter is communicative, it is not dependent at all on the face-to-face
situation and can occur across mediated settings. Imagining all of the possibilities for an
encounter is a daunting task, if even possible. We have initial encounters in which we come into
contact with the person for the first time, and we have repeated encounters, in which we have
previously met the person and are encountering them again. It is undeniable that the majority of
the relationships we have in today’s world are hybridized. Even spouses text message each other
when apart. By defining encounter as moments in which a shared communicative environment is
possible, we can account for those moments in which mutual understanding is never achieved
nor desired to be achieved. We can also account for all of the various settings in which it is
possible to encounter others in our modern world.
To exemplify this point, I will use Facebook. Facebook is currently the world’s largest
social network with nearly 2.5 billion users. On Facebook, users can interact both with
individuals they already have met face-to-face or with individuals in which they have never met
in person. Facebook has been promoting their groups feature recently, encouraging users to
connect with others who have common interests. In addition to encountering others in groups,
that is, having moments in which a shared communicative environment is possible, Facebook
also makes suggestions to their users to “friend.” In these situations, there is a possible shared
communicative environment. We are “encountering” others. Sometimes we might know the
people who are suggested, and sometimes not, but in each case, a communicative common
environment is possible. They are somehow within our communicative reach, therefore, we
encounter them.
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Some platforms are much more conducive to initiating encounters than others. Phone
calls, for example, are relatively unlikely to be main centers for initial encounters, but they are
not impossible. In fact, when we call to arrange a doctor’s appointment, for example, we are
encountering another via telephone, and sometimes, if the person answering is new or the doctor
is new to us, we are indeed encountering the person on the other line for the first time. Popular
rhetoric is full of stories of relationships that were spurred by accidental text, from young men
being invited to dinner to couples finding marriage with a text sent to the wrong number.
Encounters are essential for all human relationships and can happen in any environment in which
a shared communicative environment is possible.
Schutz (1976) noted that is possible for a Thou-orientation to never move forward to any
other type of relationship. For example, if I am on a bus and outside of the window and I see a
woman and a child walking and I am aware of them, even though I turn to them and recognize
their existence, they have no possibility of reciprocating the attention I now give them. In this
case, it would be a one-sided encounter. However, in the mutual recognition of each other’s
existence, Schutz explained that “a social relation becomes constituted” (p. 24). This, he
considered the ‘pure’ We-relation. Schutz placed a heavy emphasis on the We-relation in
observing the bodily expressions of the Other to confirm “phases of my own consciousness” with
“ ‘corresponding’ phases of your consciousness” (p. 25). He argued that “I ‘participate’ in the
conscious life of another Self only when I am engaged in a concrete We-relation, face to face
with a fellow-man” (p. 26). But, immediately after, he moves towards a discussion of language
and meaning. Schutz explained that “The We-relation, however, consists not only in the
community of time, that is, in the synchronization of two interior streams of duration; it consists
also in the community of space, that is, the bodily and thus exterior presence of fellow-man face
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to face with me” (p. 26). Collected Papers III, he again emphasizes the face-to-face, but he
writes that what ultimately characterizes the We is when “the partners are aware of each other
and sympathetically participate in each other’s lives for however short a time we shall call the
pure We-relationship” (1970a, p. 186). In the Thou-orientation, we can follow particular bodily
movements by the Other and interpret it to gain insight into the psychological life of the Other,
but to do so presupposes a system of meaning—language.
To be ‘present’ to another means to enter into a Thou-orientation in a way that is open to
reciprocation. Again, this is an encounter—the possibility for a shared communicative
environment exists. And none of it, actually, is dependent on one’s actual bodily presence within
sight of another. Schutz writes, “the experience of a fellow-man in a We-relation is, strictly
speaking, also ‘mediate’: I apprehend his conscious life by interpreting his bodily expressions of
subjectively meaningful process” (p. 26). All social relations begin from this general process of
an initial encounter.
In our world today, on an everyday basis we encounter other human persons on a regular
day to day basis. I encounter others from the moment I awake. My family surrounds me. While
I drink my morning coffee, I encounter others as I scan my social media feeds and read breaking
news stories from the night before. As I drive to work, I pass multiple others, driving to their
various destinations, and, too, I also encounter others who walk or bike. When I arrive at work, I
encounter students and colleagues both in person and through my technology. Each person I
encounter could be an opening, a potential friend. But, too, it just may be so that the encounter I
have is with someone I am already close to. No matter how brief my participation in their
existence, my daily life is saturated with encounters, whether mediated or not.
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Repeated encounters inform our stock of knowledge in such a way that we can say that
we might “know” another person. Encounters involve various layers of knowing, but not
necessarily a particularly knowing.
Schutz (1976) wrote:
In the pure We-relation I apprehend only the existence of a fellow-man and the fact that
he is confronting me. For a concrete social relation to become established, however, I
must also know how he is oriented to me. In face-to-face situations I gain knowledge of
this specific aspect of my partner’s conscious life by observing the concrete manifestation
of his subjective experiences in the common stream of the We-relation. (p. 27)
Maines (1989) argued that there has been a “transformation of modal ways of knowing others
based on the social organization of information” (p. 195). He pointed out that there are two ways
of knowing others—categorical and personal knowing, and showed how friendships involve both
types. Maines showed that “In small preindustrial communities, continual copresence without
personal knowing was for all practical purposes impossible” (p. 196). In today’s world, it is
possible to have repeated encounters with another person and yet never “know” the other person.
“Knowing” someone takes us beyond encounter, into the next chapter.
Who We Encounter: Schutz on Our Contemporaries
Like for Ong and Buber, the face to face is the paradigmatic form of all communication.
Natanson in the introduction to Schutz Collected Papers I explained that:
The ‘face to face’ relationship is fundamental for all other structures of social relatedness. In
my face to face encounter with consociates I share a community of space within our reach in
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which I interpret the other's acts, but I share a temporal community as well. Consociates are
involved in an on-going temporal flow, bounded by common spatial limits. (p xxxiii)
Schutz used spatial and temporal terms to make sense of how we form relationships with others.
He wrote:
I, the human being, born into the social world, and living my daily life in it, experience it
as built around my place in it, as open to my interpretation and action, but always
referring to my actual biographically determined situation. Only in reference to me does
a certain kind of my relations with other obtain the specific meaning which I designate
with the world “We,”’ only with reference to “Us,’ whose center I am, do others stand
out as “You,” and in reference to “you,” who refer back to me, third parties stand out as
“They.” (1973, p. 15).
Contemporaries
Schutz discussed three types of individuals that can be applied to the notion of encounter.
There are contemporaries, which are individuals that we share the same historical moment with.
Predecessors are individuals who came before us. Successors are those who will come after us.
Schutz explained, from the outset that we know contemporaries from past recollections. We
apprehend the experience of our contemporaries, in a “They-orientation”, Schutz argues, as
“anonymous processes (1976, p. 225). We may also experience them in a “Thou-orientation,”
he noted, when we apprehend their experience “within their setting in his stream of
consciousness” (p. 224-5). When They-oriented, Schutz argued that we experience the other as
an abstraction. Because of this, he argued that “My knowledge of my contemporaries is,
therefore, inferential and discursive” (p. 225).
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Mere contemporaries, Schutz explained, are “Others who are not face-to-face with me,
but who co-exist with me in time” (p. 37). He wrote:
The gradations of experiential directness outside the face-to-face situation are
characterized by a decrease in the wealth of symptoms by which I apprehend the Other
and by the fact that the perspectives in which I experience the Other are progressively
narrower. We may illustrate this point by considering the stages by which a fellow-man
confronting me becomes a mere contemporary. Now we are still face-to-face, saying
goodbye, shaking hands; now he is walking away…It is impossible to say at which
precise moment the face-to-face situation ended and my partner became a mere
contemporary of whom I have knowledge but no direct experience (1976, p. 37).
Schutz continued:
The gradations of directness can be also illustrated by the series ranging from a
conversation face-to-face, to a conversation by phone, to an exchange of letters, to a
message transmitted by a third party. Both examples show a progressive decrease in the
wealth of symptoms by which I experience my partner and a progressive narrowing of the
perspectives in which my partner appears to me. (1976, p. 37)
Contemporary itself, I believe, comes from Schutz understanding of sharing time
together. He wrote” I know that he is in some Here and Now of his own, and I know that his
Now is contemporaneous with mine, but I do not participate in it, nor do I share his Here” (1976,
p. 38).

Specifically, as we transition from the physical co-presence of being with the Other,

Schutz explained the following:
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Thereby we investigated a border province lying between the domain of directly
experienced social reality and the indefinitely experienced world of contemporaries The
closer we approach the latter, the lower the degree of directness and the higher the degree
of anonymity which characterizes my experience of others. Accordingly, the broader
world of contemporaries itself contains various stratifications: My patterns in former
We-relations who are now mere contemporaries but who are restorable to face-to-face
situations; partners in the former We-relations of my present partner in a We-relation
who are potentially accessible to my direct experience (your friend whom I have not met
yet); contemporaries of whom I have knowledge and whom I am to meet shortly
(Professor X whose books I have read and with whom I have an appointment in the near
future); contemporaries of whose existence I am aware, as reference points for typical
social functions (post office employees involved in the processing of my letters);
collective social realities which are known to me by their function and organization while
their personnel remains anonymous—although I could, under certain circumstances, gain
direct personal experience of the individuals in questions (the House of Lords)’ collective
social realties which are by their very nature anonymous and of which I consequently
cannot gain direct personal experience under any circumstances; objective configurations
of meaning which are instituted in the world of my contemporaries and which are
essential anonymous in character (the Articles of the Constitution the rules of French
grammar); and finally, artifacts in the broadest sense, which testify to some subjective
meaning-context of some unknown person, i.e, the sense which the artifact ‘had’ for its
creator, user, handler, etc. All these stratifications of the large domain of indirectly
experienced social reality are characterized, in a graduate series, by different degrees of
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anonymity and by transitions from relative nearness to direct experience to absolute
detachment from it. (1976, p. 41)
Schutz explained specifically that are “mere” contemporaries are given to us. He wrote:
The Other who is a mere contemporary is not given to me directly as a unique particular
Self. I do not apprehend his Selfhood in a straightforward and prepredicative experience. I
do not even have an immediate experience of the Other’s existence. I can only experience
the Other in acts of inference by which I judge that the Other is such rather than otherwise,
by imputing him certain typical attributes. Whereas I experience the individual Thou directly
in the concrete We-relation, I apprehend the contemporary only mediately, by means of
typifications. (1976, p. 42)
To explain this, he talked about the various ways that we can encounter our contemporaries.
First, he reminded us that we experience others as the same even when we are no longer in a
communicative common environment with them. To show how we experience and understand
this other, Schutz argued:
The act by which I apprehend the former fellow-man as a contemporary is thus a
typification in the sense that I hold invariant my previously gained knowledge, although
my former fellow-man has grown older in the meantime and must have necessarily
gained new experiences. Of these experiences I have either no knowledge or only
knowledge by inference or knowledge gained through fellow-men by indirect sources. (p.
42)
Important for our purposes especially, Schutz argued that “It is abundantly clear that all such
knowledge of contemporaries points back to, and is legitimized by, an originary direct
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experience of a fellow-man” (p. 42). However, he did note that “I can also gain knowledge
about my contemporary social world in other ways than the one just cited” (p. 42-3). Cultural
artifacts are how we do such, he explained. Schutz wrote:
My experiences of things and events in physical reality, of objects manufactures by men, of
tools and artifacts, of cultural objects intuitions and action patters, too, refer to the world of
my contemporaries (or point back to the world of my predecessors, a circumstance we shall
discuss later). (p. 43)
When it comes to exactly how it is that we can encounter those no longer in our presence,
that is they share a historical moment with us but not space, he argued that we apprehend them
sometimes through their tools and artifacts. We then interpret these. Schutz wrote that “Such
interpretations are by their very nature derivative. They consist of inferences based on and
mediated by my experiences of fellow-men, either of particular fellow-men or of fellow-human
beings in general” (p. 43). One of the major differences, Schutz noted throughout his works, was
that in the face-to-face situation we experience a flow of consciousness simultaneously as the
Other experiences their flow, and we can confirm it. Thou-orientations, for Schutz, was a subset
of a general They-orientation. Schutz argued that when we experience contemporaries, they
appear as anonymous. For him, the We-relation could only manifest in the face-to-face. The
We-relation was a double Thou-orientation, and it depended on “the immediacy of a shared vivid
present” (p. 46). Schutz argued that:
Whereas my experience of a fellow-man in the We-relation is continuously modified and
enriched by the experiences shared by us, this is not the case in the They-relation. Each
new experience of contemporaries adds, of course, to my stock of knowledge; and the
ideal types by which I am oriented to others in a They-relation do, indeed, undergo
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modifications as a result of shifts in my situation. But these modifications remain
minimal as long as a given situation and my interests in it--which have determined the
original application of a given typifying scheme, remain constant. (p. 55)
The reason for this, he explained, relates to the following. He wrote:
In the We-relation I can verify my assumption that the way in which I experience my
environment can be co-ordinated with the way in which you experience yours. I am wont
to extend this assumption to my contemporary and to say that if he were in my situation,
his experiences would be roughly identical with mine. This assumption, however, cannot
be verified. The question whether my partner’s interpretation of the world is congruent
with mine cannot be resolved with certainty in a They-relation. (p. 55)
The problem here, is that this is also not necessarily so in the We-relation, as we can never know
this for certain. In order to be closest as we can, it requires confirmation through words and
speech, through voice.
Schutz did note the importance of language in speech in this section of his materials. He wrote
that “In communicating with my partners in social relations I use sign-systems. The more
anonymous my partner, the more ‘objectively’ must I use the signs” (p. 56). He adds, regarding
language that:
The reason for this is quite clear: in the social world into which we are born, language (in the
broadest sense) is admittedly the paramount vehicle of communication; its conceptual
structure and its power of typification make it the outstanding tool for the conveying of
meaning. There is even a strong tendency in contemporary thought to identify meaning with
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its semantic expression and to consider language, speech, symbols, significant gestures, as
the fundamental condition of social intercourse as such. (pp. 160-161)
Related to contemporaries in time and space, Schutz argued that despite all “social distance,”
“contemporaries are in principle able to act on one another” (1970a, p. 119). He continued, “The
world of contemporaries contains, of course, regions which consists of former fellow-men—
whether these may or may not again become fellow-men for me—and potential fellow-men” (p.
119). He then continued, “Furthermore, there is the world of our predecessors which acts upon
us while itself being beyond the reach of our action, and the world of our successors upon which
we can act but which cannot act upon us” (1970a, p. 119).
Consociates
Schutz contrasted contemporaries with consociates. Consociates are those with whom we
share a face-to-face relationship. Schutz noted that “consociates are mutually involved in one p.
16 another’s biography (1973, pp. 16-17). He continued that “they are growing older together;
they live, as we may call it, in a pure We-relationship” (1973, p. 17). Like with contemporaries,
we still draw on our typifications and stock of knowledge to understand the Other. We also
cannot ever be certain of their complete particularity. Schutz wrote:
Summing up, we may say that, except in the pure We-relation of consociates, we can
never grasp the individual uniqueness of our fellow–man in his unique biographical
situation. In the constructs of common-sense thinking the Other appears at best as a
partial self, and he enters even the pure We-relation merely with a part of his personality.
(1973, p. 17).
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Bakardjieva (2005) in explaining consociates, wrote the following regarding Schutz and
Luckmann’s (1973) work that “Mass media, for example, enlarge the number of types of
contemporaries of whose existence I know in general, that is, whose existence I can infer on” (p.
101). She continued on:
However, just as not all those within each other’s immediate reach are consociates (e.g.
complete strangers riding on the same bus) and all those beyond each other’s immediate
reach are contemporaries (e.g. family members temporarily away from home, not all
those online are consociated contemporaries). Keeping in touch with family members by
email and chatting with friends non-anonymous on the IRC are obviously extensions of
the interaction between consociates; likewise, online business transactions and
impersonal correspondence between agents of organizations are an integral part of the
communications between contemporaries. (p. 101)
Zhao (2004) specifically calls for an update to the Schutz differentiation between the
realm of consociates and contemporaries as a result of electronic technologies. He wrote:
The use of electronic communications technologies extends human perceptual reaches
beyond the limits of human naked senses, resulting in the rise of third realm—the realm of
consociated contemporaries, where people interact face-to-device with each other in ciditons
of telecopresence. The emergence of this social domain in cyberspace reconfigures the
structure of the lifeworld by providing individuals with an opportunity to establish werelationships in a new type of shared meaning context. (p. 92)
Zhoa clarified an issue in Schutz work. He wrote:
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In a face to face situation, indiviudals enter a ‘we-relation’ through mutual orienation,
and the recurrence of such a relationship over a porlonged period of time turns complete
strangers into intimate fellows. (p. 93)
He continued:
A social realm is defined in terms of the combination of certain temporal and spatial
characteristics, with the former containing not only the dimensions of immediacy but also
the dimension of duration. It is the recurrence of a given contact situation over a
prolonged period of time that results in a given social realm. This is a point that has not
been made particular clear in Schutz’s writing
Social Relations
Schutz does not mention friendship specifically in many places, but he does mention it in in
some detail. He attacks the notion of friendship from arising out of the mundane by placing it in
the social sphere. Friendship is part of a we-relation, and Schutz explains that we often
understand particular “courses of acts as unities within larger (and more lasting) meaningcontexts (p. 71). He argues that the “unity of” a “friendship” which is “resolved in multifacted
relations situated in social time...which partly consists of living we-relations, partly of relations
among contemporaries” (p. 71). Schutz explains that the very nature of friendships is that they
are fragmentary, and this is an important point when I discuss the tech revolution on the
phenomenology of friendship. He writes, “Strictly speaking, these social relations are not
continuous but rather repeatable” (p. 71). He continues that what we conclude from this analysis
is that “there are social relations that essentially can be constituted only in the immediacy of
living we-relations" (p. 72). But, for friendship, Schutz does recognize the something more. He
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writes, “there are also chosen relations for which a certain intimacy and depth of lived
experience are constitutive, for example, an amorous relations, a friendship)” (p. 72). He does
not continue to explore this in more depth, but he does ask “”Thus, apart from the originary
structure of such social relations, the opportunities for the restorability of a living we-relation
pay an important role” (p. 72). The question is, “How long can one, for instance, be a father, a
husband, a friend at a distance?” (p. 72). He writes, although not explicitly referring to
technology, that “Here, undoubtedly, the social transformation of time is of great importance” (p.
72).
The addition of this section has been to decide as to whether it is possible for a social
relation, and friendship, could develop between two persons who are not in a face-to-face
relationship, and also, to then develop whether or not they can develop between individuals who
are contemporaries, or who are successors/predecessors. Shutz wrote that “The social relation in
the face-to-face situation are characterized by reciprocity of the Thou-orientations of the two
partners” (1976, p. 33). He wrote, “If I am merely observing, my Thou-orientation is, of course,
one-sided” (p. 33). He continued “My observation is conduct oriented to him but his conduct
need not be oriented to me” (p. 33).
The Role of Knowledge in Encounter
Our knowledge is ever-changing, dependent on our interactions and experiences and
social transformations. Schutz writes “it must be emphasized that the stock of knowledge is in a
continual flux” (p. 75), and “It is clear that any supervening experience enlarges and enriches it”
(p. 75). Most of our knowledge is derived socially via language and all of our knowledge serves
as a map from which we navigate our world. There is a difference between knowledge of,
knowledge about and knowing. Knowledge of implies our basic awareness of their possible
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existence. I can know of a person whom I have never met, or I can know about them, yet I may
not know them. When I have knowledge of I have a mediated awareness of their existence. For
example, I might know of my best friend’s friend but not know about them or know them. I
might encounter them on Facebook even as a suggested friend. Knowledge about implies more
certainty about the existence of another person. If someone says “I know about them,” they
might mean “I have basic demographic facts about them” or even “I’ve heard stories and can
predict what they will do, but have never shared a communicative environment with them.”
Again I may encounter this person via a friend suggestion for my best friend’s friend, whom I
know quite a lot about through my best friend.
In each of the above, I have taken a Thou-orientation. Failure to share a communicative
environment will not open a We-relation. Knowledge about assumes knowledge of, but having
knowledge about another does not imply that I can understand them. Ultimately, being able to
say we “know” someone means that we have some degree of accuracy related to our ability to
anticipate their “in-order-to” motives. Schutz (1976) wrote, “Above all, I cannot understand
other people’s acts without knowing the in-order-to or the because motives of such acts” (p. 12)
and for this knowing of our friends, specifically, there is required a sense of history within their
life that is required that transcends encounter.
Even if we have a good ability to anticipate someone’s motives, it does not necessarily
even mean that we are friendly with them. Schutz explained that there are “manifold degrees of
understanding” (p. 12). All of our understanding of others is understood from our “own lived
experience” (p. 175). What complicates this more so, is the idea that human beings
communicate with and without intent. To have a degree of accuracy, and for friendship to
develop, we need to have repeat encounters. That is, encounters need needs to continue through
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time, and occur more than once. We cannot, for example, be friends with someone in the future.
Our knowledge informs our way of navigating our world, the objects within that world, and the
people embedded in the world. Our knowledge also informs our expectations of our friends.
With this in mind, no matter how we encounter others, we draw from our stock of
knowledge to understand who they are and how they are. Whether it might be the bus driver
with whom we exchange a polite, “How are you,” or an online troll, we anticipate generalized
patterns of communicating as well as expectations about who they are. Technology is reshaping
our lifeworld and our relationships within it Bakardjieva (2005). This chapter has attempted to
show that one way that the lifeworld and our relationships are changing is related to the basic
level of human interaction, encounter. Technology is only expanding horizons for encounters,
not destroying them. Popular but faulty rhetoric suggests that individuals are solitary and alone,
slaves to their devices. They ignore possibilities for social relationships as they are stuck in their
devices. The research, however, shows us that whether it be through blogging, chatting, singing,
reading, or any of the other various means of communicating in our media-saturated
environment, our possibilities for encounters are rich.
In the next chapter, we will explore the tension of breaking past encounters with the
recognition of uniqueness in a mediated environment. In this chapter, we discussed some ways
in which we encounter others. Encountering others does not guarantee a friendship, though.
Instead, what must happen is a recognition of the other’s uniqueness, their individuality that is
particularly theirs. The chapter will examine the work of Walter Ong, Corey Anton, and Don
Idhe to explore the intersections of intentionality, voice, and personhood. It examines the role
that technology plays in impeding or facilitating this recognition, and makes connections to
following chapters that discuss discourse.
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Particularity and Personhood: Humanizing the Friend through Voice
“Friendship is born at that moment when one person says to another: ‘What! You too? I thought
I was the only one!’”
--C.S. Lewis
In Collected Papers I, Schutz argued that the “predominant function of the face-to-face
relationship” is to “experience one another in our individual uniqueness” (1973, p. 317). If this
is true, then what does it say for the possibility of being experienced as unique in a mediated
setting? Rawlins indicated the importance of the friend’s ability to perceive “the other’s own
selfhood” (2009, p. 31). When we are in the presence of our friends, we drop these undermost
garments, perceive the other’s own selfhood, and experience the other’s individual uniqueness.
We know that they know us for who we really are, and we know them as they are. The
recognition of the other’s unique consciousness is recognition of their particularity, of their
unique interior, and this is only possible with the manifestation of voice.
This chapter will begin with a conceptualization of the term particularity, placing it in the
communicative realm. It draws from several scholars, although the emphasis in this chapter is
on the work of Walter Ong, who has written extensively on interiority and the development of
communication technology. Particularity is essential for friendship. Friendship requires a
recognition of the particularity of the other. That is, I do not just see the other as human, as
opening, as discussed in the basic encounter chapter, but instead, I recognize this person for all
of their uniqueness and individuality, as a specific person rather than just a person, and that they,
too, do the same for me.
Gronbeck (1991) argued that Ong’s greatest contribution could actually be the work that
he has done to advance our understanding of human consciousness. In Ong’s works of
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consciousness, Gronbeck showed that Ong placed consciousness directly within the
communication. Zlatic (2017), an Ong student and friend, also highlighted Ong’s importance in
connecting the self to communications media. He wrote that Ong’s personalism was derived
from his life and interactions with others. What makes communication more than information
sharing, Zlatic explained, is that in communication, interior is shared with interior. While this
sharing can occur without any sharing of words, he noted the following:
There is a mysterious, sometimes unspoken, component of communication: an
intentionality between inexplicable interiors that precedes language use. This
understanding of communication rejects visualist classifications of objective/subjective,
for to understand a person requires not objectification but encounter, an intersubjectivity
of sharing of interiors that is best represented through sound, the material medium that
unites two interiors. (p. 367)
I have discussed in previous works that Ong’s work is continuously relevant (Petricini,
2017). Multiple scholars continue to draw from Ong, particularly in the media ecology tradition.
In addition to his hundreds of works, he has roughly a dozen books in his corpus. Ong kept
meticulous records and his entire collection is archived at St. Louis University, where he earned
his master’s degree and returned to settle for his career. This chapter will draw from several of
Ong’s most influential works, including Presence of the Word, The Barbarian Within, and some
of his articles. It will also draw from the work of Corey Anton who has done work on interiority
and Ong. Through these two scholars, I will show that particularity is the reciprocal recognition
of the other’s unique consciousness (interiority) through voice. Whereas encounter requires the
possibility of a shared communicate environment, particularity requires it.
Psychological Visibility
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Nathaniel Branden, a psychotherapist, and lover of Ayn Rand argued that one of the
central benefits of friendship is a recognition of my own particularity which he calls
psychological visibility (1993). He explained that in confirmation of our own being through our
interactions we others, we experience a sense of joy. This joy is related not just to the visibility
of our own consciousness but in the confirmation that life is possible. Branden wrote:
When we encounter a person who thinks as we do, who notices what we notice, who
values the things we value, who tend to respond to different situations as we do, not only
do we experience a strong sense of affinity with such a person but also we can experience
our self through our perception of that person. (p. 70)
We find joy in the recognition and confirmation of self when we become visible as unique
beings. We encounter thousands of others, especially in our technological world today, and the
majority of them are not friends nor will ever become friends. But sometimes there are moments
where we notice that the other person in our encounter seems to see the “real” us, and this brings
us joy that we hope to hold on to. This visibility is the reason we seek intimate human
relationships like friendship in the first place, Branden argued.
Sociologist Gerald Suttles (1970) noted the necessity for recognition of uniqueness in
friendship. He lists four essential characteristics of friendship, and three are relevant to this
notion. First, he showed that in friendship, “The other person in the relationship is positively
evaluated as a person qua person rather than for incidental advantages that may accrue as a result
of an encounter with him” (p. 98). Second, he added, “It is appropriate to appreciate the
objective qualities, private property, or social characteristics of a friend only because they
represent the person himself rather than for any universal value attached to them” (p. 99).
Finally, he added that “The person who is a friend must be appreciated as a unique self rather
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than simply a particular instance of a general class. To suggest that a friend could be adequately
or arbitrarily replaced by someone else who meets the same general criteria is usually felt to be
antithetical to ‘true friendship’” (p. 100). Ginsberg, Gottman, and Parker (1986) showed that
even in childhood, we already can recognize that not just anyone will do when it comes to
friendship. We seek particular persons for friends.
To be able to recognize the other in their uniqueness is a form of communicative work.
To move beyond encountering someone and typifying them, objectifying them as one body
among many, we must perform a series of communicative acts. Anton (2002) wrote, “Common
sense, as informed by modern science, tells us that persons and the world are things” (p. 185).
Ong suggested, in The Barbarian Within (1962), that “At the heart of the linguistic situation” and
“at the heart of all human operations of understanding” is a “twinning” (p. 42). This
foundational process of human intellect is a setting apart. When we say “this,” this is “not that.”
Ong wrote that “Man knows compendo et dividend” (p. 42). Ong called our setting apart
binarism, and says it is “endemic in human intellect” (p. 43). In breaking down, we do objectify
and dehumanize others, but, this process also is how we come to know and understand others.
The word for friend and the thought of friend are neither the same sort of thing as the
sensorily present friend. The reason for this is because, as Ong argued, “The paradigmatic sense
of presence is the presence of one conscious human being to another” (2017, p. 24). Ong is very
explicit about the idea that we have an actual sense of presence, as in SENSE, a felt sense of
other persons. He works through an example of a chair, to a plant, to a subhuman, to an animal
to show that we as humans have very different senses of the presence of objects and things
before us, and humans before us. What differentiates this full sense, as in what makes human
presence felt so much different than the presence of all other objects in the universe, is
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reciprocity. Ong asked us to imagine the emptiness of an animal’s eye in understanding the
problem with reciprocity. While to encounter another we need not ever have a reciprocated
awareness, for particularity to occur reciprocity is required.
This mutual recognition is foundational for friendship or any intimate relationship. In
his interview “Why Talk,” conducted by Walter Altree (1973), Ong discussed the nature of our
isolation in thought and the role that communication plays in building intimacy. It is impossible
due to our human limits to ever completely understand another without a doubt. The closest we
can get to another is an estimation, and this is achieved through their communicative acts and our
interpretation. Ong writes:
Even a husband and wife never find out what it feels like to be the other. They try, they
get awfully close. But no matter what, each of us remains isolated in his or her own
consciousness, each one in his own little prison. (2000, p. 374)
The isolation, though, is also our grace. Ong notes that our ability to distinguish I from others, to
set apart, is the foundation of our ability to communicate.
Shared Interiors
Words are at the fundamental level the opening of consciousness to the other for the
sharing of interiority. All thought and all communication are only possible through relationships
with others, and Ong says that all communication “goes on in a context of belief” (year, p. 265).
All communication, no matter in which form, expects a response. When we speak to others, we
are making a statement about our belief in their existence. Ong wrote that each communicative
act we engage in with another is a recognition, a recognition of “a presence to whose word I can,
in turn, attend and in whom I can thus believe through acceptance of what he has to say” (p.
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265). In turning and communicating with another person, we believe them to be alive and
capable of reciprocating. Anton stated that “presence and interiority” are key to understanding
the basic fact of Ong’s phenomenology—that “persons...are interiorities who are present in
voice” (p. 74). We believe in their existence in each communicative action we partake.
Triadic Intentionality
For Anton, intentionality provides a pathway for understanding person and world that
avoids the various problems associated with the objectification of other inherent in language
itself that we see as problematic in other ontologies. Anton proposed an understanding of the
triadic structure of intentionality that is useful here in an understanding of how intentionality
gives rise to voice and interiority. Anton (2002) explained that the three components of
intentionality are: intentios (“intentional activities), intentums (“their correlative intended
objects), and a peculiar proper (“specific intendableness”) (p. 187). Anton clarified that “When
we consider some object, any object at all, our object is not in ‘the object itself,’ but rather in the
object given its ‘intendableness’” (p. 188). He used a pen for an example, and here, I would like
to substitute instead the word friend to show how this triadic structure is important to
understanding the relationship between interiority, particularity, and friendship. On one hand,
there is “an act of seeing, the object begin seen, and the seeableness” of the friend. He also noted
perhaps we instead think through the “touchableness” of the friend. In this case, there is the act
of touching, the friend being touched, and the touchableness of the friend. He told us to “Note
that the thing seen and the thing touched are the same, and yet are manifested differently
according to the differing manners of making contact” (p. 188). This, he argued, shows that
“This intentional relatedness implies that any perceived entity in so far as it is perceived, is an
entity in its perceivedness” (p. 188). A point that Anton made that is essential to the current
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project is that “‘intendableness’ cannot be reductively isolated to deriving either from the world
or from the subject. It is, on the contrary, a dialogic constitution” (p. 188). In the everyday
realm of encounter, the natural attitude, the mundane then, drawing from our earlier point, Anton
would argue that “intentional threads, while pre-reflective, are taut such that the ‘intentio’ is
absent and we mindlessly dwell in the ‘intentum.’” (p. 189). The givenness of our friends is
manifested via voice in a context of belief. We mindlessly dwell in our communication with our
friends, their interiors given to us.
When we hear our friend, for example, rarely if ever are we focused on the hearing itself
and instead “dwell in what is heard” (p. 189). We also do this with speech. We speak without
attending to the fact that we are speaking. And, if we take this further, we can see that we listen
without attending to the fact that a friend is speaking or that we are listening, we instead dwell in
what the words make manifest, that is the interior of the other and especially their uniqueness.
He also points out that we are not singularly experiencing one sense and no others, but instead,
we can imagine that we dwell in the existence of our friend no matter how we encounter them,
that is, what is primarily in focus as another speaks to us. In those moments in which we
confirm our friend as unique, and they confirm us as unique, we hardly pause to utter, “Wow,
you are unique.” Rather, in the process of the revelation of interiors, we recognize something
special about the person--their voice.
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Voice in a Context of Belief
In the previous chapter, when we discussed the different possibilities for an encounter,
within these encounters communication was not a required component. While an encounter is
communicative, it does not rely on the sharing of a communicative environment. Also,
communication does not necessarily lead to particularity. While all reaching out might be
revelatory of an interior, it is not necessarily recognized as this interior. Voice is the revelation
of this particular interior. Friendship requires mutual recognition of each friend’s interior.
Voice is exterior for Ong, and all communication is a break out of our own interior and
an attempt to grasp the other (2002). All communication is in a way a breakthrough into
interior, but dialogue specifically leads to particularity. Ong notes that “this dialogue assures me
also of the uniqueness of your consciousness and of its ultimate inviolability” (p. 270). We will
discuss dialogue and friendship later, and this dwelling in the givenness will be important.
Anton has argued that voice for Ong “is not only the paradigmatic sound in the human world, but
it is also a key phenomenon for understanding persons” (2012, p. 73). Is voice only possible
however through sound?
While Ong (2000) does not exclude the ability for the presence of interiority to be made
clear through strictly sound, he does privilege sound. He wrote that “true interiority is
communicative” (p. 117). However, sound, he argued, conveys more information about physical
and psychological elements. While he noted sound’s ability to convey interiors in space, such as
a cave, he does recognize that hearing is not the only way in which we can explore interiors of
objects in general. He noted that both movement and touch can convey information about
interiors. But again, there is a danger in placing the same weight in human beings as we would
an object like a cup or a cave. Sound is the paradigmatic way voice has been heard for most of
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human history. Dance (1989) writes, regarding sound’s primacy to paradigmatic human
dialogue:
Ong senses that this initial utterance may constitute the primal means of knowing—of
knowing other, of knowing self, of knowing outside, of knowing inside. This
utterance of self may well be the primal noetic which allows the human being to
make known to itself and to others its ‘I.’ (p. 188)
Sound is particularly important in the “revelation of the other” (Dance, 1989, p. 186)—their
interiority, their thoughts, their words. Soukup (2012) wrote, “Sound reveals the interior. The
social structures of all human life presume those interiors” (p. 41). Soukup wrote of the ability
of sound to establish a sense of immediacy and simultaneity, although texting can now be nearly
as simultaneous as spoken conversation if one’s physical skills and technological access allows.
Our senses form our place of being in the world, Ong explained how sound, specifically,
shapes our being. Ong wrote on the topic of simultaneity that, “Because it situates me in the
midst of a world, sound conveys simultaneity” (p. 130). Sound, he suggested, establishes a sense
of the present in presence. When we are in actual physical presence, we share everything going
on at oncedness. In addition to simultaneity, sound is also connected to human thought. Ong
wrote that sound “has proved in all cultures the most immediate sensory coefficient of thought”
(p. 140) and again, this is correlated with our interactions with others. There is a direct
connection between thought and sound. Still, though, this does not mean that voice is only
possible through sound.
Ong asks us when pondering voice, to consider what might happen when the speaker
wears a mask. While for him, the mask is related to Greek tragedy, a similar pontification might
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be “what happens to voice and belief when the other person is behind the screen?” Drawing
from Heidegger, Buber, and Lavelle, Ong showed us that the other’s “sense of self remains
outside my direct awareness, and yet I can feel its aura and know that there is some interiority
with whom I am dealing” (2002, p. 268). In the contact we make with the other, Ong argues that
it is “mediated by exterior phenomena that implements commerce between interiors” (p. 269).
Brook (2002) worked from Ong. She argued that “sight alone” cannot “deal with interiors” and
that “other senses can help to reconstitute the interiority of experience” (p. 70). She continued:
Focusing on the other senses, the way we can and sometimes do use them presents the
interiors in a way it could be argued is closer to them as given. That is, the encounter
with interiors in the world which carries a veracity to the experience and to the interiors
themselves. (p. 74)
Givenness is essential here for this idea and brings us back to the earlier discussion of Anton.
When we add our voice to a communicative event, we are giving our interior. If we imagine an
impersonal conversation, quite scripted, there is no revelation of voice and hence no true sharing
this particular interior. We might stand next to someone in the elevator and comment on the
weather. This is a manifestation of interior, but it reveals nothing really about the self and the
words could belong to anyone. But the revelatory of voice moves us again from an to this. In
our comments on the weather, if we move from a general script to a revelation about our
childhood and a snowstorm we remembered, we then have added our voice. In such a
conversation, it is possible that our revelation may not be noticed, nor may be reciprocated. It
may be recognized, but not reciprocated. But, in revealing our voice, we are giving something
away.
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A Side Note—Buber’s Confirmation and Particularity
There are elements of this discussion that may sound similar to scholars of Buber’s work.
Having been influenced by the work of Walter J. Ong, I cannot ignore that he was influenced
greatly by the work of Buber. While this section specifically does not draw from Buber, one of
the main themes throughout Buber’s works was that of confirmation. Sarah Scott, philosophy
scholar, wrote in the peer-reviewed Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry that for Buber, It
is “In confirmation one meets, chooses and recognizes the other as a subject with the capacity to
actualize one’s own potential. In order for confirmation to be complete one must know that he is
being made present to the other” (n.p.). She drew our attention to the fact that “confirmation is
not the same as acceptance or unconditional affirmation of everything the other says or does”
(n.p.). She continued that “Since we are not born completely focused and differentiated and
must struggle to achieve a unified personality, sometimes we have to help an “other” to actualize
themselves against their own immediate inclination” (n.p.). Scott identifies several terms that
Buber uses to “describe the grasp of the other that is necessary for confirmation” in the I-Thou
relationship including; ‘embrace,’ ‘inclusion,’ ‘imagining the real,’ and ‘synthesizing
apperception’” (n.p.) and this rings true of elements we have seen and will see throughout this
work on friendship.
One hesitancy with using the term and instead choosing the term particularity in this
work is related to the psychologizing of the term for the field of psychotherapy swept up and
adapted as part of the self-actualization hierarchy. Friedman (1988) traces the adaptation and
conversation with the work of Carl Rogers related to confirmation. Friedman wrote that “Buber
is unalterably opposed to that psychologism which wishes to remove the reality of relationship
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into the separate psyches of the participants” (2005, p. 29). Confirmation cannot occur
intrinsically. Instead, it can only manifest between persons. Friedman added:
Being made present, as a person is the heart of what Buber calls confirmation.
Confirmation is interhuman, but it is not simply social or interpersonal. Unless one is
confirmed in one’s uniqueness as the person one can become, one is only seemingly
confirmed. The confirmation of the other must include an actual experiencing of the other
side of the relationship so that one can imagine quite concretely what another is feeling,
thinking, perceiving, and knowing. (p. 29-30).
Technological Implications
Soukup (2004), an Ong student and friend, wrote concerning belief that “Electronic
media include either delay or distance; they require both a belief in the interlocutor and a belief
about the media” (p. 7). Soukup, concerning electronic communication and interiority,
explained, “In creating written words, a writer must also create an audience—not the immediacy
of another interiority who will call forth the writer’s interior, but an artificial, imaged person” (p.
9). He continued, “Here, too, we come to belief that, for the writer create a text as something
separate from the writer’s own interior and separate from any actual person. The possibility of
writing exists in the imaged other, but gives up the possibility of an interactive response” (p. 9).
He further added that “The notion of response to a presence, to a voiced word, disappears and is
attenuated to behavior” (p. 9). Later, again related to electronic media and the notion of voice,
Soukup asked if electronic media invite us or summon us to belief. He explained that “They,
like writing, are artifacts, objects separated from us; unlike writing, they speak with their own
voice, although it is voice deferred. And, like writing, these newer communication forms share
in the faith that arises with the possibility of communication” (p. 10). Because voice is the
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language of interiority, it can invoke these possibilities with any medium. Voice is what
summons a belief in the other. Voice is not the sound of the other but instead the combination of
words that are strung together to reach out from inside the other.
Soukup (2004) explained that “The voice, as Ong notes, implies not only the self and
interiority; it implies a divided self as well, for every speaker simultaneously takes on the role of
listener” (p. 10). Soukup brings to the forefront the notion of rhetoric. He summarized Ong’s
1977 essay “From Mimesis to Irony.” He writes, “Formal oral performances have both a
particular audience situation and a particular rhetoric. This implies that each frame has its own
rhetoric and its own rhetoric situation. The voice in its immediacy summons the hearer to belief”
(p. 11). Continuing on, he wrote, “The voice in its immediacy summons the hearer to belief.
Rhetoric here fosters a shared interiority, a shared understanding of the world” (p. 11).
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added that “The dramatic performance, in contrast, with its characters and masks summons belief
through a rhetoric of imagination. This rhetoric calls forth roles, including the role of belief” (p.
11). Each medium then has a specific rhetorical situation that summons belief. There is a
difference between performative and descriptive acts, Soukup noted. He wrote, “Each frame,
each medium, adds something to the language and thus to the relationships that we humans
enter” (p. 11). He then explained that “If the living voice summons us to belief through its
immediacy, it makes a double claim: Whatever the locutionary status, a word of address
summons us to belief in the other and belief that the other’s locution has the status that it claims”
(p. 11-12). He continued, “Another way to put this is that the locution’s content (meaning)
makes a claim on us to belief in the voice of the speaker” (p. 12). Then, drawing from The
Pragmatics of Human Communication¸ Soukup pointed out that “Every word of address does at
least two things—it expresses a content and describes the relationship between speaker and
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hearer” (p. 12). In addition to belief about the person, Soukup also noted that electronic requires
a belief “about the medium, its fidelity, its reliability, its transparency” (p. 12). When we send a
text message, for example, we believe that our message will be received.
Interior can be revealed through mediated means. Voice is projectable through mediated
means. Reciprocal recognition, too, is possible through mediated settings. Just like walking on
to an elevator, mediated communication can certainly be scripted and reveal nothing. However,
in sending a message out there in which I reveal this interior, I am believing that it can be
received and often, it is received. I might send a message to a friend about a snowstorm, and that
friend, hours later, can certainly respond in a way recognizes my unique interior and our
asynchronous communication can be a reciprocal recognition of the other’s unique interior—we
have entered the space of particularity.
Soukup (2004) explained mediated belief like this: “The frame again interposes an
additional relationship message: not ‘Here is a content,’ but “here is (1) a content at a distance,
(2) a relationship with a person addressing you, and (3) a relationship to the frame that is far
away from you” (p. 12). Ultimately, Soukup concluded at the end that electronic media can
relay belief, but only through “layers of hermeneutic action” (p. 14). He wrote, “The more
unlike the frame of utterance to the immediacy of voice, the more extended the demands for
interpretation” (p. 14). He wrote, “The frames of secondary orality pose challenges that foster a
hermeneutic of suspicion” (p. 14). The idea of the hermeneutic of suspicion and the increased
need for interpretation in our media-saturated world moves us to the next section of this work,
where we will examine the interplay of digitization and dialogue. Zlatic wrote, “new media can
promote personalist encounters in original ways” (p. 31). Related to speech, Zlatic (2004) wrote,
“All speech is a cry, a call from one interior to another” and “All discourse, whether oral,
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written, printed, or digitalized, cannot escape this grounding” (p. 34). All discourse then allows
for the call from one unique interior to the next.
In the last chapter, we noted that technology was advancing in ways that allowed for the
human encounter to radically change. The goal of this chapter was to examine how particularity
emerges from an encounter, and to examine whether or not it could still occur outside of the
face-to-face communicative setting. Particularity emerges in the reciprocal development of
voice, and voice, as we saw here, is the language of interiority. Interiority can be conjured
through all human discourse.
In the next chapter, we will continue the conversation by visiting Ong’s work on
depersonalization and hermeneutics. In addition to Ong, Buber and Schutz will also be utilized
to gain insight in the relationship between talk, text, and technology. Jumping off from the
nature of human thought in this chapter, the next chapter delves deeper into the ways in which
intentionality and interiority guide interpretation.
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Dialogue and Digitization: The Language of Friendship
“Ultimately the bond of all companionship, whether in marriage or in friendship, is
conversation.”
– Oscar Wilde
One of the most pressing issues that Ong explored at the end of his life was the
increasingly difficult problem of hermeneutics in an electronic world. Two years ago, his final
manuscript was posthumously published, Language as Hermeneutic. Of particular concern for
Ong was depersonalization. Farrell, in the introduction to Presence of the Word, explained that
for Ong, depersonalization refers to “situations in which we no longer advert to a person or are
aware that someone is speaking” (p. xix). Farrell added that what Ong meant was that “we do
not advert to the person behind the word, so to speak, the human voice from which such an
utterance might come because the written or printed texts with words seem to detach them from a
person” (p. xix). As mediated communication became standard practice and many of our regular
interactions now occurred through a screen, this continues to be a concern.
Depersonalization is more than just an occurrence related to textual communication.
Buber, in his work on dialogue, recognized that humans naturally flow from I-Thou orientations
to I-It. It is a feature of human communication—one so problematic that Buber dedicated much
of his scholarship to exploring its effects. One way depersonalization manifests with current
technology is related to the reduction of the other as an information-giving tool rather than a
person. Bakardjieva (2005) explained that we “suffer” through a series of reductions which
include “intensity and spontaneity, of reciprocity and tangibility” (p. 65). As we will see later
though, the association of reduction with loss is sometimes wrong. In the previous chapters, we
explored the relevance of the work of Schutz and Ong to inform this project. In this chapter, we
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will begin by reviewing some of the basic tenets of the work of Martin Buber on dialogue.
Buber’s work greatly influenced Walter Ong, particularly Ong’s work on presence. His accounts
of presence, belief, and voice were grounded ultimately in Buber’s conceptualization of dialogue
(Farrell, 2012). While Ong’s admiration for Buber is clear throughout his works, I have
struggled to find a connection between Schutz and Buber. At the time of writing, I have found
only one piece of literature examining common themes and connections between Buber and
Schutz. Grinnell (1983) studied the use of the “Pure we” in Schutz and compared it to Buber’s
“I-Thou.” Grinnell noted, “fundamental to both Schutz and Buber are the notions that
intersubjectivity is tied to the lived presence of the self with other” (p. 185). Martin Buber was
born in 1878 in Vienna. Schutz was born about two decades later in 1899, also in Vienna. Both
were born into Jewish families. Both attended the University of Vienna, although Schutz studied
law and was there about two decades after Buber who studied philosophy. While there is no
explicit connection, Schutz's work on interpretation can inform our understanding of dialogue in
this work.
The central concern for this chapter is not whether dialogue is necessary for friendship. It
is. Nor is it whether dialogue is possible via mediated settings. It is. This chapter instead
shows that while dialogue can occur online, there are several implications associated with the
nature of our interpretations of others that are unique to our electronic age. All communication
is hermeneutic. Dialogue, the language of friendship, is hermeneutic. Technologically-mediated
communication has altered our understanding of others. Zlatic (2017) explained that “All
language use is hermeneutic” and “all writing is digitization” (p. 371) Sara van der Berg, Ong
scholar and co-editor of Language as Hermeneutic, wrote in the introduction that “Ong set forth
several principles basic to his understanding of interpretation: all meaning is negotiated between
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people; all language is hermeneutic; and digital technologies evoke interpretation as a corrective
to the apparent totalizing of information that the dichotomous structure of digitization conveys”
(2017, p. 2). To address and explore the implication of these issues on friendship in our age,
this chapter begins by drawing from Buber and Ong to overview the basics of dialogue. It then
transitions to Schutz to explore how our interpretation of others and the surrounding world is
communicative. After, Ong’s thoughts on textual communication are overviewed to respond to
several current themes that need to be re-examined in today’s world. It concludes by making
connections to technologies today and friendship.
Dialogue
When we think of the term dialogue, we are likely to imagine a conversation between two
people. Perhaps we might imagine the dialogue in a movie or in a fiction text where the narrator
breaks and the characters then talk. Dialogue though is more than words. Friedman (1965a) a
Buber scholar, wrote that “genuine dialogue can take place in silence, whereas much
conversation is really monologue” (p. xvii). For Buber, human dialogue is grounded in “the
sign” (1965a, p. 4). Specifically, he argued that “the sign” meant “sound and gesture” (p. 4). He
added, though, that written language actually can be considered dialogue in “special
circumstances” (p. 4). The example of a special circumstance that he used was two friends
sitting in a meeting passing notes back and forth. In this setting, the friends are engaged in
dialogue. He added that the absence of sound and gesture (sign) does not eliminate the
possibility of dialogue, however, it would be impossible for an outsider to understand the nature
of the dialogue of silence without being an active participant. Farrell, in the introduction to the
2000 edition of Ong’s Presence of the Word, also wrote of the special relationship of silence to
dialogue. He wrote, “But person-to-person communing, the communing of spirits, is exemplified
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paradigmatically in live conversation, and perhaps in moments of silence together, too” (p.
xix). While dialogue is more than just words, they are an important element of dialogue.
Silence has word-dependent meaning.
Words and language play central roles in authentic dialogue and lead to the creation of a
realm of mutual meaning between two persons. Buber noted that there are three specific modes
of our being in the world related to our utterances. He called them “present continuance,
potential possession, and actual occurrence” (1965b, p. 110). Potential possession, he explained,
is “the totality of what has ever been uttered in a certain realm of language” (p. 110). Actual
occurrence is “its spokenness” and he explained that what sets it apart from the other two is that
it presupposes “a historical acquisition” (p. 110). For Buber, present continuance is the “totality
of that which can be spoken in a particular realm of language in a particular segment of time,
regarded from the point of view of the person who is able to say what is to be said” (p. 110). The
importance of present continuance here Buber argued is that it is the foundation for both
“genuine author” and “genuine dialogue’ (p. 110). Genuine dialogue lacks scripting. Scripting
is a limitation of the words and utterances that can and should be said in a particular place at a
particular time. Scripted dialogue finds its existence outside the between of the two participants
as such, it has no place in the spontaneity and generative space of genuine dialogue.
The ‘between’ two persons is an important element of dialogue. Both Buber and Ong
recognize the social nature of thought and its place in language. Thinking is speaking to oneself.
From their points of view, thought is only possible because of language. While thought can be
spontaneous, and it may be generative in the sense of a new idea, it lacks its generation in the
shared space that emerges between two persons in dialogue. Ong argued, “The origins of thought
and language in the individual’s history make evident the radically social nature of thought
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itself” (2000, p. 140). He added, “As we know it, thought appears only in a linguistic setting” (p.
145). He added, “There is a limitless variety of nonverbal activity connected to thinking, but
when our thought is fully developed, it manifests itself as verbalized, although the thought may
be interior and the word not thinking” (p. 145). For Ong, to be generative thought still has to be
verbalized so that it can become part of our ongoing language. To be able to alter language
means to be brought into being between persons, which again highlights the generative nature of
language.
Buber called the “between” “the oscillating sphere between the persons” (1965b, p. 112).
Buber showed that the between is a dynamic space that emerges between two people who come
together in genuine dialogue. It comes into being with communicative work and can disappear.
It is not permanent between two persons. It requires a turning of being towards the other in
complete truthfulness. The between is a generative space for both meaning and being. This is
how dialogue becomes the language of friendship. As we discussed in the previous chapter, the
reciprocal recognition of being, particularity, is an important element of friendship. This
emerges through dialogue in the between. To show exactly how in the space of the between
through genuine dialogue, friends are mutually received in their givenness and confirmed as their
unique selves, Buber’ writes the following in Knowledge of Man (1965b):
Relation is fulfilled in a full making present when I think of the other not merely as this
very one, but experience, in the particular approximation of the given moment, the
experience belonging to him this very one. Here and now for the first time does the other
become a self for me, and the making independent of his being which was carried out in
the first moment of distancing is shown in a new highly pregnant sense as a
presupposition-a presupposition of this becoming a self for me, which is, however, to be
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understood not in psychological but in a strictly ontological sense, and should therefore
rather be called ‘becoming a self with me.’ But it is ontologically complete only when
the other knows that he is made present by me in his self and when this knowledge
induces the process of his inmost self-becoming. (p. 71)
But also in this space, the meaning of the relationship itself as friendship is co-created and given
meaning. In addition to the creation of Thou, the meaning of friendship itself is co-created in the
dialogic space of the between. Wright (1978) wrote that because friendship lacks formal
constraints and definitions, it is solely dependent on interpretation.
In his 2009 work, The Compass of Friendship, Rawlins set the stage for dialogue as
necessary for human friendship. He wrote that “Time together, straightforward talk, shared
stories, and mutual respect produce the ‘co-knowledge’ of creating friendships” (p. 1) and that
friendships are a space for the co-creation of “deep understandings allowing for shared moral
visions and rights unique to their friendship” (p. 1-2). Dialogue moves friends to a space in
which a co-creation of a meaningful existence is possible. Regarding interpretation and
hermeneutics, Rawlins (2009) wrote, “Our perceptual process of noting similarities and
differences goes on constantly, even as we act and communicate in ways that change their
significance or create new alignments among them” (p. 17). Like in the previous chapters, we
come to know others by setting them apart and coming together—distancing and drawing near.
Interpretation
In the dialogue of friendship, the interpretive process is reciprocal and ever-changing.
Cocking and Kennett (1998) wrote, “It is not that I must reveal myself to, or see myself in, the
other, to any great extent, but that, in friendship, I am distinctively receptive both to the other’s
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interests and to their way of seeing me” (p. 505). Because of the receptivity and reciprocity,
beyond the meaning-making of the friendship itself and the visibility of the unique self, Cocking
and Kennett argued that we then “develop in a way that is particular to the relationship” (p. 505).
They added, “the self my friend sees is, at least in part, a product of the friendship” (p. 505).
For Cocking and Kennett (1998), this interpretative process is key for the flourishing of the
friendship. Helm (2010) slightly disagreed with Cocking and Kennett. He did believe that they
were correct in the important role that friendship plays in our lives, but that they were wrong
when they attributed “our receptivity to direction and interpretation” as dispositional and
internal. Instead, he argued that we need a normative perspective. This is important, because
while the meaning of friendship is created in the ‘between,’ there are certain normative
constraints imposed from the outside that direct friendship that we discussed in our first chapter.
These normative constraints are part of our stock of knowledge that informs how we
interpret others and our relationships. Schutz drew from Husserl but also diverged from him,
dismissing transcendental intersubjectivity and instead placed intersubjectivity in the mundane.
In Collected Papers I (1973), Schutz thoroughly addressed analogic apperception. Husserl (and
multiple other phenomenologists, including Ong) have argued that human thought is binary.
Schutz wrote, “Husserl, in the later period of his life, studied the general phenomenon of paring
or coupling which is, according to him, a general feature of our consciousness” (p. 294). At a
very basic level, if we are “copresent” with a table, we see only one part of the table but know it
as “table.” Here, Schutz wrote, that “this perception of the visible front side of the object
involves an apperception by analogy of the unseen backside, an apperception which, to be sure,
is more or less empty anticipation of what we might perceive if we turned the object around or if
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we walked around the object” (p. 295). We fill in the missing pieces in our perception to create
a whole.
We have particular expectations about the un-sensed portion of the object based on our
stock of knowledge, and our expectations (anticipations) may not be entirely correct. Schutz
explained that:
we may say that the frontside, which is apperceived in immediacy or given to us in
presentation, appresents the unseen backside in an analogical way, which, however, does
not mean by way of an inference by analogy. The appresenting term, that which is
present in immediate apperception is coupled or paired with the appresented pair. (1973,
p. 295).
We discussed this twinning in chapter three, also, related to the uniqueness of friendship. Being
in the world, we piece together discrete experiences to create a flowing stream of continuity in
perception.
A Side Note—Husserl’s Contribution
To perceive means filling in the gaps. When we perceive a chair, we know it as a chair,
although we might only see one dimension of the chair. When we perceive a friend, we fill in
the gaps but we fill them in in a much more complex way. In any case, the entire perception
draws from retentions and protentions—we recollect and anticipate the future of the intentional
object in a single perception. The protention is the biggest interest here. If I am with a person, I
assume they are real without question in the everyday natural attitude. I draw from all of my
prior experiences both with this person that have contributed to my stock of knowledge as well
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as my prior experiences with others, and from non-interactions but recipes that have been
socially passed to me. When it comes to a chair, or a desk, or a tree, what comes to mind is the
essential characteristics which make the object what it is, above all other objects. This is the
eidectic reduction.
Schutz draws from Husserl specifically in his framing of intersubjectivity and its
relationship to temporality. In On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time
(1964), Husserl attempted to uncover the flow of duration in experience when the content of our
experience is a series of nows. Time, he argues, consists of a now, a retention, and protention.
Events that are “just now” become just past. They are no longer a “present melody” Husserl
explained, but accumulate in memory. All perception is not lost, but instead becomes retained in
consciousness. If I experience cold, I retain that feel of the cold. Merleu -Ponty in
Phenomenology of Perception (2002) wrote:
Husserl uses the terms protentions and retentions for the intentionalities which anchor me
to an environment. They do not run from a central I, but from my perceptual field itself,
so to speak, which draws along in its wake its own horizon of retentions, and bites into
the future with its protentions. I do not pass through a series of instances of now, the
images of which I preserve and which, placed end to end, make a line. With the arrival of
every moment, its predecessor undergoes a change: I still have it in hand and it is still
there, but already it is sinking away below the level of presents; in order to retain it, I
need to reach through a thin layer of time. It is still the preceding moment, and I have the
power to rejoin it as it was just now; I am not cut off from it, but still it would not belong
to the past unless something had altered, unless it were beginning to outline itself against,
or project itself upon, my present, whereas a moment ago it was my present. When a third
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moment arrives, the second undergoes a new modification; from being a retention it
becomes the retention of a retention, and the layer of time between it and me thickens. (p.
485)
All of our experience in the flow of duration is made up of just now, just past, and
immediately next. In the now, we anticipate what may happen next. It is not a slow, paused,
intentional anticipation but an automatic feature of our experience. In doing so, the next instant
projections are our protentions. Our perception is experienced as duration, however, should we
direct our intentional powers toward duration the content of our consciousness now shifts in the
experience. Schutz (1970a) adapted Husserl’s project on temporality to explore human action,
which for Schutz is communicative action. He wrote that:
A special problem as to the anticipations of future events originates, however, in the
sphere of human action. For the purpose of this paper the term ‘action’ shall designate
human conduct as an ongoing process that is devised by the actor in advance, that is,
based on a preconceived project. (p. 289)
Schutz argues that “All projecting consist in an anticipation of future conduct by way of
phantasying” (p. 289). Projection, for Schutz, is more than just phantasying. There is the act of
imagination, but there is also “motivated phntasying,” he argued. He added “motivated by the
anticipated supervening intention of the carrying out the project” (p. 289). For Schutz, there is a
limiting factor on the imagined, the motivated, and the real. He wrote,
The practicability of carrying out the projected action within the imposed fram of reality
of the Lebensweltt is an essential characteristic of the project. This refers, however, to
our stock of knowledge at hand at the time of projecting. Performability of the projected
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actions means that according to my present knowledge at hand the projected action, at
least as to its type, would have been feasible if the action had occurred in the past. (p.
289)
He added in another text:
Any experience refers likewise to the future. It carries along protentions of occurrences
expected to follow immediately—they are so called by Husserl as a counterpart to
retentions---and anticipations of temporally more distant events with which the present
experiences is expected to be related. In commonsense thinking these anticipations and
expectations follow basically the typical structures that have held good so far for our past
experiences and are incorporated in our stock of knowledge at hand” (1970b, p. 137)
Analogic Apperception
We also do the same in our experiences with others. Schutz (1996) explained that our
experience of others is incomplete. He wrote, “I have experienced only some discrete stretches
of the enduring life of the Other” (p. 201). He added, “I know his past--up to the present
moment—only intermittently and it is not likely that my encounters with him coincided with
what were his truly ‘relevant moments,’ moments he considered and continues to consider to be
of great relevance for him” (p. 201). We are incapable of truly ever having complete access to
the Other’s experience. Schutz explained that “this is so because I lack the knowledge both of
the relevant factors of his past life and of the intrinsically personal effects they had on him and
co-determine his present feelings and decisions” (p. 201). Ultimately, at this very basic level of
meeting, we can say that “The total present of the Other, including memories of his that are codetermining influences on his present conduct, is not accessible to me” (p. 201). Despite this
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accessibility, we make particular inferences about that inaccessibility of others, drawing from our
stock of knowledge. Particularly with our friends, Briggle (2008) pointed out that the
accumulation of knowledge we build about our friends allows us to make decisions in their best
interest, even in their absence.
Every day, we encounter various objects. Schutz wrote that “Among those objects which
we experience in the vivid present are other people’s behavior and thoughts” (1970b, p. 166). As
we listen to another person speaking, Schutz argued, “we participate in the immediate present of
the other’s thought” (p. 166). Schutz showed us that we are unable to grasp our stream of
thought in the vivid present. Instead, we can only reflect. Should one, however, stop to think
about the grasping of that stream of thought, I no longer experience it but instead now reflect.
Schutz (1976) wrote, “My experience of the fellow-man is direct as long as I am
straightforwardly engaged in the We-relation, that is, as long as I participate in the common
stream of our experiences. If I think and reflect on our experience, this directness is broken” (p.
26). Essentially, our partner becomes an object—the object of thought. As discussed earlier,
objectification and depersonalization are issues that stem from the nature of human thought and
language, as we continuously draw from our stock of knowledge and apply information,
sometimes incorrectly, to guide our interactions.
Maines showed that friendships are both personal and categorical, and as such, a
relational label emerges (not categorical). We draw on our typifications to structure the
relationship. To further emphasize how this is important to friendship and social relationships in
general, Schutz (1976) wrote:
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In the pure We-relation, I apprehend only the existence of a fellow-man and the fact that
he is confronting me. For a concrete social relation to become established, however, I
must also know how he is oriented to me. In face-to-face situations I gain knowledge of
this specific aspect of my partner’s conscious life by observing the concrete manifestation
of his subjective experiences in the common stream of the We-relation. (p. 27)
Continuing from Schutz in Collected Papers I, he wrote “that the We-relation as such transcends
the existence of either consociate within the paramount reality” and he continued that it “can be
appresented only by symbolization” (p. 353). He noted that “My friend is to me and I am to him
an element of the reality of everyday life” (p. 353). He added, “But our friendship surpasses our
individual situation within the finite province of meaning of the paramount reality” (p. 353). For
Schutz, the parties to the situation are those which define the particulars of that situation. He
adds that “A joint interest makes them partners, and the idea of partnership is perhaps the most
general term for appresented We-relation” (p. 354). All types of human social relationships rely
on appresentation to various degrees, even friendship.
Schutz advanced the idea that all of our encounters are filtered through our scheme of
interpretation which is our stock of knowledge. Not only do all encounters become interpreted
that way, but as we are with our friend, we add to our stock of knowledge about that specific
person and the relationship itself, which then becomes a reference point from which we
understand the other person. Through repeat encounters, a social relationship emerges and our
ability to interpret the other becomes more accurate.
Related to our apprehensions of other persons whom we are no longer in corporeal copresence with, Schutz argued that we do so by “means of a fixed concept, or type, derived
ultimately from direct experience but now held invariant” (1970a, p. 223). If, though, we learn
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of someone through another person, that is, mediated by a second person, Schutz explained that
“I have no concrete vivid picture of my own with which to start: I must depend on what my
friend tells me” and “I have to depend on my friend’s assumption, not my own, that the
contemporary he is describing has not changed” (p. 223). When we are oriented to the other, or
aware of their presence, Schutz said that this “serves to call attention to the peculiar way in
which I apprehend the conscious experiences of my contemporaries” (1970b, p. 225). He argued
that “I apprehend them as anonymous processes’ (p. 225). He called this a “They-orientation”
and contrasted it to a “Thou-orientation.” He wrote, “When I am Thou-oriented, I apprehend the
other person’s experiences within their setting in his stream of consciousness” (p. 225). He
wrote, that our awareness in the They-orientation is an abstraction and “My knowledge of my
contemporaries is, therefore, inferential and discursive” (p. 225). Because all language is
hermeneutic and because of the nature of human consciousness, all knowledge of all others is
inferential and discursive.
In The Social Construction of Reality (1996), drawing heavily from Schutz, Berger and
Luckmann advanced the idea that our stock of knowledge at hand is the ground of all
interpretation for all of our experience. However, even in our face-to-face situations, they
acknowledged three central problems. They wrote, “the knowledge of the man who acts and
thinks within the world of his daily life is not homogeneous; it is (1) incoherent, (2) only
partially clear, and (3) not at all free from contradictions” (p. 75). All interactions are
interpretive, all communication is hermeneutic. Ong explained that there is a reciprocity in
discourse, a reciprocity that creates as it is created. He wrote, “Thus reciprocal discourse
commonly interprets itself bilaterally (or multilaterally if more than two are engaged in it) as it
proceeds. It negotiates meaning out of meaning” (p. 42). He continued that “Dialogue…is
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hermeneutic in hermeneutics’ natural habitat” (p. 42). Then, “Oral conversation advertises the
intersubjectivity of all human thought and its tie-in with the intersubjectivity of expression” (p.
42). Ong wrote the following passage to clarify how, exactly, all language requires
interpretation:
There is no end to interpretation. In its quite ordinary and simple sense, to interpret
means to bring out what is concealed in a given manifestation, that is, in a given
phenomenon or state of affairs providing information. We can interpret not only
verbalized expression, but anything that provides information: a sense, a roll of thunder,
a gesture, a personal attitude shown in various ways, an utterance. (2017, p.13)
While all communication conceals, there is a special concern when it comes to mediated
communication.
Hermeneutic Presence
Don Idhe in Technology and the Lifeworld delineated the various relationships humans
have with and through technology. Idhe recognized the argument that pervades modern
scholarship that “technologies are thought to take us away from ordinary and face-to-face
experience and distance us from others, nature or even objects” (Idhe, 2010, p. 3). Idhe, instead,
argued from the position that “contemporary technologies actually embody or re-embody our
fleshly experience in new ways, in interactive ways” (p. iii), and he worked to uncover “the new
ways in which contemporary experience is transformed through new or re-embodiments” (p. iii).
Working through Idhe and drawing from Clark’s (2008) claim that writing is extended thought, I
have argued elsewhere (Petricini, 2019) that our encounters of others online are hermeneutic
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encounters. We now are in a world where we can solely encounter others via mediated settings.
This means that we, too, also can interpret them strictly through mediation.
Bakardjieva (2005), too, made the connection that our communication with others is
hermeneutic. She wrote, “The response of the Other comes to me through a hermeneutic
relation: I–(technology– social world)” (p. 64-65). In a hermeneutic relation, we “read” others.
But this reading requires several extra layers of interpretive ability, including some beyond our
control (such as access to the internet).
I have written earlier that “All human communicative exchange is between persons,
human persons, their bodies, and although mediated in various forms, it is still between bodies”
(Petricini, 2019). When we communicate with others today, most of our communication is
hybridized. We interact with our closest partners both in-person and via screens. Drawing from
Idhe’s phenomenology, we perceive the screen and through the screen. Whether through text,
video, or audio, we encounter others in a filtered way. The more we remove the other from the
totality of our senses, the more we rely on our interpretive abilities to fill in our understanding of
them and the less we rely on information communicated by them.
Reduced Cues and Effects
Up until now, the purpose has been to show the role of interpretation in dialogue to pave
the way for the following implications. Mediated communication has changed elements related
to dialogue. The conclusion that it has changed it for the worse is not supported by the research.
Mediated dialogue is possible and requires additional levels of communicative work for success.
There is no doubt that mediated communication reduces the available cues that aid in interpreting
meaning when we engage in communication with other persons face to face. Often, if we are
emailing someone or text messaging them, we have no opportunity to see their bodily gestures or
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facial expressions that may indicate that the words they are saying may not reflect how they feel.
We are unable to reach out and hug them or touch them at all. The sensory cues that make up the
full experience of presence are absent.
It is important to consider though the hybridized nature of today’s relationships. It is
nothing out of the ordinary for one to send an email to a colleague that is in the office next to
them. I often turn to email out of respect to her particularity. Email creates a reminder that
makes life easier than pop into her office, and it allows her to address my communication on her
time, rather than intruding. When my son was younger and was sleeping, often I would text my
husband in the next room rather than risk a minimal whisper that would wake my son. Rarely do
we communicate with someone strictly via mediated settings, even our friends. Technology has
seemingly been transformed in response to these reduced cues. When I travel, I can send home
videos of my time away. I can take pictures and receive pictures from home while I’m gone, and
I can even call and video chat with my family at bedtime and read a story to my son.
Failing to be attentive to the hybridized nature of most relationships has created a
scholarship form of tunnel vision that is one problem. Additionally, even if cues are absent,
absence can be beneficial in various aspects of our lives and is not always indicative of loss.
Bakardjieva wrote, “both my means of self-expression and the codes in which the social is
represented to me have to be adapted to the structure of the mediating technology (and the social
institutions and practices growing upon it)” (p. 65). She cautioned us that this can be a source of
alienation. Ong agreed that communication technologies have created alienation. In many
works and lectures, he showed that reading increasingly became an interiorizing and solitary
activity. While they do promote alienation and objectivity, they also have promoted
introspection and intimacy. In an interview with Wayne Altree, Ong says, “Words are
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interiorizing. They relate things to my consciousness, but they also enable me to relate my
consciousness to itself” (2002, p. 385). Interiorization, specifically, for Ong in this interview is
about the fact that “Man can say ‘I’ He can come back and take possession of himself, get hold
of his own consciousness” (2002, p. 385). Briggle’s (2008) work also supports the idea that the
absence created can be quite positive. He wrote, “the reader of the written words will interpret
them in light of his experiences” and he continued “Through this interpretive process, meanings
emerge and indeed the very indicator itself is partly constituted by this work at the receiving
end” (p. 77). He continued, “Through dialogue, the written words will take on new, emergent
meanings that suppose initial intentions on the writer’s part as they are interpreted by the reader”
(p. 77). He even argued that “because the act of writing plunges the friends toward great depths
of introspections, these interpretive processes can take place at a more profound level” (p. 77).
Walther and Parks (2002) have shown also that there are particular cues filtered out of
mediated communication, but there are also elements of mediated communication that are not
present in the face-to-face. Citing multiple studies, the pair identified several benefits of
mediated interpersonal communication. They wrote that studies reported improved mental
wellbeing, access to superior expertise, support, and relationships grounded in similarity (versus
solely proximity like in the past). Zhao explored Schutz and other relevant literature to show
that mediated exchanges allow people to “express themselves more openly, engaging in intimate
exchanges of feelings and thought with one another free from the concerns that constrain human
interactions in geospace” (p. 101). In addition to the above, there are other benefits to mediated
communication.

81

Introspection and Interiority
Zhao (2005) also noted the level of introspection necessary to communicate online. He
wrote, “Telling telecopresent others who we are therefore requires a level of introspection and
reflectively that is not normally exercised in the realm of face-to-face interaction” (p. 397). Zhao
explained that when we are within the actual physical presence of another person, we do not
need to describe ourselves. He wrote, “they can see for themselves” and “they will come to
know us over time” (p. 397). When it comes to mediated communication though, particularly
text-based, the cues are so filtered that it is necessary to give self-descriptions. Zhao wrote, “in
text-based online communications we are nothing until we type at the keyboard and others do not
know us unless we tell them something” (p. 397). In addition to increased self-awareness
through text-based communication, Briggle also noted another important element—
deliberateness. He wrote, “Writing occurs at a slower pace than speaking, which fosters the
attentiveness and discipline to discover deeper truths about one’s nature” (p. 77). He added
that “It also affords greater opportunities to formulate precise langue to describe one’s character
to articulate one’s reactions to the words of a friend” (p. 77). He continued “This deliberateness
can thus act as an anchor to submerge the friendship to great depths” (p. 77). He did note that
different types of media encourage different types of levels regarding this, e.g. email versus text.
Particularly, related to the cues-filtered out approaches that argue that our friendship
possibilities are limited via virtual environments due to the loss of cues, there is no guarantee
that the richer cues in the face-to-face context enrich relationships. Briggle wrote, “In offline
contexts, we may encounter richer cues, but we may also often be constrained from working with
them to do the important interpretive effort for the of building close friendships” (p. 75). He
showed that “mutual acts of reading and writing” actually helped cultivate friendships (p. 76).
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Finally, one more instance in which absence can allow for deeper understanding is related
to the judgments and stereotypes that prevent dialogue related to one’s appearance in face to face
settings that can disappear via mediated settings. Walther (1996) said:
Although interpersonal impressions do accrue in CMC, the social information on which
they are based in conveyed primarily through language. And verbal behavior is
commonly assumed to be more subject to our editing and control than are nonverbal
behaviors. Thus first impressions are highly manageable in CMC, and such social
valuations as one is able to garner are not impeded by messy hair, lack of makeup, or
normal imperfections, much less more pronounced physical distractors or disabilities. (p.
20)
Mediated communication does distance the individual creating meaning from the words which
are used to convey that meaning. It fragments and digitizes communication and removes
speakers from dialogue. When this happens, there is an objectification of the self. We see in our
mediated world a great amount of concern with how one’s words appear, or one’s image appears
via words. Drawing from Buber, Friedman wrote that “The essential problematic of the sphere
of the between, writes Buber, is the duality of being and seeming. The man dominated by being
gives himself to the other spontaneously without thinking about the image of himself awakened I
the beholder” (p. 27). He then explained, “The ‘seeming man’, in contrast, is primarily
concerned with what the other thinks of him, and produces a look calculated to make himself
appear ‘spontaneous’, ‘sincere’, or whatever he thinks will win the other’s approval. This
‘seeming’ destroys the authentic of the life between man and man and thus the authenticity of
human existence in general” (pp. 27-28). But, important to note here is that Buber wrote this
long before mediated communication, in the electronic setting existed, and this distancing is
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endemic to all human communication in general. In this above work, Buber argued that all
human relation requires a distancing.
Phenomenological Distance and Depersonalization through Text
Ong wrote, “A text certainly does separate an utterance from its author, who, once he or
she has written down the text, may as well be dead” (p. 29). In this context “A text,” is a broader
work than the average Tweet or phone message. That being said, when one imagines small
fragments of type from individual “authors,” they tend to consider them “utterances.” They are,
without a doubt, not spoken. They could be rehearsed, or perhaps not. These short snippets of
words, though, vary depending on the immediacy of response. Take a ten-word sentence typed
out for a Tweet, versus a ten-word sentence typed into a text message. Here, due to the setting,
both are text and both may say the same thing, but the anticipated response where we imagine
others is quite different. It seems that the degree to which various media feel separate relates to
anonymity and intimacy. Ong addressed this. He wrote, “writing creates anonymous discourse,
as has often been pointed out” (p. 45). He continued, “But removing an utterance from its author
is not removing it from discourse” (p. 45). He explicitly then stated that “No utterance can exist
outside discourse, outside a transactional setting” (p. 45). He further clarified “Putting an
utterance into script, then, can only interrupt discourse, string it out indefinitely in time and
space” (p. 45). He continued later that “Text, however, functions fully as a text (and thus in
actuality raises consciousness) only when it reenters discourse” (p. 46). He added, “Text can be
made to reenter discourse, to function as utterance only by something nontextual, that is, by a
code in a living person’s mind for converting the visual into the auditory, the code that we learn
in order to read” (p. 30). All language is hermeneutic and requires interpretation.
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In Language as Hermeneutic, Ong actually tied language learning and interpretation to
intersubjectivity itself. He called intersubjectivity “mysterious” and argued that it “marks human
consciousness” (p. 88), and he argued that it what underlies all language. He wrote, “In learning
to speak a language, the child has to learn to interpret intersubjectively” (p. 88). He further
added that “For a sound to function as a word, the speaker has to intend that the sound he or she
makes so functions—that is, that the sound is not just a sound but has some specially intended
purpose of its own” (p. 88). Furthermore, “the speaker has to know that the hearer knows that he
or she so intends” (p. 88). He continued, “And all this network has to be set up initially without
being explained in words, for it lies beneath the use of words as words” (p. 88). Instead, he
noted, “It lies in our intersubjectivity, in our being able to be aware and, in a way, to participate
in and interpret the subjective consciousness of other human beings” (p. 88). He argued,
“Hermeneutic or interpretive activity, like intentionality, precedes as well as accompanies
naming as such” (p. 88). To clarify this point, Ong explained that “from the start, language
learning is not essentially an exercise in affixing names and structuring them in relation to one
another but is a complex hermeneutic or interpretive process...involving intersubjectivity” (p.
88). Whether inserting text into an ongoing discourse or engaging in face to face conversation,
all language is hermeneutic. Hermeneutics is concerned with showing us what is concealed.
Ong wrote, “Interpretation or hermeneutics makes up for such missing elements, the absences
with which all texts present us” (p. 39). All text creates an absence of meaning outside the words
themselves and the meaning the interpreter ascribes to those words.
All language requires interpretation, however, the more removed from the paradigmatic
setting, the more the individual interpreter must draw from his or her conjectures to interpret the
other. As communication technology has evolved, we have been more and more able to uncover
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more cues about others in their absence. Soukup wrote that “Handwritten texts more urgently
than face-to-face communication required interpretation because here people first experienced
the absence of the author, the absence of the kind of dialogue to which that had been
accustomed” (2012, p. 40). Despite this, face to face communication is still paradigmatic for all
other forms of communication. Ong argued that in the interpretive process of the face-to-face, it
begins before the utterance of any words. Meaning, he explains, is always negotiated and this is
a natural part of the ‘discursive process” (p. 40). He wrote:
In fact, in oral utterance the negotiation begins even before the oral utterance itself. The
first speaker needs to anticipate some conjectural feedback from an interlocutor before he
or she can devise something to say or even to think. Only if we are to some degree in the
mind of another can we formulate our own thought, for what I say (and articulately think)
depends on my conjectures, before I begin to speak, about your state of mind and about
the possible range of your response.

(2017, p. 40).

The paradigmatic form of interacting with others is the face-to-face situation.
All meaning is embodied, even the meaning of the being of the other. Ong explained
that words themselves represent. He noted that “The re- in ‘represent’ suggests some kind of
sense of presence antecedent to verbalization” (p. 23). Ong asked us to understand the “the word
for chair and the thought for chair are neither the same sort of thing as the sensorily present
chair” (p. 23). Zlatic (2017) wrote that for Ong, “[a]ll language use is hermeneutic because
being is not equivalent with idea; every statement must be interpreted in light of contexts,
purposes, attitudes, and so on” (p. 371). Textual communication is not even possible without
face-to-face communication we all encounter naturally in our world. Soukup (2012) wrote that
written communication is entirely dependent on face to face communication. Soukup adds that
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even to read a text is to liken the text as sound, in a sense when we “decode” it. This process,
however, requires a system to decode it, which is grounded again in the primacy of the
paradigmatic form of communication. All text arises from speech and all text is read and
belongs to a greater discourse, Ong has explained.
While all language is hermeneutic, textual language, Ong argued, requires more
interpretation. He explained that “A basic reason why text can call urgently for interpretation or
hermeneutics is that text always comes always out of the past. Spoken words come into being
always in the real, existent, holistic present. Writing does not” (p. 36). We must fill in the gaps
based on our stock of knowledge at hand.
When it comes to the difficulty of interpreting outside of the face to face situation, Ong, like the
research done by Walther and Parks, argued that there are cues that are filtered out. He wrote:
Spoken words are in great part further given meaning, further explained, interpreted as
they are being uttered, not merely verbally but often in other ways such as subtle personal
interaction with the other party or parties to the discourse as well as by nonverbal
elements in the fuller context or situation in which they are spoken—who is speaking to
whom, on what occasion, with what sort of force, in what sort of social structure, with
what unarticulated presuppositions involved I the situation or its background, with what
facial expressions, gestures, and so on. Such nonverbal elements are missing in a text
and need somehow to be made up for. Interpretation or hermeneutics makes up for such
missing elements, the absences with which all text present us, and deconstructionists have
liked to insist. (2017, p. 37)

87

The purpose of this chapter has been to show that due to the nature of interpretation in the
dialogic process, dialogue is possible in mediated settings but it imposes several specific
challenges in our relationships and communication with others. As a result, there are several
directions and implications that need to be explored further. First, despite the I-Thou, I-It
transition that is part and parcel of all communication, like textual communication, mediated
communication is especially conducive to objectification. Ong wrote, “Taken up by different
readers at different times, always after its creation, the text constantly emerges in always new
context” (2017, p. 36). Text is visual, “lying there passively, able to be operated on as spoken
words are not” (p. 37). He also noted the “think-like quality” of texts (p. 37). This “thing-like
quality” creates a separation as we interpret that is different than the interpretation of spoken
words. Ong explained, “Spoken words are in great part further given meaning, further explained,
interpreted as they are being uttered, not merely verbally but often in other ways such a s subtle
personal interaction with the other party or parties to the discourse as well as by nonverbal
elements I the fuller context or situation in which they are spoken” (p. 39). In some settings, the
immediacy of continuous interpretation is delayed. Because of this, we need to be cautious
about the interpretations we make about our asynchronous encounters.
For example, if a friend sent a text that said, “I am mad at you” without context, I could
interpret that text in several different ways. Should the friend go to work and be unable to text
for the next eight hours, I would be unable to clarify in any way exactly what they meant.
Perhaps I choose to get angry. Perhaps I get nervous, wondering how I upset them. I could
imagine that they are joking about something I did. No matter how I proceed, I am drawn into
the text without the ability to further clarify until much later.
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Anonymity and Receiver
In some instances, we are uncertain even WHO will be the recipient in our
communicative exchanges via solely text. Ong wrote, “a distinctive feature of textual utterance
as against oral utterance is that its author cannot absolutely predict or often even discover who all
will continue the discourse he or she has engaged in by inscribing the text” (p. 46). Malcolm
Gladwell (2019) surveyed multiple current events to understand how we interpret the behavior of
those we do not know. From judges and police officers, to medical workers and instructors, we
cannot escape the nature of human thought and interpretation. Gladwell argued that we default
to truth when interpreting others. He blames this and the “illusion of transparency” for our
difficulty in recognizing the “stranger as an individual” (p. 458). He advocated for a consistent
confrontation of self when confronting the stranger, in which one “ask[s] yourself where and
when you’re confronting the stranger---because those two things powerfully influence your
interpretation of who the stranger is” (p. 467). This is interesting because it is true that speaking
to someone face to face is confirmed again that the who behind the discussion is there. However,
orality alone in today’s world does not ensure this. Instead, this is a feature of face-to-face or
even face to screen to screen to face. Yet, there is much more uncertainty there in the textual
case as we are never 100% sure who is reading our messages. At the same time, we are also
never sure who is hearing our conversation with someone in which we are face to face. Because
of this, we need to again be cautious and aware of this new possibility of our age.
Ong was attentive to the various forms of media, particularly of mass media versus
mediated interpersonal communication. He noted that “it is not always true that person-toperson contact is nonexistent in today’s mass media, particularly in those using the spoken word”
(p. 291). He added, “The telephone has certainly helped maintain many close personal
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relationships at a pitch otherwise impossible” (p. 291). Ong explained, “To be present to
himself, man must find the presence of another or others. Man’s life-world is not the opposite of
solipsist: it is a world not of presence but of presences” (p. 295). He then wrote, “In presences
we mature. Each individual I finds himself by dealing with a thou, and another thou, and
another. The presence of other persons fills man’s consciousness, as objects cannot” (p
295). Then, if we go back to Aristotle, if human flourishing cannot occur in a vacuum, we need
others to be our best selves, then all friendships that promote mutual human flourishing,
regardless of where the communication takes place, are true friendships. Continuing, Ong wrote,
“Situated among objects, a person may indeed find them interesting, but he responds only to
other persons, other presences, who are not objects. In a whole universe filled with countless
objects and occupied by only one other man alone, it would be to the man alone that I could
present myself, establish a relationship of presence” (p. 295). Ong then explains that presence
today is different, though. He writes, “The kind of presence which early man was able to
establish in the universe was vastly different from the presence enjoyed by technological man
today. Despite what personalizing effects may have been realized in his immediate environment,
for early man the globe was not truly peopled” (p. 296). He adds, “The presence of man to
himself over the face of the globe is basically a presence of the word. It is not a peripatetic
presence. Individual men do not all journey to the ends of the earth and back to encounter each
other. The presence is realized within human communications media” (p. 298). He notes that it
makes the past present—which is something Schutz discusses in his work on intersubjectivity—
the world of our predecessors and Ong adds to that part here. Also, we are exposed to everyone
else in a way that has never been possible in the past and this is important.
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Our technology has expanded to create enriched cues to compensate for the lack of cues.
Because of this, we also now require more specialized interpretive training. For example, emojis
and their meaning can vary. In Japan, the emoji for steam coming out its nose is used to signify
triumph, while here in the United States, it is often used to signify anger. All language is
hermeneutic, Ong explains. But it seems that as we reduce the cues more and more, we create a
more desperate need for interpretation if we alter his earlier quote. Ong noted, “With special
skills and great effort the reader may be able to reconstruct conjectured responses of the absent
writer which will fit the text somehow into the milieu in which the reading is being done” (p.
47). And this does happen. But, arguably there is also a between space created when two people
converse via cyberspace, in which the milieu itself is the between that is generated between the
two individuals. Ong later wrote that text creates a “laborious, self-conscious, one-sided" level of
work (p. 47).
He noted, “Diminishing the temporal distance of the printed word decreased the
impersonal distance between reader and writer” (p. 504). He then went on to predict,
“Eventually other forms of mediated communication will provide great, more direct interaction
beyond the immediacy of the event and increase the interactive nature of the discourse in ways
that artificially simulate (not nonetheless approach) direct verbal communication” (p. 505). The
next chapter will explore these new instances in which communication has been spread across
time and space.
Zhao argues that in comparison with shared space, instead, telecopresence requires more
communication. He wrote, grounded in Habermas:
In the realm of consociates, mutual knowledge is constructed based on the sharing of
lived-through life experiences; in telecopresence, however, it is constituted through
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communicative action. Communicative action is a form of ‘speech acts’ by which ‘two
subjects come to an understanding with one another.’ (p. 118)
Even more importantly, those who are together virtually are unable to make as many
assumptions and do more communicative work, Zhao argued.
Like the previous chapter, communicative work has been the focus of this chapter. In the
next chapter, we will explore how shared space, shared thought, and shared language come
together. Social systems have changed, and the next chapter will review how they have changed
related to time and space. Perceptions and experiences of time and space of changed, although
there are enduring elements of friendship in time. The next chapter also examines the notion of
intimacy and its relation to space and time.
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Time and Space: Altered Dimensions of Friendship
Nothing makes the earth seem so spacious as to have friends at a distance; they make the
latitudes and longitudes.
--Henry David Thoreau
For most of human history, social relationships were limited by pace and time.
Friendships were created and maintained within specific physical locations. Adams (1998)
wrote, “even maintaining already established relationships across distances was difficult because
contact was infrequent, expensive, or unsatisfying” (p. 157). Today, it has been said that
friendships exist independent of time and space (Dreher, 2009, p. 407) Time and space as social
dimensions of relationships that have often failed to be addressed outside of phenomenological
works. Giddens (1979) has influenced multiple scholars relating to time and space in human
relationships. He specifically argued that “neither time nor space of been incorporated into the
center of social theory” (p. 202). Giddens argued that “The extensions of social systems in space
and time is an evident feature of the overall development of human society” (pp. 203-4). This
chapter will explore the altered dimensions of time and space and the associated effects on
friendships.
As communication technologies evolved, our perceptions of and experience in time and
space have changed.

Schutz argued in his works that “I experience a fellow-man directly if and

when he shares with me a common sector of time and space” (1976, p. 24). It was a central
element of his phenomenology. For Schutz, sharing time is what is central to “a genuine
simultaneity of our two streams of consciousness” (p. 24). Sharing space, Schutz explained, is
what is central for “my fellow-man [to appear] to me in person as he himself and none other” (p.
24). Bakardjieva (2005) argued “ that media are implicated in a recharting of the zones of
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anonymity of the experienced social world” (p. 43) She added, “Technological mediation, and
particularly information and communication technologies, similarly rearranges the structures of
anonymity stretching from the most intimate we-relations to the most distant they-relations” (p.
64). Proximal distance and phenomenological distance related to anonymity and intimacy then
seem to be affected.
Time and Space as Social Dimensions
Parks and Floyd (1996) noted that traditional relationship development characteristics
are: “physical proximity, frequent interaction, information about physical appearance, cues
about group members, and information about the broader social context” (p. 84). Often, online
relationships are considered to be impersonal. Despite this view, even when examined by way of
models of traditional relationships, Parks and Floyd argued that relationships do occur online.
The evidence suggests then, that proximity has nothing to do with friendship. While there
appears to be a shift in proximal limitations, new research related to social media networks
shows that there appears to be a limit on the number of “friends” one can maintain at one time.
Emmeche (2019) pointed out that limits are not just due to physical space, and instead showed
that there are actual cognitive limits.
Friendship Transcends Time and Space
There are several relationships between time and friendship. Friendship, as noted before,
seems to transcend space and time, while still being bound by time. Friends must share the same
historical moment. Friendship itself requires a duration through time. Also, an absence of
communication over long periods does not end a friendship. Much of the literature on
friendship notes the amazing ability for friends to meet again after decades and pick up as if they
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had never been apart. Dreher (2009) wrote that “friends can live great distances apart” and that
friendship “can be reactivated after a tremendously long time” (p. 407). While friendship does
seem to transcend time, it is also bound by time. Dreher pointed out that “friendship can only be
constructed in concrete historical worlds” (p. 408). It would be impossible, for example, for me
to be friends with my great-great-grandmother’s friend, despite the possibility of me finding a
journal and knowing her innermost thoughts. And, while friendship can extend through shared
biographical time and space, it cannot extend over non-shared time, because dialogue is
reciprocal.
Friendship as Duration
Another significant way that friendship is related to time is the notion of friendship as
duration. Stocker (1981) wrote, “friendship must have a significant temporal duration: that it
must last more than one minute, or one hour” (p. 752). Our encounters with our friends are
discrete units of extensions of time. We do not spend all of our time with them, nor would we
want or be able to. That being said, while our interactions with them are discrete, our actual
friendship is experienced as duration. Schutz (1970b) drew from Bergson in his discussion of
duree. He began “What we, in fact, experience in duration is not a being that is discrete and
well-defined but a constant transition from a now-thus to a new now-thus” (p. 60). Our
experience of the Other’s presence in the actual experiencing moment is duration. We
experience friendship as a constant transition. Schutz argued that discrete experience and pure
duration is a “difference between two levels of consciousness” (p. 61). Schutz asked us to
imagine our immersion in our streams of consciousness. He wrote, “in my duration, I do not find
any clearly differentiated experiences at all” (p. 62). He continued, “At one moment an
experience waxes, then it wanes” (p. 62). He wrote, “For I experience my duration as a
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unidirectional, irreversible stream and find that between a moment ago and just now I have
grown older. But I cannot become aware of this” (p. 62). Should we turn our awareness towards
the stream, what Schutz calls reflection, we are then turning against the stream and we cease to
be immersed during our reflection. The Now that has become a thus is only understood through
remembrance. Ultimately, Schutz’ point here was that “The simple experience of living is the
flow of duration” (p. 62). All meaningful experience is ultimately discrete as it requires, for the
nature of being meaningful, a reflective turn. And so, then, as a meaning-making relationship,
our experiences with friends are discrete moments that are filed into a protracted sense of
duration with them. Schutz wrote:
Because the concept of meaningful experience always presupposes that the experience of
which meaning is predicated is a discrete one, it now becomes quite clear that only past
experience can be called meaningful, that is, one that is present to the retrospective
glance as already finished and done with. (p. 63)
Meaning, particularly, he wrote, is “merely an operation of intentionality” (p. 63). Our stream of
consciousness is our duree. Schutz noted that:
In and by our bodily movements we perform the transition from our duree to the spatial
or cosmic time and our working actions partake of both. In simultaneity we experience
the working action as a series of events in outer and in inner time, unifying both
dimensions into a single flex which shall be called the vivid present. The vivid present
originates, therefore, in an intersection of duree and cosmic time. (p. 70)
Our communicative acts are what draw our inner duree out to the manifestation of duration in
friendship and all human relationships. Specifically related to time, as biographies intersect,
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Dreher (2009) argued that the particular uniqueness of the relationship must be shared “as well
as experience of an existential nature” (p. 413). That is to say, that within each of the
individual’s biographical identities, life narratives, they must find the friendship to be a
friendship as well as be orientated reciprocally toward each other AS friend.
Schutz addressed issues associated with the separation of two people by both space and
time. He made several related points. First, he argued “that apprehension does not necessarily
presuppose actual perception, but that the appresenting member of the appresentational pair may
also be a recollection or even a phantasm” (1970, p. 201). Second, he added “that the result or
product of another activity refers to the action from which it resulted and, thus, can function as a
sign of his cogitations” (p. 201). Finally, he notes “that the principle of the relative irrelevance
of the vehicle is applicable (the printed lecture refers to the talk of the lecturer)” (p. 201). So we
still perform analogic apperception, independent of actual existence.
Bakardjieva (2005) argued that there are three critical aspects of “temporality of the
lifeworld in the Schutzian framework” (p. 41). One, the “fixed course of temporality,” she
wrote, it is derived “from the intersection of subjective time (stream of consciousness),
biological time (the rhythm of the body), world time (the seasons) and social time (the calendar)”
(p. 41). Technology, she noted, helps bring biological, world, and social time “into closer
conformity with my subjective time” (p. 63). She added, “In a sense, this can be interpreted and
experienced by the actor as an increase in personal freedom, spontaneity, and control, or in other
words as empowerment and disalienation” (p. 63). Technology can help us overcome challenges
related to time.
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Cultural Transformations in Time and Space
Ancient Humanity
Many scholars have traced the changing nature of our consciousness of time throughout
human history. Eliade, in Myth of the Eternal Return (1954), explored archaic ontologies using
recordings of various myths, narratives, and rituals. Without the ability to record knowledge or
information, the world available to these early groups of people was the world as it could exist
only in the spoken word. Sound exists only in time, it has no spatial dimensions. Sound is
completely bound by time, by the moment one sound comes into existence, the sound that comes
before is already gone (Ong, 2000). What could be remembered, stored, and passed then was
limited to the capability of the human mind and verbal language. Early human beings
experienced being in the eternal present. Natural events, by all appearances, seemed to be
cyclical. Over time, the moon waxed and waned. The sun seemed to return to its position on the
horizon. The heavens, too, seemed to adhere to a cyclical pattern, always returning to a point of
beginning. Eliade explains that collective knowledge endured through repetition (1954, p. 20).
This is not just in language, meaning metrical phrases, songs, and stories. This included actual
repetition of acts and rituals which help transport the individual into the perceived time of the
original creation of the act itself. What we have here are human beings who are limited to a
knowledge of the eternal present and knowledge of a sense of being as it is in the beginning.
Eliade writes, “Through repetition of the cosmogonic act, concrete time, in which the
construction takes place, is projected into mythical time, in illo tempore when the foundation of
the world occurred” (p. 20). All acts had archetypes, the main archetype being creation.
Time spent repeating archetypical acts was time spent in illo tempore, or sacred time.
Time without any mythical meaning, without an archetype or an exemplary myth, simply was
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not time. Eliade writes, “an object or an act becomes real only insofar as it imitates or repeats an
archetype.” (p. 34). Sacred time was not experienced as time, however, as we might understand
ourselves in time in today’s world, either. Instead, to be in the act of ritual was to create an
“abolition of time through the imitation of archetypes and the repetition of paradigmatic
gestures” (p. 35). Profane time “is without meaning: in the state of ‘becoming’” (p. 35), he
explained. As communicative technologies changed, though, so did our experience of time.
Chirographic Culture
As human beings relied more and more on scripts to record, the mind began to explore
and reflect on being in the world and being in time. Eliade points out that in the development of
monotheistic cultures of the ancient world, we begin to see narratives in which there appears to
be a shift toward a somewhat historical or even linear understanding of time—that it has a
beginning and an end. For most cultures, time was still cyclical. Havelock (1986) wrote, “The
substitutions for the ‘timeless present’ turning into the ‘logical present’ in place of the
‘immediate present’ or the past or future, became a pre-occupation of the pre-Platonic
philosophers, particularly Parmenides.” (p. 106). We can see in the work of many ancient Greek
philosophers an explosion in abstract thinking and by 100 B.C.E., Eliade says that knowledge of
the human as a historical being was commonplace.
Middle Ages
By the middle ages, a sense of measured time infiltrated human consciousness, changed
by and changing how humans interacted with the world, each other, and themselves. To say that
language alone changed consciousness is to reduce the complexity of the vast changes that
occurred over this period. First, in this period, written and then printed word created an
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orientation toward the visual field of sensory experience and jolted language somewhat out of the
sound world in which it had been since the beginning. Second, written word also made it
possible for knowledge to be stored outside the human, and in such, thought could now be
abstract. The new orientation toward the visual, then, and the ability to know think abstractly led
to a new orientation toward the linear, mechanistic, quantified experience of time.
Mumford argued that the mechanistic, linear, sequential time stemmed from the
monastery of the middle ages. (2010). He wrote,
Benedict added a seventh period to the devotions of the day, and in seventh century, by a
bull of Pope Sabinianus, it was decreed that the bells of the monastery be rung seven
times in the twenty-four hours. These punctuation marks in the day were known as the
canonical hours, and some means of keeping count of them and ensuring their regular
repetition became necessary. (p. 13)
Jacques Le Goff, a medieval historian, has studied the rise of both Christian time and
secular time in his works Medieval Imagination (1992) and Time, Work and Culture in the
Middle Ages (1980). The 11th century marks the beginnings of change. Le Goff explained that
“For the Bible, and primitive Christianity, time is primarily theological time. It ‘begins with
God’ and is ‘dominated by him’” (1980, p. 30) and continued, “Their eternity was merely the
extension of time into infinity…” (p. 31). An orientation toward the quantitative was
developing, though. Time “spent” in church and time spent praying now had a direct effect on
time spent in purgatory in the afterlife. In this quantitative orientation, time was the means to
God. Time carried the Christian in one direction, linearly, to God. By no means was time
quantitative and linear in today’s sense of time, however.
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Spiritual fissures began to arise in the 12 th and 13th centuries, which Le Goff investigated
specifically by tracing artifacts of the medieval merchants (1980). Le Goff explained that
merchants were subject to natural time, or “the dominion of meteorological time, to the cycle of
season and the unpredictability of storms and natural cataclysms” (1980 p. 345). As the flow of
communication and records increased, so too did commercial networks, networks in which time
was now an object of measurements. Le Goff noted the commonality of letters of exchange in
12th and 13th century Champagne. In the 14th century, escapement devices began to be used in
towered mechanical clocks, ensuring mechanical accuracy (Le Goff, 1992). Consciousness was
now altered as the sound of the bells signaled a measured, punctuated time that was independent
of religious life. At this same time, the vanishing point now began to be used in painting, murals
now depicted cycles, and portraits became more realistic, capturing the subject in time (Le Goff,
1980).
Modernity
The post-modern era experiences time differently than modernity. We are in a society so
fragmented in the individual experience that in the present world, trying to reflect on any
collective experience might be impossible. If the consciousness of time is intertwined with the
medium of the word, whether it be oral, written, or print, electronic or digital, then the present
world is an age in which the preference for the method of delivery of the word, although
computerized, varies greatly between individuals. Despite these limitations, from a rhetorical
standpoint, there are generalizations and even implications that arise from study.
Born in 1912, by the time Ong published In the Human Grain (1967), a collection of
essays in which he explored the consciousness of human time, he had experienced two world
wars and the atomic era. In the decades before Ong’s birth, the industrial era brought the
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Western world into a new era of mechanistic time. In the 1850s, the railroad system
standardized time across North America. Sun time varies every eight miles from east to west,
but the railroad system of time now grouped time into four locations, spatial locations (Mumford,
2010). The standardization solidified a linear experience of time across space. The railroad in
one sense, then, built a collective spatial time structure. In another, it annihilated time and space,
transporting people with speeds thought never possible. Boorstin wrote, “As there comes to be
less and less difference between the time it takes to reach one place rather than another, time
itself dissolves as a measure of space” (1987, p. 115).
The railroad was only one means through which space/time structure changed in that era.
Vehicles of transportation evolved to transport goods and people faster and faster, and
communication technologies, such as the telegraph, telephone, radio, and television now made it
possible the transport interior through space in record time and these electronic technologies
drew the word toward an oral/aural orientation. In Ong’s world of the electronic age, voice now
was becoming alive, and printed word was melding with sound. This post-typographical era, the
electronic era, established man in a radically new relationship to time” (2000, p. 98). Ong wrote,
in Knowledge in Time (1968), that knowledge is now accessible to the human being: knowledge
of the physical universe, knowledge of man and his life world, and knowledge of man in time.
He noted, “Until quite recent years, man had no very effective idea of the real time scales
applying to the universe of which he was a part” (1968, p.13). We know ourselves on a macro
scale, meaning of our place in the evolving physical universe, and on a micro-scale, meaning as
part of an evolving unique person. He wrote, “Today we know the world as something with
which we are in publicly and circumstantially verifiable contact, and as affecting the real present
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in ways that are matter for scientific, cosmological, and historical study” (1968, p. 14). This has
had an effect on our experience of others in time and space and as a result, our friendships.
Media-Saturated Culture
In both oral culture and electronic culture, there is a strong sense of simultaneity and
presence between individuals, but Ong pointed out that simultaneity in the electronic world is
“supercharged” (2000, p. 91). He explained that “The computer is actually the most quantified
and most highly sequential or linear of all instruments; it creates a sense of simultaneity only
because its inhuman speedup of sequences makes it appear to annihilate them” (p. 91). This
speedup has still drawn us inward, but at the same time outward. It has created a paradox and
draws us toward both interiorization and exteriorization (1967, 1968). As time and space have
been “annihilated,” it has led to a heightened sense of presence yet at the same time, electronic
technologies draw people inward, into themselves and have offered a possibility of reflection of
the self in a historical way not possible in the oral world (2000, p. 312).
The process of digitization in our age refers to the process of converting everything into
binary code, or quantification. Mumford wrote of the mechanical age (early electronic) that
“Irrespective of strain or fatigue, despite reluctance or apathy, the household rises close to its set
hour” (2010, p. 269) and it is no stretch to say that most individuals still are servants to time.
Time consciousness as it “..arbitrarily rule[s] over human functions is to reduce existence itself
to mere time-serving and to spread the shades of the prison-house over too large an area of
human conduct” (Mumford, 2010, p. 271). Boorstin believed that experience was being
homogenized. He writes, “Moving only through time, measuring our distances in homogenous
ticks of the clock we are at a loss to explain ourselves, what we are doing, where, or even
whether we are going” (1987, p. 115). Rushkoff agreed that in the present age, we have found
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ourselves lost in general and lost in time (2013) and numerous philosophers find the electronic
and present era marked by a lack of moral unity, coherence, and narrative.
It becomes difficult to think of any aspect of human life that has not been quantified.
Even childbirth now occurs on a schedule as more and more mothers and their obstetricians plan
dates for cesarean sections, not just for medical necessity but for mere convenience. Marshall
McCluhan writes that “…time is separated from the rhythms of human experience” (2003, p.
199). Despite being a scholar of the electronic age, he recognized that “Time measured by
abstract uniform units gradually pervades all sense of life” (2003, p. 199). In his era, he
recognized that “Not only work, but also eating and sleeping, came to accommodate themselves
to the clock rather than organic needs.” (2003, p. 199). Rushkoff in his book Present Shock
discusses chronobiology (2013). Researchers have discovered that the human body seems to
operate on a 24-hour cycle, known as a circadian rhythm, independent of any time cue.
Melatonin production, the hormone that makes us feel tired, has been shown to decrease with
exposure to sunlight and increase with exposure to darkness, and melatonin production even is
interfered with when an individual is exposed to blue-light rays—the rays emitted from
smartphones, computer, and television screens. Body temperatures fluctuate with exposure to
daylight. Rushkoff argues that today’s age is marked with the “…false digital premise that all
time is equivalent and interchangeable.” (2003, p. 94). This has definitive effects on our
experience of others and our friendships. Studies in the millennial generation suggest that there
appears to be what are being called “micro-generational gaps.” Preferences for technology
greatly varies. The choice of medium affects experience, and these choices appear to be highly
individualized and fragmented.
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Breaking the Barriers of Intimacy
One major way that time and space are connected to our experience of others in social
relationships is intimacy. While intimacy has traditionally been associated with time and space,
as our mediums have changed, a new view of intimacy has become necessary. Intimacyis
communicative and developed through communicative work and as such, transcends time and
space. One way in which time is connected to intimacy is due to rate. Rate implies immediacy,
which can build intimacy, although, paradoxically, friends can go long amounts of time with no
communication at all and still be close friends. Time also matters because friends have to exist
in the same historical moment and share biographical time. Friends also do need to dedicate a
specific amount of time to the other in the friendship.
Intimacy Defined—A Review
Intimacy is a very well-studied term in interpersonal relations research and suffers the
same fate as definitions of friendship—there are multiple (Bennett, 2000; Goleman & Cherniss,
2001; Hatfield, 1982; Sexton & Sexton 1982; Perlman & Fehr, 1987). Solomon and Theiss
(2012) identify five components of intimacy; closeness, openness, trust, affection, and mutuality.
The pair define intimacy as “connection between two people that includes psychological,
emotional, and behavioral bonds” (p. 266). Sinclair and Dowdy (2005) in the development of
the emotional intimacy scale differentiated emotional intimacy from other types of intimacy like
physical. They define it as involving “a perception of closeness to another that allows sharing of
personal feelings, accompanied by expectations of understanding, affirmation, and
demonstrations of caring” (p. 194). Derlega (2013) agreed that belonging and closeness were
important aspects of intimacy, as well as affection. She also noted though that knowledge and
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experience are essential to the intimacy building process. Drawing from Buber, she drew to the
forefront the role of dialogue in this process.
Intimacy is recognized to be a main feature in all relations, including friendship, familial,
and romantic partnerships. Jurkane-Hobein (2015) argued that relationships required “intimacy
work” as part of normal relational maintenance (p. 224). Along with Mjöberg (2009) and Leslie
and Morgan (2011), she argues that it is a relationship quality that is dynamic and requires
ongoing work. In their study Marriage and the Construction of Reality, Berger and Kellner
(1964) drew from Schutz to discuss conversation, biography, and their associated roles in
building closeness in marriages. Again, these relationship are ever evolving and co-construct
meaning, and as such intimacy is a form of communicative work.
Family relationship research is another well-investigated area of intimacy study. Leslie
and Morgan (2011) highlighted three types of intimacy: embodied, emotional, and then they add
particular knowledge about the other. Jurkane-Hobein (2015) compared emotional intimacy in
Leslie and Morgan’s work to Jamieson’s (1998) emphasis on disclosure. She wrote that
“Intimate knowledge relates to everyday routines and emerges from the former two, thus,
providing the couple certain privileged knowledge about each other, such as sleeping patterns or
personal preferences” (p. 225). This knowledge, she wrote, is not dependent on intimacy,
though, so she added a time dimension and argued that it must be daily. She wrote that
embodied, emotional, and intimate knowledge “are the result of a mutual process of caring,
touching, interacting, and having conversation” (p. 225). Fehr (2004) pointed to the fact that
friendships, like family and romantic relationships, are another source of intimacy in our
everyday world. In Fehr’s work, it was shown that like romantic relationships, friendship
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satisfaction was judged based on idealized notions about the nature of friendship, in large part
related to intimacy expectations.
Across the spectrum of relationships, from family to friendship, reports of intimacy and
qualitative measures often include the notion of a feeling of being close with another person.
Aron and Aron (1986) argued that closeness is dependent on similarity of identity. Berscheid,
Snyder, and Omoto (2004) developed the Relational Closeness Scale. The three examined
multiple factors on the feeling of closeness, but specifically important to this chapter were their
conclusions that time spent alone together, doing things with each other, and communicating
were related to feelings of closeness.
Long-Distance Relationships—A Review
Related to intimacy, another area of study in interpersonal relationship is long-distance
relationships. Maguire and Kinney (2010) define long-distance relationships intimate
relationships “between partners who are geographically separated from one another” (p. 26).
Just like in studies in intimacy, there are studies on long-distance family, romantic, and
friendship-type relationships, although friendship is the least studied. Cao, Sellen, Brushs,
Berheim, Kirk, Edge, and Ding (2013) examined family relationships that spanned time zones. It
was noted that family members preferred synchronous settings like phone calls and video
chatting the most. Two major recognized themes associated with this preference were feeling
more present and connected.
Cao, Sellen, Brushs, Berheim, Kirk, Edge, and Ding (2013) examined family
relationships that spanned time zones. It was noted that family members preferred synchronous
settings like phone calls and video chatting the most. Two major recognized themes associated
with this preference were feeling more present and connected. A seminal scholar in long107

distance friendship research, Rohlfing (1990; 1991) concluded in her study that at that time, in
the early 1990’s, that almost 90% of study participants reported a long-distance friendship.
Rohlfing (1995) concluded that there are qualitative differences between proximal relationships
and long-distance relationships. Johnson (2001) found no significant difference in relational
satisfaction between proximal and long-distance relationships, however.
Jurkane-Hobein (2015), noted in the previous section, did a study exploring intimacy in
long-distance relationships. She specifically wanted to examine practices that fostered intimacy.
She concluded that an important element in long-distance relationships related to intimacy is
imagination, and imagination guides “four dimensions of intimacy: embodied, emotional, daily,
and imagined” (p. 226). She drew from Illouz and Sadeh (2007) to conceptualize the notion of
imagination in the long-distance setting. She wrote, “Internet imagination is self-generated
through textual and visual mediated communication” which is in contrast to self-generated
imagination (p. 226). With regard to the four types of intimacy, there were a variety of practices
examined by Jurkane-Hobein. Daily intimacy, she expressed, is developed through
communicating about daily life events. Emotional intimacy, she added, is based on mutual
disclosure. Embodied intimacy, she argued can be experienced in a long-distance relationship as
the body has physiological responses to communication.
Zones of Relevance
Schutz worked to delineate different zones of relevance to my body in space. As I stand,
my body in space, there are particular spatial zones. For example, there is the zone of actual
reach. I can reach out and touch my computer. But there is also present reach. A world that was
within my actual reach can move out of my present reach. But the world within our formerly
actual reach is retained, flowing into our stock of knowledge. Though I might walk out of the
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room, the computer, to me, is still on that table. Schutz and Luckmann wrote that this is
“conscious activity in the form of remembrance and anticipation” (p. 45). Based on how things
were, I then remember them and anticipate them. My computer might very well have been
stolen.
Schutz and Luckmann wrote, “The world in actual reach has essential the temporal
character of the present” (p. 51).

They wrote:

The world in potential reach has a much more complicated temporal structure. The world
in restorable reach is based upon the past, upon that which was previously in my reach
and upon that which (as I assume on the grounds of the idealizations of the ‘and so forth’
and ‘I can always do it again) can once again be brought into my actual reach. (p. 51).
We have particular zones of objects in the world that we encounter and perceive. Schutz calls
these our zones of relevance and highlights four zones. We have the world within reach. The
world within reach “can be immediately observed by us and also at least partially dominated by
us” Schutz explains (Schutz, On Phenomenology and Social Relations, 1970, p. 112). The
second zone is associated with “fields not open to our domination but mediately connected with
the zone of primary relevance” (p. 112). The final two are “reliatvely irrelevant” and
“irrelevant” (p. 112). This is important because a small portion of our stock of knowledge is
grounded within our interactions within these zones, and the action within these zones are
affected by those recipes we have available to us. Our stock of knowledge molds particular
typifications. A typification is an expectation, an idea type based on the knowledge we have
accumulated either via direct experience or passed down from our world. As we encounter other
objects, we reach into our stock of knowledge and apply these typifications. Schutz writes, “In
other words, what has been experienced in the actual perception of one object is apperceptively
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transferred to any other similar object, perceived merely as its type” (Schutz, On Phenomenology
and Social Relations, 1970, p. 117). Although the process of analogic apperception is different
when we are discussing human beings, this brings to mind questions related to friends. We have
particular typifications of friends, and this is automatic and unreflective for our every day
interactions. However, there is a moment in which we “name” that friend and enter into a
reflective attentiveness. When we name something, for example “friend,” “we are related it by
its typicality to pre-experienced things of similar typical structure, and we accept its open
horizon to future experiences of the same type, which are therefore capable of being given the
same name (p. 117).
For Schutz’ zones, they are discussed with regard to four different dimensions; space,
time, and ability to change the environment, and social relationships. Bakardjieva (2005)
explains:
With regard to action, these dimensions of the spatial arrangement of the lifeworld take
the shape of differentiated ‘zones of operation’ (p. 41). Within the world of actual reach
and as a subsection of it there exists a zone which the subject can influence through direct
action – the zone of operation. Schutz draws a distinction between the ‘primary zone of
operation,’ where action is tied to the physical body of the actor, and the ‘secondary zone
of operation’ (and its corresponding ‘secondary reach’), in which action can be
performed only with the help of various media. The province of mediated action meets its
limits in the prevailing technological conditions of a society, and is being dramatically
enlarged with the advance of technology and its penetration into the everyday lifeworld.
Schutz clearly recognizes the broad variation of subjective secondary zones of operation
among the members of a single society. Social structures and the position a subject
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occupies within them determine differential access to what is technologically possible. (p.
40).
Bakardjieva (2005) also discussed the nature of Schutz zones based on social relationships. She
wrote:
We-relations are established at different levels of nearness, depth, engagement,
coordination, mutuality or, in sum, immediacy. Tracking further these different
‘gradations of immediacy’ (p. 69), Schutz moves into the zones of the social world
populated by ‘contemporaries’. This term refers to ‘those other men with whom I do not
actually have a werelation, but whose life falls in the same present span of world time as
mine’ (p. 69). Our experience of contemporaries is qualitatively different from that of our
fellow men. This difference lies in the dramatic decrease in the ‘abundance of symptoms
through which the conscious life of the other is accessible to me’ (p. 69). Therefore,
contemporaries are experienced as ‘types’ (p. 75) to which certain attributes, certain
functions and behaviour are ascribed. These types display various degrees of anonymity
on the basis of which the world of contemporaries is stratified into personal types,
functionary types, and typifications of social collectivities. The anonymity of a
typification is inversely proportional to its fullness of content, which is determined by the
origin of the typification – was it inferred from immediate experience of an earlier
fellow-man, or was it a learned generalization of social reality? (p. 42).
She continued:
Thus the immediate encounter with a fellow-man and the mediate experience of a highly
anonymous social type represent two poles between which many intermediate forms can
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be found. At this point, an isomorphism between the spatial and the social structures of
the everyday lifeworld becomes obvious. The structures of attainability and restorability
characterizing the spatial arrangement of the lifeworld can be recognized in the subjective
experience of the social world as well. Based on the complex graduation of immediacy
constituted by the various degrees of restorability and attainability of a once-existent or
achievable we-relation, the structure of the social relationships between contemporaries
emerges. Schutz’s structures of the social world present the key to understanding the
unique character of communication technologies compared to all other technologies and
artefacts. Communication technologies and devices mediate subjects’ perceptions of and
actions onto the social world, while the effects of all other technologies are realized first
and foremost in the physical world. It is clear from the outset that media are implicated in
a recharting of the zones of anonymity of the experienced social world. Mass media, for
example, enlarge the number of types of contemporaries of whose existence I know in
general, that is, whose existence I can infer on (p. 44).
Finally, she wrote:
More and more, our zone of actual reach comes to resemble a control tower from where
we can perceive distant objects and social entities by reading them off technical
representations – I–(technology– world), which extends our zones of actual and potential
reach. We can also exert action upon distant objects and people through technological
levers – (I– technology)–world, which extends our secondary zone of operation and our
province of possible operation. (p. 61)
Zhao (2006) has argued that technology has created a new zone, one that effects all four of the
above noted dimensions. He wrote:
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Specifically, the Internet has created a new spatieotmeporal zone--the zone of the ‘there
and now,’ a new mode of communication—the electronic text chat, and a new social
gathering place—the online public domain. (p. 458)
Related to this topic, he wrote:
Conditions of social interaction refer to the totality of the environment in which
interpersonal contacts take place From the perspective of phenomelogy, such an
environment consists of not only the ‘contact situations’ that directly affect a given social
encounter but also the ‘zones of operation’ that participation the lifeworld into different
time-space segments. The advent of the Internet has brought about significant changes to
this environment by creating (1) a new spatiotemporal zone—the zone of the ‘there and
now,’ (2) a new mode of communication—the electronic text chat, and (3) a new social
gathering place—the online public domain. (p. 459)
The foundation of intimacy in friendship is retention. The shift from out of reach to within reach
seems continuous. We believe that our friend when they leave our physical presence, will return
to that presence and be the same friend with the same qualities and traits in which there were
originally in our presence. And, this is developed through a build-up over time. When we
encounter someone in a face-to-face situation, as they continue to meet us in the present over and
over again, we build up a stock of knowledge about who we believe them to be. Even when they
cease to be within our actual reach, as in, within our physical presence, they are still present to us
as a remembrance and as an anticipated person in the future, so that we can then build a pattern
of our encounters with them. Schutz (1970a) addressed the idea of a human being walking out of
our direct reach, and in doing so points to the notion of our experience of friendship that is built
through our anticipations and memories. He explains:
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Far from seeming obvious, it actually seems absurd that someone we are close to has
somehow become ‘different’ now that he is out of sight, except in the trite sense that our
experiences of him bear the mark of pastness. (p. 220)
The jump from attainable reach from a face-to-face setting to a virtual setting is not that difficult,
providing that the verbally explicit there is created in such a way that our stock of knowledge
provides us with enough information to adequately anticipate information, as the remembrance is
irrelevant anyway based on Schutz’ observation that only a very small amount of information
about our world comes from personal experience.
Drawing from Husserl, Schutz (1970a) examined “subjective time” to explain “the
interconnectedness of the stream of thought” (p. 11). Schutz wrote that “The actual present,
therefore, is not an instantaneity, but the persisting form for continuously changing contents” (p.
11). He continued, “Actual impression is nothing else than the limiting phase of a continuous
series of retentions, or, in the other direction, of a continuous series of anticipations, both chains
to be interpreted as continuous successions of intentional relationships” (p. 11). Furthermore, he
writes, “Therefore, says Husserl, each actual experienced present carries along its horizon of the
experienced past, which is necessarily always filled with content, and its horizon of the future,
which is empty or filled merely with the content of the anticipated future present” (p. 11). And
so, we can say then that with each encounter, the content of our friendship is filled more and
more, both with past and future horizons.
In the previous chapter, the notion of absent cues was discussed and the inaccurate
tendency to association absence with loss. This, too, has been done with immediacy. A lack of
immediacy is not a lack of intimacy, but it can become problematic when we begin to
inaccurately interpret the Other. Schutz wrote, “The first steps beyond the realm of immediacy
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are marked by an increase in the number of perceptions I have of the other person and a
narrowing of the perspectives within which I view him” (1970a, p. 218).
Gumpert and Cathart (1986) pointed out that all human communication is a derivative of the
interpersonal communication process. They wrote, “An environment in which we talk to each
other and see each other while we are actually in the presence of the other is no longer necessary
to interpersonal communication” (p. 165). They added:
Interpersonal intimacy has traditionally entailed physical and psychological closeness.
We could be intimate only with those that we could be close to physically and
emotionally. As Edward T. Hall has pointed out in his works on nonverbal
communication, we actually divide personal space into intimate and social distance
depending on how close we allow others to come. (p. 165)
As communicative, intimacy transcends space and time and can account for the large distances
between friends both across time and space. Cocking and Kennett (1998) explored the
relationship of intimacy to friendship. They argued that intimacy is not even a requirement for
friendship in the first place, and even if it were, it is not tied to space. The pair wrote that
typically literature does tend to focus on “intimate friendships” and that these friendships entail
“reciprocal deep affection, well-wishing, and the desire for shared experiences” (p. 502). The
pair highlighted the nature of self-disclosure on intimacy. There is a huge dedication of
communication literature to self-disclosure and trust, and it is beyond the scope of this project;
however, this project does take the position that intimacy is an essential feature of friendship.
Cocking and Kennett wrote that self-disclosure “is thought to cement the bonds of trust and
intimacy that exist between close friends and has been understood to mark companion friendship
in two sorts of ways” (p. 503). Both of these are problematic for the pair. One version of self115

disclosure paints intimacy in friendship as requiring a telling of secrets. Another version is the
mirror-view which argues that intimacy requires a seeing of ourselves in the other. Cocking and
Kennett argue that the mirror-view and secrets-view of friendship “fail to identify features that
are in part constitutive of close or companion friendship” and “that they miss the mark quote”
concerning understanding the self in the role of friendship.
They point out that sometimes friends lack similar interests, and sometimes similarity
does not create friendship. Sometimes friends do not “herald increasing intimacy” and they
explained, “I may like to discuss philosophy with you but have no wish to go the to a football
game with you upon discovering that you, too, follow football” (p. 508). When it comes to selfdisclosure, Cocking and Kennett mention that it is kind of absurd to imagine that we could share
our most private moments, e.g. using the bathroom, without having the opposite effect of
alienating others. They then responded to imaginary arguments to this idea—that the kind of
information disclosed needs to be revelatory. Cocking and Kennett (1998) recognized that
sharing secrets and concerns “can serve to deepen and nurture intimacy” (p. 508). However,
they clarify that the nature of the privacy of the disclosure has nothing to do with intimacy, and
instead it is “the value we assess to the hopes and concerns we share (whether we wish them to
be kept private or not) and the fact that we choose to talk to each other about what matters to us
that contributes to the growth of intimacy between us” (p. 508). Intimacy grows through
communicative choice—the choice to communicate, communication with you, how to
communicate and to call you my friend.
Bennett (2016) argued that technology obscures the “need for close physical space” (p.
254). For her, there is a loss associated with lack of physical space which is “rectified,” she
argued, “when we are intentional about our daily choices of interaction” (p. 254). Her article
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drew from Elull and technique and she cautioned against the “tendency to truncate the basic
premise of human relations—presence—for the sake of a more efficient means of dealing with
the other” (p. 255). She argued:
While social media allow people to be co-preset (i.e. present to each other simultaneously
in different time zones and locations), the absence of one’s physical presence leaves a
friendship (or any relationship ) in a precarious situation. The inability to act towards or
touch another creates a situation that is emotionally sparse, certainly lacking in
relationship richness. Connecting with others online, over time, creates a normalcy for
absence. (p. 255)
Zhao, too, notes the issues associated with lack of touch. He wrote:
In computer-mediated communication under corporeal telecopresence, one’s sense of
copresence is dampened by the loss of the possibility of haptic engagement. However,
the belief that one is in contact with a real human being, although remotely, sustains the
social suspense and excitement that underlie face-to-face interaction. Such a belief is
constantly being validated based on the behavioral cues (such as voice over the telephone
and images on the screen) gleaned from the mediated communications. (p. 451)
Regarding intimacy, Chambers writes:
technologies express deep-seated aspirations for intimate connections of choice based on
trust, sharing and reciprocity. Paradoxically, while the concept of intimacy has been
interrogated through the lens of friendship, friendship has come to be idealised and
venerated. Thus, late modernity brings with it a new kind of intimate relationship and
culture which draws on the ideal of friendship: a relationship no longer deﬁned by or
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conﬁned to ties of duty but entered into voluntarily in a context of mutual beneﬁt.
Friendship signiﬁes less formal, more casual companion-like bonds. The concept of
friendship mirrors the ‘pure relationship’ by signifying the desire for equality and choice
in all relationships. The variability and emphasis on choice involved in this kind of
intimate relationship correspond well with social media by promoting a sense of choice,
control and reciprocity at the same time. This corresponds with the idea of social network
sites such as Facebook as more casual, immediate, informal modes of communication.
These personal networks can involve self-disclosure, shared secrets and a sense of
exclusiveness. Individuals can construct their own narratives of self through ﬂuid,
ﬂexible ties. (p. 52)
Bennett did note that “For online social networking to work, people must be absent from each
other. Distance is a necessity” (p. 250). But distance and remoteness are part and parcel of all
human relationships because they are communicative phenomena. In Ong’s Contributions to
Cultural Studies, Farrell (2015) asked, “How…does intimate sharing proceed? How, according
to Ong, do persons commune with one another?” (p. 108).
Ong argued that “personal presence in a text is not the same as the presence of two
persons to one another in spoken dialogue” (2002, p. 521). He adds, “And indeed in some
texts—such as lists, certain perfunctory reports, and the like—the presence of the text’s author
can be minimized. But, however remotely, it is there, although it lies in the background” (p.
521). This is essential because if we say that presence is a necessary component of friendship,
then ultimately it still would be made manifest in communication that would be strictly textual
between two people. Farrell wrote, “But person-to-person communicating, the communing of
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spirits, is exemplified paradigmatically in live conversation, and perhaps in moments of silence
together” (p. xix).
Intimacy and Distance
All relationships have an element of distance because of the nature of what it means to be
a human being with consciousness and intimacy has its limits. In his interview with Altree, Ong
said:
The same is true of all human beings. Even a husband and wife never find out what it
feels like to be the other. They try, they get awfully close. But no matter what, each of
us remains isolated in his or her own consciousness, each one in his own little prison.
And yet such isolated beings are the only ones on earth who can communicate. This is
what a mere animal can’t do. He can’t say “I” can’t enter into himself in isolation. So he
has nothing to say. We can communicate, paradoxically, because we are completely
different from one another. (p. 398)
Distancing is a natural part of our relationships with others, both in the physical realm
and in cyberspace. Zhao pointed out that in the physical domain, we have ways of keeping
others closed off from our spaces—He called these involvement shields and wrote, “Besides
using walls and gates that physically keep others from getting within range, people also create
‘situational closures’ to symbolically close off a region into which they retreat. For example, a
door curtain, even if transparent” (p. 576). Online, he noted, we do the same—we might
“ignore, hide, block, or relegate” (p. 576). He added:
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In either region, the establishment of compresence also depends on people’s willingness
to engage and be engaged by others, as various involvement shields can be deployed to
block access if people are not interested in participating. (p. 578)
Zhao explained that “electronic text chat” “combines the permanence of writing and the
synchronicity of speaking” and that this is “an entirely new mode of human contact created by
the internet” (p. 462). Zhao explained that “In the traditional society, intimacy is closely tied to
physical proximity and others become progressively more anonymous as they are distanced from
each other.
Communicative technologies have altered our experience of space and time, and as a
result, because of the connection between friendship and space and time, we find ourselves at the
forefront of new possibilities for connection. Different technologies have different effects and
are conducive to different forms of encounter and intimacy. Mok, Wellman, and Carrasco
(2010) found that email, for example, had minimal effects on relationship maintenance. At the
time of the study, the trio noted that face-to-face communication between friends and relatives
remained unchanged from the 1970s to the time of the study. Phone contact did slightly
increase. Yang, Brown, and Braun (2014) observed that specific channels that are more
conducive to building and fostering intimacy than others. For example, they noted that cell
phones are the most intimate and social networking sites the least.
Ong wrote the following concerning intimacy and electronic media:
Does Hopkins electrically implemented relationship with his subject establish any special
relationship with his readers? It does establish a new kind of directness in the
relationships, a new intimacy, a participatory intimacy. (2002, p. 501)

120

Chambers also noted a new intimacy. Chambers (2013) argued that “today’s technologically
mediated relationships give rise to a new, mediated intimacy which incorporates friendship and
reﬂects the ﬂuid, diverse and informal nature of contemporary personal interactions” (p. 45).
Adams (1998) pointed out that not only are we altering our friendships but that we are
developing technology that suits the purpose of forming and maintaining friendships.
Zhao argued that we need to update Schutz’ divisions to incorporate a third realm,
“consociated contemporaries” (p. 91). This group shares time but not space, he explains. There
are new spaces for contact and it requires new understandings. The third realm, specifically,
Zhao argued is one in which there is an interaction between face and device. In this realm, the
mediated realm, there is a significant amount of trust that must occur in addition to the usual trust
between two persons in dialogue. Zhao uses the example of a mailperson delivering a letter
between two people. Each person trusts in their understanding of the system to deliver their
message, for example. This notion of trust will be taken up in the next chapter.
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Sunaisthesis: The Synechdotal Activity of Friendship Ethics
“I don’t need a friend who changes when I change and who nods when I nod; my shadow does
that much better.”
– Plutarch
Plutarch made an important observation about friendship. Our friends are not those who
mirror us. Our friends are those with whom our selves become visible to us, but in a way that
generates and transforms meaning. Currently, there is a debate that is ongoing about the nature
of friendship and ethical being in a media-saturated age. McFall (2012), for example, argued
that character friendships cannot be created online. He added that hybridized character
friendships are possible but cannot be sustained only through mediated communication. Valor
(2012) reasoned that social media do support and strengthen friendships, but they must
supplement and not substitute for face-to-face interactions. Bennett asked, “Just what does it
mean to be a true friend? Is it the same in 2014 as it was twenty years ago? Is the online friend
synonymous with or an adequate substitute for the friend who lives down the street?” (p. 251)
and along these same lines, what does it mean to be a good friend?
Multiple scholars have attempted to understand the essential qualities of friendship, one
of the earliest of which was Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics and Eduemonian Ethics.
Aristotle argued that friendship was itself a virtue, and Cooper (1980) argued that Aristotelian
virtues fail to even manifest in the absence of authentic friendship. There is no doubt about the
importance of friendship in our lives, especially today. Suttles (1970) explained that
“Friendships are especially valued in a population where social contracts have outgrown the
bonds of kinship, neighborhood, age grades, workgroups, ethnicity and social classes” (p. 96).
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Friendship is necessary for human flourishing, but technological changes have affected how we
interact with others.
Von Heyking (2008) wrote that “Aristotle’s friendship teaching has been called the
‘peak’ of his moral teaching” (p. 179). However, diving deeper, Von Heyking wrote, “His
understanding of sunaisthesis (joint perception/awareness) as the activity of virtue friendship has
been called the ‘peak of the peak” (p. 179). Von Heyking argued that “Friendship is built into
the very way human beings think and act toward one another as moral agents, which shows its
foundational role for political life” (p. 179). He continued, “Because sunaisthesis cannot be
judged by a standard or rule outside of itself, the paper considers the emphasis Aristotle places
on the practice of friendship” (p. 179). Friendship, he noted, is considered “to be the highest and
‘most divine’ human capacity” (p. 179). Sunaisthesis is essential for friendship and all human
flourishing. Sunaisthesis is central to ethics, Liu explained, because it “refers to the way friends
feel the life or existence of each as good, meaningful, and desirable” (p. 589). For Liu,
sunaisthesis is “a way that friends grasp each other’s lives” (p. 590). As such, she explained
“sunaisthesis is therefore a fundamental form of intimacy and an indispensable component of
friendship” (p. 590). She added that “We are not really close to our friends unless we have a
feeling for what gives their lives meaning or what moves them” (p. 590). She continued, “And
as a way of appreciating the goodness in each other’s lives, sunaisthesis would also appear to be
necessary for friendships” (p. 590). Sunaisthesis, Liu argued, is “one of the most
important…activities of friendship” (p. 590). Because sunaisthesis is the activity of virtue
friendship, it then will be the focus of this chapter. This chapter begins by overviewing the
importance of sunaisthesis for Aristotle’s moral philosophy and friendship. It reviews the
secondary literature to trace the etymology of the term, then approaches the notion of
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sunaisthesis by examining it as the synthesis of human living together, perceiving together, and
doing together within a communication framework. After, it concludes that as communicative, it
can and does occur online.
Aristotle on Friendship
For Aristotle, there were types of friendship—utility, pleasure, and virtue. The most
desirable friendship for the good life is virtue-friendship. McFall (2012), drawing from
Aristotle, explained that character-friends “provide for each other, an opportunity for robust
moral reflection” (p. 222). Friendship is a conduit for human flourishing, and arguably for
Aristotle, the conduit for human flourishing. Multiple scholars recognize the importance of
friendship for Aristotle’s entire project on ethics. Cooper (1980), as noted before, noted it was
the central component of all of his work. Thomas (1993) explained, “It is clear that Aristotle
took friendship to contribute in an enormous way to human flourishing” (p. 48). Kaliarnta
(2016) wrote, “Aristotle’s theory of the good life and in particular, his analysis of the role that
friendships play in achieving human flourishing, has been one of the most influential and longlasting theories on human connections and friendships” (p. 66). Von Heyking (2017) argued that
“friendship is the quintessential human activity, where the soul and its constituent parts are fully
activated in their intellectual and moral capacities” (p. 179). He added that for Aristotle,
friendship was “an intellectual and moral activity” (p. 180). As an intellectual activity,
friendship is related to the ecology of knowing. One reason why this issue is so pressing is that
friendship is foundational to the creation of knowledge itself, and communicative practices
within friendships are one way in which knowledge is produced. Maines (1989) even equated
an “ecology of friendship” with “an ecology of knowing” (p. 198). Cooper (1980) noted that
according to Aristotle, “Human flourishing, in short, does not consist merely in conformity to
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natural principles but requires self-knowledge and conscious self-affirmation. Self-knowledge is
thus an essential part of what it is to flourish” (p. 341). Von Heyking added, “Friendship is the
expression of the human intellect whose nature it is to identify with the known” (p. 187). Also
associated with knowing is situating ourselves within a world of narrative and virtue structures.
Rawlins (2009) wrote, “Friends also co-create deep understandings allowing for shared
moral visions and rights unique to their friendship” (p. 1-2). Friendship is an epistemological
and ontological space, deeply entwined with our virtue structures. He adds that “In close
friendship we desire good things to happen to our friend because we care about this particular
person” (p. 5). From an Aristotelian perspective, our well-wishing, Rawlins showed, is “mutual”
(p. 5). He writes that this includes “reciprocated concern and actions to benefit each friend” (p.
5). These concerns and these actions, then, lead us to the realm of ethics, as there are significant
choices involved in “connected, responsible, positive freedoms” (p. 9). Rawlins argued that “It
requires unforced yet mutually contingent choices to respond to each other as friends” (p. 9). Up
until this chapter, much of the discussion has revolved around several moments of choice within
friendships—the choice to reach out, the choice to partake in dialogue, the choice of how to
communicate.
For Rawlins, ethics specifically enter the arena of friendship when we make choices
related to similarity and difference. He wrote, “All communicative contexts are reflexive
achievements. When we share emerging moments of real time, we co-construct the ‘now’ in
which we are living’” (p. 21). In the construction of the now, we again employ choice. Rawlins
wrote:
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All interpersonal events composing a ‘set of alternatives’ simultaneously are partially
performed and partially perceived. We construct choices as we select them and select
among them as they are constructed. (p. 22)
Co-creating knowledge and sharing moral visions requires the agreement in choice, and Aristotle
addressed how friends can make good choices together using the term sunaisthesis.
Sunaisthesis
Living
To understand sunaisthesis, it is important to overview two ethical components of the
good in friendship. The first is desiring or doing good for others, the second with. Rawlins
explained that “In close friendship we desire good things to happen to our friend because we care
about this particular person. The activities compassing personal friendship occur for the most
part in private settings out of public eyes and ears” (2009, p. 5). Stocker (1981) considers
friendship from a teleological position and argues that teleology alone is not sufficient in
understanding the good acts we do for our friends and that they do for us. He wrote, “To
understand them we must recur to their source, or arche not simply their end, or telos” (p. 747).
He then examined the arche of friendship. For Stocker, we first begin with the friendly act itself,
“to identify it as a friendly act” that “only its purpose, goals, ends, desires, and the like are
critical” (p. 748). He added that “Character and other elements we act out of are relevant if at
all, only because and to the extent they are reducible to teleological elements” (p. 748). He noted
that there is a difference between “friendly acts done for a friend” and “acts done out of general
friendliness, amiability, or goodwill” (p. 75). The defining element here is that of particularity.
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Doing Good for Others
Sokolowski (2002) argued that virtue friendships require shared virtues. He showed
sharing virtues “involves calibration” and honing. He continued that “It demands that in the
contingences and vicissitudes of life we possess the insight and the character to achieve truly the
good of another” (p. 462). Not only then do we need to be moral agents, but we must meet our
friend in the particular to know “precisely what he needs…and how he needs it” (p. 462). To be
able to do this requires the ability to share perceptions of the good. Stocker considered this an
“expansion” and an “ ‘intersubjectivizing’ of the good by me” (p. 459). This is sunaisthesis. It
is the synecdochal activity that creates a “we” in the space of friendship.
Sunaisthesis is used in both the Eudemonian and Nicomachean Ethics. Flakne’s work
(2005) demonstrated that sunaisthesis was “overlooked” and “misconstrued” in the majority of
the literature, which was unfortunate because she considered it “central to Aristotle's philosophy
of friendship” (p. 37). Kosman (2004) wrote that the literal translation of sunaisthesis is coperception, although it was taken up by a later tradition to mean apperception. He wrote that the
latter tradition used in in a way that meant:
either the inward awareness that accompanies perception (what we often call simply
consciousness) or the self-awareness or self-consciousness of ourselves as conscious.
But Aristotle here intends a more literal sense of sunaisthesis, a sense that can be heard in
the etymology of the term: the shared or common perception that friends enjoy. (p. 150)
Von Heyking also breaks down the term specifically in Aristotle’s work. He argued that
Aristotle “shows us how moral seeing (aisthesis) operates like ‘aesthetics’ seeing of the
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beautiful. Acting rigorously or nobly cannot be reduced either to following a rule nor
subjectivity” (p. 183). Continuing, he explained that:
Adding the sun-prefix to form sunaisthesis was rare in antiquity. Plutarch uses it to
describe the fellow-feeling Solon created in Athens with his legal reforms. However, its
primary meaning in antiquity was self-consciousness without necessarily referring to
another, and its meaning shifted to signify the interiorization of the self. (p. 183)
Flakne argued the term derives from suzen, that is, the social life, and aisthesis, or perception.
Doing Good with Others
Liu (2010) wrote that “human living (to zen) is living together (to suzen)” (p. 580). Her
argument is part of a broader claim of Aristotle’s that we are social creatures by nature. She and
Kosman (2004) both showed that Aristotle considers living together to consist of more than colocation. Liu wrote, “Aristotle equates living together with simply spending days (to
sunemereuein) in each other’s company, an activity whose significance shows up most
conspicuously in contrast to the lives of grazing animals” (p. 594). She pointed out in Aristotle
that although sheep graze together, they do not live together that human beings live together.
Kosman addressed the misconception that a happy life requires self-sufficiency. He warned that
the notion “might lead us to view friends as an unnecessary addition to such a life” (p. 135). He
wrote:
It is peculiar to think of a happy person living in isolation, and more than just peculiar to
think that such a person might choose to live his life apart from the company of others
like himself, other persons, whom he might love and be loved by. (p. 135)
To live is to live with others, and a significant component of human living is perceiving.
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Perceiving
Liu explained that “Perceiving is part of to zen” (p. 583). Co-perceiving is part of to
suzen. Liu considered friends to be “second selves” because they, too, exist and feel pleasure
from living. She wrote “we need to jointly perceive (to sunaisthanesithai) friends, and this
requires us to live together (to suzen) with them” (p. 583). Kosman asked, “What is a human life
in the fullest sense of actively living, that is, as the end toward which the structures and powers
of a human being are directed” (p. 136)? For Aristotle, Kosman argued, “that it consists in the
active exercises of perceiving and knowing” (p. 136). He added that “therefore life in common
with others must also consist of perceiving and knowing in common with them” (p. 136).
Kosman struggled with a particular section in Aristotle in which Aristotle claims that
perceiving and knowing is desirable. He wrote that there is a translation error that has been
perpetuated. He draws our attention to a translation of Aristotle that claims that “to perceive and
know oneself are what is most desirable for each person” (p. 137). Kosman wrote, “According
to interpretation, you will recall, friends are desirable because they provide an avenue, imperfect
but all we have, to the pleasure and moral betterment that derives from self-awareness” (p. 137).
He continued:
If, in other words, we abstract consciousness in the sense of considering it without
reference to the particular subject of consciousness, then there would be no difference
between my desiring that I be conscious and my desiring that some other person be
conscious. But that would be, Aristotle continues, like supposing that my desire to live
might be satisfied by some other person living instead of me. (p. 138)
Kosman showed that this is a common way of reading Aristotle but it is incorrect. He added:
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For me to wish to be is for me to wish for my being, which is, for Aristotle, to wish for
awareness in the form of subjectivity; and this subjectivity is not another characteristic of
mine. That the desire for life and thus for conscious is for each person a desire for his or
her own consciousness does not then specify an additional element in the original desire,
but a necessary part of the structure of that desire. One may desire that there be life or
that there be consciousness without desiring that life or consciousness be one’s own. (p.
140)
Kosman differentiated between the “exercises of consciousness” and “the mere possession of the
powers of consciousness” (p. 141). It is the exercise of consciousness that Aristotle believed we
desire. This is because amid “the society of friends,” the “power of thought” is transformed
“into the activity of thought” (p. 145). Kosman called this transformation the “power of
consciousness” and that it “constitutes the end of human life” (p. 145). The end to which all
human life aims is to be conscious, which is impossible without being conscious in the
consciousness of others. Consciousness enacted with others is communication.
In her 2013 work, Danblon wrote that the translations that conflated sunaisthesis with
conscience “reveals the epistemological gap between the Aristotelian conception of rationality
and its modern version, especially as it is inherited by Descartes” (p. 501). She wrote:
What Aristotle called sunaisthesis is the human capacity to feel that one feels, to put
together sensations and emotions, but also to interact with others by sharing (discursive)
representations of this common feeling. In other words, as an ancient version of the
modern conscience, sunaisthesis is the human capacity to experience the common sense.
(p. 501).
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Communicative Work
Being together or even perceiving together is not the ultimate good. It is doing together
that is important. It requires shared “contemplation,” “praxis,” “cooperation,” and collaboration”
(Kosman, 2004, p. 148). Eating in the same space is not a true “shared” activity. Shared activity
involves an “enlargement of being,” Kosman argued. From this perspective, Kosman showed
that co-living:
is understood in a new way, such that being conscious together does not indicate being
conscious, as it were, side by side, but forming together a partnership of consciousness, a
community characterized by the common perception that is sunaisthesis. (p. 148)
This living though moves beyond perception and requires “shared plans and projects, communal
hopes and memories, cooperative theories and strategies” and “common ways of looking at and
experiencing our common world” (p. 149).
Kosman added that the idea of “living together” “involves a corporate life properly called
political, the life of comrades engaged in shard projects of language, thought, action, and
culture” (p. 150). He wrote that “the partnership of good friends will above all” according to
Aristotle “be concerned with the goods of our lives, and will thus involve thinking together and
feasting together” (p. 151). His point was that “Reading sunaisthesis this way will enable us to
parse correctly the passage I earlier cited as important to Aristotle’s argument: the perceiving of
one’s friends is in a sense necessarily the perceiving of oneself and knowing oneself” (p. 151).
Kosman then argued that the translation should be “for one’s friend to perceive is necessarily in
some sense for oneself to perceive, and in some sense, for oneself to know” (p. 151). To justify
this, he wrote:

131

It is not that I see myself in my friend and therefore see myself in seeing my friend. It is
rather that he and I, joining together in the partnership that friends constitute, become a
conscious community, a single soul, as Diogenes recalls Aristotle to have said, dwelling
in two bodies. (p. 151)
Aristotle insisted, Kosman argued, that sunaisthesis “be realized by common discourse” (p. 153).
He added, “Sunaisthesis is not primarily what friendship provides, but part of an explanation of
what is required if it is to be desirable” (p. 153). Creating communicative works together is the
end of sunaisthesis.
Emmeche (2019) explained that “for some forms of friendships, the agents not merely
attend to common interests; their perception is shared, mediated by the very relationship as an
embodied activity of distributed cognition” (p. 47). He gave the example of art. He pointed out
instances in which “friends or colleagues work close together to solve problems or develop new
forms of creative expression” (p. 47). Emmeche explained that using Flakne’s perspective of
sunaisthesis, it explains our limitations on the number of friends we can maintain. It requires
ongoing communicative labor that requires a significant amount of cognitive energy.
Synecdoche and Sunaisthesis
In living, perceiving, and doing together, friends cease to exist as individual I’s and
instead become a We. Sunaisthesis is the synecdochal activity in word, thought, a deed that
creates the We. In 1964, Warren attempted to unravel the mystery of the term sunaisthesis in the
work of Plotinus. He explained that “Sunaisthesis defies accurate translation, and the best I can
do is it to enumerate the various shakes of its meaning” (p. 90). Warren wrote
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it does not simply mean consciousness (the awareness of the duality of knower and
known) or self-conscious (the awareness in which what is known is the knower). Even
when the terms are sunaisthesis hautou, one can not simply translate, ‘selfconsciousness.’ This phrase may mean a consciousness that one part of a mental whole
has for another part, i.e. That we are thinking certain thoughts. (p. 90)
Warren wrote that sunaisthesis “is a relation of part to whole, whole to part, and part to
part” (p. 91). He continued that “One might say that the particularly ‘sunaisthetizing’ agent is a
kind of unity such that its consciousness or awareness is always of that unity itself” (p. 90). As
for the agent which enacts sunaisthesis, Warren argued that it “may be a particular individual or
even the universe” (p. 91). Warren wrote, “Sunaisthesis refers to a plurality in a unity and a
consciousness or awareness in some way of that whole with itself (p. 91). Sunaisthesis is
awareness of my awareness, awareness of the other’s awareness, awareness of the Other’s
awareness of my awareness, and the Other’s awareness of my awareness of their awareness.
Flakne referred to sunaisthesis as “double intentionality” (p. 49). She wrote:
What is important here is that in the kind of aesthesis that is sun-aesthesis, I intend toward
both what my friend intends toward, and to her being-in-intention. The sensible form that I
‘take on’ in sunaisthesis, then, is that of my friend’ determined human life, a life organized
around ends which tie together past, present, and future capacities for determination. (p. 49)
She added:
Not only do I intend, in my aisthesis, my perception, to an object, but I also intend toward
you, in your sensible form, which is nothing other than your Energeia, your life as a
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determined perceiving and knowing, a perceiving and knowing organized around ends that
give you pleasure. (p. 51)
Drawing from Aristotle, Liu even argued that we cannot even perceive our own lives
independent of friends. She wrote, “we do not perceive either our own or each other’s lives
directly, but rather through synecdochic activities that reveal the structure of the whole” (p. 589).
For Liu, joint perception, sunaisthesis “requires an intimate acquaintance with each other’s lives”
(p. 595). She added, “This acquainting consists in knowledge of the character, history, and
trajectory of a life, as well as sympathetic understanding of how that life has been experienced”
(p. 594). It is communicative. It can only be achieved communicatively, not by being in one’s
physical presence.
In Eudemian Ethics, Flakne argued that Aristotle differentiates between an abstract,
particular living and social knowing and perceiving. She wrote that “Sunaisthetic speech is a
special kind of speech, one that someone pertains to the ethical ideal of self-sufficiency” (p. 49).
She continued that “Sunaisthetic speech transforms perceiving selves into ethical selves” (p. 49).
The true good life requires being together and doing good together, and as such, is impossible
without sunaisthesis.
Bennett (2016) argued that “As we transfer more and more of our human exchange to
mediated environments such as Facebook, we inadvertently limit our ability to grow in
relationships” (p. 256). She insinuated that relationships that have been transferred to Facebook
are more likely to be “sparse, superficial and unsatisfying” and went on that we must convince
“ourselves that they are genuine” (p. 256). She then added that “Trust, loyalty, faithfulness all
are developed in an environment that is tangible, actual—a place where people are meeting faceto-face, sharing life together through words and deeds” (p. 256). Like Bennett, McFall (2012),
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too was skeptical of the ability of technologically-mediated communication. He argued that
“technological communication” impedes our ability to morally reflect through friendship. He
also added that proximity did not necessarily facilitate “moral betterment” (p. 223).

McFall

acknowledged that while mediated communication “can aid existing character-friendships,” he
maintained that it cannot create or sustain them.
Bennett and McFall are only two among many who are not encouraged by the direction
that modern technology seems to be taking our friendships. Many others are much more
hopeful. If we consider the three components of sunaisthesis, living, perceiving, and doing, we
can evaluate the role of technology. Vallor (2012) pointed out that the notion of the shared life is
problematic when we interpret Aristotle in light of technology. He wrote, “deeper reflection on
the meaning of the shared life (suzen) for Aristotle raises important and troubling questions about
the capacity of online social media to support complete friendships of virtue in the contemporary
world” (p. 185). He added that without co-location, “social media and other forms of online
interaction seem antithetical to shared living” (p. 288). Human living is togetherness.
Togetherness is quite possible today in online environments, offline environments, or
using a combination of the two in a hybridized style of relation. Mary Chayko (2012) considered
the possibilities for relationships that exist as a result of our technology and explored the notion
of the sociomental bond. She defined these bonds as existing “primarily in a mental realm, a
space that is not created solely in the imagination of one individual but requires two or more
minds” (p. 1). She argued that “they are no less real for being located in a mental realm. They
are the manifestation of an absolutely genuine and often deeply felt sense that despite physical
separation, a closeness” (p. 1). She added that “They represent an experience of communion

135

with another person, one that does not depend on face-to-face meetings to be initiated or
maintained” (p. 2). Chayko pointed out that:
Even when the people involved in a sociomental connection do not know, have never
seen, and cannot accurately visualize one another, a kind of mental pathway exists
between them, along which information may be passed or people may otherwise
influence one another. It is as though a passageway to many potential forms of social
exchange and social relationship has been opened. The people involved may not be aware
of this passageway or “use” it in any but the most weakly realized fashion, but due to the
sociomental connection that exists, they have an increased opportunity to use it at some
point in the future. Thus many more outcomes to an interpersonal association (including
face-to-face relationships, friendships, and even love affairs are possible when a mental
pathway has first been opened between two people in the form of a sociomental
connection. (p. 73)
Elder (2014) argued that social media preserves the relevantly human and valuable portions of
life, especially reasoning, play, and exchange of ideas” (p. 287) and as such, can also lead to the
sharing of flourishing lives.
Elder (2010) highlighted that Aristotle associated shared living with conversation and
thought. He argued that “Any medium allowing friends to share conversations and thought
should thus be compatible with virtue friendship” (p. 288). More specifically, Elder wrote:
Our capacity to share our lives and thoughts via language and other symbolic
representation and artistic expression surely plays a role in the kind of sharing of ideas,
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experiences, and perceptions that constitutes the realest sense of living together, and
conversations are facilitated rather than discouraged by many social media. (p. 289)
Von Heyking (2017), in a response to critics of his work The Form of Politics, argued that to
even be able to asynchronously share, across time and space, his response to his critics is an
example of sunaisthesis. Their work is collaborative. Von Heyking even suggested that one
partner can even be silent.
Munn (2012) argues that:
Under my account of shared activity, friends engaged in such activity jointly pursue a
goal when all of them not only desire a particular outcome, but also desire that the
outcome be the product of the combined activity of the group, as it is composed. As
friends, they may be willing to reduce the likelihood of achieving the desired outcome, in
order to ensure that if it is achieved, the group which achieves it is composed of the
friends. (p. 4)
Munn (2012) places the sharing solely within the communicative praxis realm. He
writes, “I take communication to be the planning of activity, the sharing of ideas, the
development of procedures and so on, while activity involves putting the things into praxis” (p.
4). The foundations of friendship related to mutual caring and intimacy can only arise through
communicative praxis. He writes, “two components commonly held to be required for
friendship, namely mutual caring and intimacy, predominantly arise through shared experience,
rather than independently of it (p. 9). Friendship allows for a space of sharing moral visions. In
the final chapter, we will now explore this space from a communication ethics framework.
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Conclusion: Communication Ethics and Digitized Friendship
In Book VII of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argued that friendship “is either itself a virtue
or connected with virtue” (1155a). In the beginning of this work, it was noted that one reason for
an approach to friendship as communicative phenomenon is that it allows us to attend to the
historic moment we are currently in and that it frames communication in a way that allows us to
navigate friendship in an age of virtue contention. Whether friendship is a good, a faculty, or a
virtue does not discount framing friendship as a communicative phenomenon. Arnett and
Arneson define a communicative ethic as a “value-laden philosophy of communication that gives
weight to issues and events” (p. 9). They likened it to an “evaluative” house. The foundation of
the particular communication ethic in this chapter is to begin from the framework that friendship
is a communicative phenomenon and expand.
Eberwein and Porlezza (2016) have argued that technology has led to a challenge of
communication ethics in our age in two ways. First, they wrote that “digitization of the media
creates new ethical problems that stimulate calls for a redefinitions of the norms and values of
public communication” (p. 328). Second, they argued that “new instruments of web-based
media observation introduce new possibilities for media (self-)regulation and accountability, thus
complementing the initiatives of traditional institutions like press councils” (p. 328).
Sociological literature recognizes several major social institutions, but generally friendship is
not considered a major social institution across cultures. The historical evidence, though,
suggests that it is. Friendship persists across time and place and is a central good that is
protected and promoted in all cultures. One cannot have happiness in the absence of others.
There are multiple benefits to having friends. Like discussed in the first chapter, pain tolerance
increases as the size of one’s social network increases (Johnson & Dunbar, 2016). There are
138

cognitive benefits, such as slowing cognitive decline in older adults (James, Wilson, Barnes &
Bennett, 2011). Also, social network size has been linked inversely to depression (Hill,
Griffiths, & House, 2015). In childhood, friends help each other through the development
process. Friends make us better people, and they also help us participate and create meaning in
the polis.
Virtue Ethics
To exemplify how friends help us become better people and better citizens, Stocker (1981)
explained that friends enlarge our mentality of the good. He wrote, “This expansion of my desire
for the good, this ‘intersubjectivizing’ of the good by me, means that I have become more
virtuous, more human, more perfect as an agent. (p. 459). Meilaender (1981) argued that
envisioning an Aristotelian perspective on friendship can prove problematic in our time. This is
because we fail to recognize the nature of friendship in the formation of virtue and moral
excellence. To explain this, he wrote:
In our society the private bond of friendship is usually regarded as far less important than
the public bond of citizenship. And indeed, if the preferential character of friendship
creates problems for Christian ethics, it is not difficult to see why the more universal
bond of citizenship might have done to seem more deserving as a focus for our attention
and activity. (p. 68)
He added:
Friendship, as we understand it today—an intimate, personal, and private bond among a
small group of people—is for Aristotle only a more perfect expression of the bond which
unites the polis. (p. 70)
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The relationship of friendship and the effects on character development and society at
large uniquely calls for a virtue ethics approach. Even more specifically, as a communicative
phenomenon, a communication ethics approach grounded in virtue ethics is pressing.
Traditionally, empirical studies in mediated communication and their effects trend in
deontological and utilitarian frameworks (Vallor, 2012). In an earlier work, Vallor (2010)
argued that these frameworks have drastically narrowed our understanding of the effects of
technology on human flourishing. From a deontological and utilitarian perspective,
technologies’ roles and effects on friendship are defined and judged in measurable and
quantifiable ways associated with the individual and fail to recognize friendship as between
persons. To explain this problem, Vallor wrote:
Such studies can encourage a narrowly utilitarian calculus that draws conclusions about
the impact of new social media on user’s well-being simply from measures of their
enjoyment of psychosocial goods such as feelings of ‘life satisfaction’, ‘self-esteem’ or
‘social capital. ’ (Vallor, 2012, p. 187).
These frameworks often tend to be narrowly focused on particular times, and the broader nature
of technological impacts over the course of human history are left out. Vallor suggested as a
solution a turn to virtue ethics. Virtue ethics, she explains, “has the ability to account for the
long-term and cumulative impact of particular practices on our character” (p. 187). As
friendship has been important in every era of human history, scholarship that is attentive to its
nature in history and the practices which it encourages and also effects it is important.
Stocker (1981) also recognized problems with a teleological approach to understanding
friendship. He used the example of courage to show us that we run the risk of reifying pratcies
of true friendship when he wrote:
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One can act in order to show that one is courageous. But to act for that end need not be
to act courageously, nor conversely. Rather to act courageously constitutive involves
acting from a certain appreciation of the situations danger, a suitable handling of fear, and
the like. And these features, among others, are not amenable to a teleological
understanding. Thus, there is no goal, properly so-called the seeking of which is, as such,
to act courageously. (p. 758)
Therapeutic culture finds value in teleological perspectives. According to the New York Times
(https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/books/books-of-the-times-classic-advice-please-leavewell-enough-alone.html) Dale Carnegie’s How to Win Friends and Influence People (1936) has
sold over 30 million copies. One of his suggestions in his work was for people to be sincere.
But in telling someone to be sincere, it is impossible then for them to be sincere. Rather than be
sincere, their focus of attention is on the state of being so. When we tell someone what they
ought to do in a friendship, we ignore that friendships are communicative phenomenon that
develop between persons. Friends ought to meet in person more. Friends must spend more time
meeting face-to-face. These perspectives run the risk of treating the particular practices as
means to ends rather than allowing the practices to naturally evolve through discourse.
Scult (1989) argues that through discourse, friends “raise their relationship to the highest
moral level” (p. 206). Scult invoked hommonoia to explain that friendship is not a “relationship
that exists for the sake of satisfying our yearning for companionship” (p. 208). He says that “It is
an idea to guide us in developing the moral dimension of already existing institutional and quasiinstitutional relationships” (p. 308). He then argued that the “instrumental function” of
friendship is to “bring out the communal sensibilities that exist between individuals in order for
them to engage in the sort of discourse that predicts their individual integrity and eventuates in
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good judgment” (p. 208). Scult felt that virtue attraction was the cement of friendships. He
wrote it was because friends are those with whom we engage in “moral pursuits” (p. 209).
Sokolowski (2002) argued that “Friendship exceeds justice as a human perfection” (p. 452). He
explained that “The virtues are embodiments of practical intelligence” and that:
We ourselves are the works of doing. Virtues, therefore, are embodiments of practical
reason, and the installation of reason into our inclinations takes place through the actions
we perform and the choices we make. (p. 453)
Communication Ethics
Fritz (2014) in advancing the notion of professional civility as a communicative virtue,
argued that it can provide a home for care of institutions. She explained that “Care for
institutions involves thoughtful engagement of an organization’s horizon of possibilities and a
thoughtful, deliberate phenomenological turning toward key facets of organizational experience”
(p. 223). This work has been an exercise in the thoughtful engagement of friendship’s horizon of
possibilities and has turned to the key facets of experience related to friendship, outlined in each
chapter.
Fritz argued that MacIntyre considered institutions “necessary to reach the telos of human
flourishing” (p. 224) and in the previous chapter and throughout this work, it has been a central
tenet that from Aristotle and beyond, friendship has been considered instrumental in human
flourishing. Fritz explained that with organizations, and similarly institutions, we are summed
“to tend to them with the care that we extend to human Others” (p. 223). She continues that
“Such care embraces a unity of contraries” (p. 223) and necessitates a reflection cares for
institutions “that support the labor, work, and action of human persons in the gestalt of public
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and private life” (p. 224). Fritz advocated for protected and promoting those specific practices
which led to professional flourishing in the workplace.
Fritz incorporated a conceptual framework that centered on three components:
1) “the need to see beyond immediate presenting problems occurring in institutional
contexts”
2) “the importance of taking a long-term view rather than a short-term view of
organizational health”
3) “and a rejection of the equivalent, in organizational terms, of temporary comfort
reflective of a therapeutic response in the interpersonal context”
In this conclusion, the goal is to adapt the above framework to attend to friendship as an
institutional from a communications ethics approach, and to engage in the particular forms of
communication work and associated practices of each highlighted throughout this work.
We have already shown that there is some substantial disagreement in our era about what
constitutes friendship itself. Arnett, Fritz, and Bell (2009) argued that each communication ethic
“carries or reflects two sorts of related goods” (p. 4). The first, the explained, is “a substantive
good” and the second “is a set of communicative practices that ensures active protection and
promotion of a given good” (p. 4). The trio suggested that the defining good of our postmodern
age is “difference” (p. 5). Arnett (2010) has argued that a defining feature of philosophy of
communication that helps situate it as unique from philosophy in general is its attention to the
particulars. Regarding this attention, he drew from Arendt and wrote, “Philosophy of
communication engages particulars contingent on a particular situation, a particular moment, and
a particular public contribution to public opinion” (p. 58). As examples of theories that have
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stood the test of time, he noted Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Buber’s dialogue, and said that they
“offer examples of temporal conviction that remain significant as long as a given theory
continues to pass a pragmatic test of public opinion in the public domain” (p. 58). The entry
point of the particular is particularly relevant for friendship studies.
Elder (2010) noted that “The shared good life” needs to address the universal good of
human happiness and “particular goods for particular” human beings (p. 288). Sokowlowski
(2002) said that virtue friendships require shared virtues. He showed sharing virtues “involves
calibration” and honing. He continued that “It demands that in the contingences and vicissitudes
of life we possess the insight and the character to achieve truly the good of another” (p. 462).
Not only then do we need to be moral agents, but we must meet our friend in the particular to
know “precisely what he needs…and how he needs it” (p. 462). A philosophy of communication
approach can help then meet the friendship in the way it needs met and avoid the pitfall of
reification.
An Ethical Analysis
Looking back to earlier, Arnett, Fritz and Bell (2009) highlighted a twofold nature of
goods. First, there is a substantive good, and secondary are a set of practices that protect and
promote that good. On one level, we might say that human flourishing is the substantive good
and friendship is one of a set of practices that protect and promote that good. We can also say
that friendship is a substantive good, and investigate the particular practices that might protect
and promote friendship. This work will do so, and it will examine the themes written about in
each chapter as a practice. Finally, we also might say that each individual theme itself is a good
and then examine the individual practices that protect and promote each. This work will also do
that.
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Encounter
To begin, it seems pertinent first to review the specific conceptualization of each theme
from a communicative framework and highlight some of the major ideas from each. In Chapter
Two, we began by discussing the nature of Alfred Schutz’ work on intersubjectivity and its
importance to all social relationships. All human beings are by nature of being human embedded
in an already social world that existed before their birth and will continue to exist after their
death. Intersubjectivity is the state of only knowing the world in the between of persons, as all
thought and knowledge are socially created. Schutz’s approach is Aristotelian, which we see
later, although not explicitly called such.
In this natural state of every day existence, we take for granted our world, and because of
that, we also take for granted the existence of other humans. We take for granted that they exist
like we exist, and we are able to do so because of the thesis of general reciprocity. For most of
human history, we encountered others in their originary presence first bodily. Their bodies were
presented to us as objects, and much like we move through the apperceptive process to envision
that they have a heart, and stomach and all other organs and physical feature we can imagine, we
also do so with their consciousness. With their consciousness, it cannot be accessed from the
outside in any type of tangible way. Instead, we must rely on their words to grasp their
interiority. When we encounter the bodies of others in our world, they are given to us in their
originary presence. When we enter a space in which it becomes possible to communicate one’s
interior and make it exterior through language, we find ourselves in a communicative common
environment. This led us to define encounters as the communicative phenomenon in which
persons enter into a communicative common environment.
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The ways in which we encounter others, that is enter into communicative common
environments, is not space-bound in today’s world. To illustrate this point, I will now examine
some of the ways in which I encountered others yesterday. To begin my day, I encountered each
member of my family in some way as the house became alive. Although my niece grumpily
walked passed me with no communication whatsoever, in that moment we shared a
communicative common environment. When she closed the bathroom door, she used an
“involvement shield.”

As I drove the kids to school, each driver I encountered on the road had

the potential for a shared communicative environment. Had I found myself sitting at the light
too long, thinking about my dissertation, I surely would have heard at the minimum a honking
horn.
When I dropped them off at school, kids and parents hustled and bustled to stay out of the
way of other cars. I encountered rushed parents and students looking forward to the day—or not,
some looked quite irritated. While I exchanged no words with any of them, some shared eye
contact or a wave or nod. In each of these instances, we see a case of encounter. I arrived home
and immediately checked my email. Again, I encountered others, in their textual presence, in a
very asynchronous way. As I began working on my dissertation, I received an email from
someone asking me to call. When I encountered her email, I then called. Throughout my day,
whether mediated or not, I encountered many people in many different ways. I encountered
some both in person and via text. The point is that in our peopled world, we encounter others
regularly and in various different ways.
As a practice that helps achieve friendship, encounter is a necessary requirement, for we
must share communicative common environments with someone to be their friend. I cannot be
friends with a celebrity I see on television—there is no shared communicative environment. As a
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good to promote and protect, there is much more to say. From an ethical perspective, I believe
that we can look at the specific practices that promote and protect encounter from an individual
and institutional perspective.
At the institutional and individual level, we can apply Fritz’ earlier mentioned
framework. First, she suggested a commitment to long-term health, to seeing beyond just the
present, and to be wary of therapeutic approaches.

Literature has tended to imagine technology

as have opening the door for everyone to contact everyone all the time, but Zhao and Elesh
(2008) explain this is a faulty way of looking at the state of electronic media in our world. They
explain, “It might be true that calling has led to more contact with friends and family members,
but there is little sign that telephone calling opened up new social contacts” (p. 567). This is
problematic because as we know, philosophy of communication encourages a commitment to
learning through difference. Meeting difference, from this perspective, would mean encouraging
the openness to encounter. It means promoting the development of media and all endeavors that
allow for encountering difference and promoting it, and protecting the public spheres in which
encounter is possible.
In practice this, requires a recognition of very real problems that prevent others from
pursuing encounters in difference. First, would be comfort, of course. Learning in difference
requires communicative work. Encounter requires communicative work, and cognitive and
emotional energy. Another issue is stereotypes, prejudices, and bias. Difference needs to be met
with courage, and possibilities and positivities related to encounter should be promoted.
Protecting diversity is of utmost importance in the realm of encounter. Part of this is a secondary
problem, and that is the digital divide. While the majority of people in the United States do have
internet access, as discussed in the previous chapters, the small minority who do not still
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represent millions of people who do not. And from a more global perspective, as of 2015 only
about half of the world population even had access to the internet (https://www.itu.int/en/ITUD/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2015.pdf). In the world’s least developed
countries, under 10 percent had access to the internet. With the various possibilities that merge
from encounter alone and the role of encounter in human flourishing from its connection to
friendship alone, ensuring that all have equal access to the spaces in which humanity can access
others should be priority.
Zhao and Elesh (2008) noted the digital divide as one among several issues related to
misconceptions about our possibilities for encounter. In addition to the digital divide, they note
that there are “normative factors that restrict social connectivity” (p. 568). Even within the same
physical space, the pair note that “Being ‘within range’ is not the same as being available for
contact” (p. 569). Indeed, our earlier comment about stereotypes and prejudices apply here.
While some normative constraints are beneficial, others are harmful. Here then, a promotion and
protection of an ongoing conversation about the nature of these restraints and their constant
evaluation and reevaluation in the public sphere is necessary.
Particularity
In the third chapter, the phenomenon we investigated was particularity. There, we left off
from the encounter chapter saying that mere encounter is not enough to spark a friendship.
Instead, there is a tension that emerges. In each encounter there is the potential for a social
relation, and in the communicative process one will arise through the tension between mere
encounter and particularity. In the chapter, we identified that particularity is the reciprocal
recognition of the other’s unique consciousness (interiority) through voice within a context of
belief. Voice, in the context of this project, is the expression of one’s interiority. Interiority was
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one’s unique consciousness that belongs to no other human being nor ever will. Ong, in several
of his works including In the Human Grain (1967b), explained that the atoms in our bodies are
millions of years old and for them all to come together to create the being that is us is no less
than proof that God exists. If we go further, what a miracle that the atoms in two bodies build to
give rise to two unique interiorities that they come together to do good things together!
Doing good things together means that we have an expression into the outer world of our
consciousness—we communicate. Everyone does, but to move from an everyday encounter to a
relation requires a recognition of one’s particularity. And that alone is not enough—it must be
reciprocal and voluntary. Using Anton’s work, it is important to remember that this process
cannot be forced or scripted. We dwell in the what is said, we dwell in our friend, and we dwell
in the friendship without stopping to reflect on these things in themselves. In the moment’s that
we do, then focus of our attention changes. Like encounter, as a practice particularity is
naturally associated with human flourishing because it is a practice that leads to the good of
friendship (and other important social relationships).
On one hand, one of the reasons that we should protect and promote particularity is
because it, itself, is a good. Aristotle’s work on ethics discussed the nature of pleasure, pain, and
our purpose in life. While not all things that are good bring pleasure, particularity DOES.
Revisiting chapter three, remember that Nathaniel Branden highlighted that human beings
experience actual joy when we experience being “visible” as unique individuals to others. Recall
that he wrote:
When we encounter a person who thinks as we do, who notices what we notice, who
values the things we value, who tend to respond to different situations as we do, not only
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do we experience a strong sense of affinity with such a person but also we can experience
our self through our perception of that person. (p. 70)
The practices then that allow us to even express ourselves as particulars in our world, then, need
to be protected and promoted. The protection of autonomy, and choice but managed and
negotiated through the tension of similarity and difference embedded in difference is one of
Rawlins major contributions to friendship.
To clarify the specific practices to promote and protect related to the overall good of
particularity requires andeeper understanding of the role of particularity in creating the virtuous
individual. The very recognition of the good is a co-created construct. To explain this process,
Stocker (1981) writes the following:
I do not seek this larger good simply because it is useful for me. If I were to do so, my
‘perfect’ friendship would have slipped into being a friendship based on utility. Nor do I
seek this larger good simply because it gives me a good feelings to do so, because it is
pleasant to me. If I were to do so, my ‘perfect’ friendship would have deviated into being
a friendship based on pleasure. Rather, I see this good for another because I have become
someone who is capable of friendship, someone who can desire and accomplish the good
of others as my own good. I want good things not only for myself but for others as well,
and the others in question have the same disposition toward me. The friendship is
reciprocal and mutually acknowledged. This reciprocal and enlarged well-wishing
involved a categorical form. It is a highly sophisticated intellectual structure. It is a form
of recognition or identification. The good of my friend is identified as my own good, and
my good is identified as the good of my friend, and both of us rejoice in the
identifications that we mutually accomplish. (p. 459-460)
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Being able to have virtuous friendship requires intimate knowledge about the friend,
understanding their particular being, because to be a good friend means to do good things for the
other friend, which requires recognition. Stocker explains further:
Perfect friendship, friendship of the highest kind, requires that each of the friends wishes and
performs the good of the other friend. He wills the good of his friend; that is, he takes the
good of the friend as his own good. When I act with and for a friend, I act in such a way that
what is good for the friend as such, is wished for and done as my own good. His good, as
good for him, has become my good, and he acts in the same manner toward me. The good
each of us seeks is not just our own individual good but the good in common and the good
for the other. If my friend and I are accomplishing something as friends, I am not just trying
to do something that benefits me; I am trying to do something that benefits him as well, and I
do it precisely as benefiting him. Its being good for him has become good for me. I have
enlarged my sense of what is good for me. I wish not only things that benefit me
individually, but also things that benefit others (my friends), and I wish those things precisely
as benefiting them.
In the third chapter and into the fourth, the role of dialogue is recognized as important for the
development of particularity between persons. Therefore, particular practices that promote and
protect authentic dialogue are those that need to be in focus. Media that help facilitate this need
to be in the forefront of our discussions. While there is rhetoric about the negative effects of
technology on our relationships, more emphasis needs to be placed on the positives of
technology. Using one single app like Snapchat, users have at their fingertips voice, video, text,
the option to engage in synchronous and asynchronous dialogue. They can use stickers or play
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games with others. Platforms like Youtube allowed me to take videos of my world and life and
share them with my friend in Monterrey as she and I shared a common goal of language learning.
From a philosophy of communication approach, using the Fritzian framework, again
long-term views and the rejection of temporary comfort are important. In a future work, I intend
on working on a pedagogy of interiority. The evolution of human consciousness relating to
media is a concept that would benefit a general education curriculum. However, to be able to
contextualize media consumption and the role of the self and self expression in general is
important within the broad scales of human history, one that can engage in the promotion and
protection of particularity, providing a “why.”
Dialogue
Dialogue was an important component in the process of drawing out the interiority of the
other and allowing for the emergence of particularity. As noted previously, Ong was influenced
greatly by Buber’s work. In the act of coming into relation with other people, we draw on a
stock of knowledge that brings forth an interpretive process. Human thought in its nature is
binary and “breaks” down what we see. This is paradigmatic of language, as language is equally
digitizing and breaks down as well as brings up. For example, we are well aware that in the
process of naming, the word given to the object of intention is not the object of intention itself.
Words are arbitrary representations of the objects of intentionality. However, in entering
discourse and dialogue, words give life and representation to some things that are very really and
not tangible, like the inner consciousness of others. In addition to dialogue being necessary for
particularity, it is also the only way in which a friendship can become such an “object” that it can
be identified as such. Friends co-create meaning, including the meaning that their unique
friendship has and that it is even a friendship in the first place.
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Chapter Four identifies several challenges related to dialogue and the interpretive
process, and this is an opening for direction for a discussion on ethics. Dialogue is clearly a
practice that leads to human flourishing and friendship. But dialogue is a good that needs
protected in and of itself. For this work, specifically, the goal is to stay as close to possible to an
understanding of the communicative practices that promote and protect dialogue from the
perspective of friendship and friendship ethics.
First, related to the co-creation of meaning, it is important to be mindful of the current
conversation that is questioning the quality of online friendship or its authenticity or
genuineness. Based on the philosophical underpinnings, friendship’s significance is co-created
in the between of persons. As such, we employ evaluative deontological and utilitarian
universals to relationships that are not particularly ours. For one, friendships vary and change
over the course of lifespans and across time and place. Some friendships look much different
than others. Some are considered to have “weak ties” or dismissed as not “true” but instead
“friendly relations.” Rather than discussions of the nature of “true” friendship’s ability to occur
online, from a philosophy of communication perspective the focus would be better centered on
what practices in mediated settings can protect and promote the dialogic space that allows for the
co-creation of friendship. What spaces encourage people to engage in dialogue? What can we
do to protect these and encourage their use?
Throughout the chapter, the lack of cues was a main focus. The lack of cues does reduce
the available information for interpreting the other. This causes, because of the nature of human
thought and language, the interpreter to draw from their stock of knowledge from their
protentions and retentions more so than the face-to-face setting. Text creates phenomenological
distance, and in chapter six where we discussed intimacy, we saw this manifest as the feeling of
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closeness. From a Fritzian framework and philosophy of communication perspective, though, a
more situated and long-term perspective is needed.
Like noted in the chapter, it is important to resist lamenting the loss of cues. Loss of cues
is not inherently negative, nor is distance. As we saw in the chapter, studies show that when
cues are reduced there are actually several positives. The more reduced the cues and the more an
individual must rely on words alone, the more introspective they must be. They tend to be much
more deliberate in their messages. To exemplify this, I am going to explain a game that I play in
my classes when we review verbal and nonverbal communication.
Almost all my students are familiar with charades, and I find great joy in bringing the
game of Taboo into the classroom and telling them it is “reverse charades.” Rather than
eliminating the verbal, it eliminates the nonverbal. Students must rely on their words to get their
teammates to guess particular words that they have drawn on cards. At the end of the activity, I
tell them the following. I ask them how many are good at painting. A few raise their hands, but
never very many. When a student enters a class on painting, no matter they possess when they
come in, they will learn particular skills, techniques and a strong knowledge base in order to
leave better than when they come in. And so it is with communication. While it is natural to
humans, doing it well or in the most effective way is not natural. Studies in communication—the
how, the why—they are what provide, like the painting class, skills, techniques, and knowledge.
When a student leaves a painting class, the teacher cannot supply them with something they will
need to continue to grow and create—this is the paints, the materials. When I ask the students
what the materials are of communication, they say words. Words, yes, are the materials and as
nonverbal cues are reduced, a deliberateness and level of introspection is required more so than
available to past generations. When I ask students where they get words, they always pause.
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The answer is learning, from learning. From reading, from education, and from communicating
with others. Philosophy of communication directs us to a commitment to always learning,
particularly from difference, and this continues to be a focal point, even more so in an age where
cues are reduced and our words often stand alone.
One final problem area to probe here at the end is relate to a small section of chapter four
where I noted that in our technological age, sometimes we may not be certain at all who, if
anyone, will be on the other end of our message. Not are we even unsure if anyone at all will
read our messages, we now are in an era where “deep fakes” are a reality and a concern.
Chesney and Citron (2019) wrote an extensive review covering the challenges and potential
benefits that deep fakes have for culture. They wrote, “The ability to distort reality has taken an
exponential leap forward with ‘deep fake technology” (p. 1753). The define deep fake
technology as audio and visual technology that makes it possible to depict “real people” of
“saying and doing things they never did or said” (p. 1753). For the reasons discussed in the
chapter, mediated communication is already conducive to depersonalization.
Arnett and Arneson (2014) noted that Friedman suggested a “need for ‘existential trust’” in
response to Buber’s claim that “existential mistrust has dominated” our time (p. 16). They
continued that “With a loss of trust, we lose the ability to distinguish genuine problems from
manufactured problems, the genuine friend from a disingenuous salesperson, and genuine hope
from a loss cause” (p. 16). Instead, there is always an underlying hidden meaning that is sought.
The inability to trust that the other is genuine, let alone actually real, is problematic. However,
there is hope in Ong’s claim that all language conceals but also reveals. Arnett and Arneson
advocated for a dialogic civility perspective. They wrote that, “A dialogic civility perspective on
interpersonal discourse is grounded in historicity, not therapeutic discourse” (p. 30).
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Specifically, they note the importance of listening to the demand of a particular moment, and this
includes interpersonally listening to the particular moment and particularity of the friend. They
wrote, “Dialogue suggests that “we” more than “me” must guide the discourse of self, other, and
the historical moment” (p. 5) and therefore, from a philosophy of communication approach, we
must lean in on the “we” to guide us.
Intimacy
In the chapter where we explored space and time, we examined the nature of intimacy
and the tendency to imagine it as a space-bound phenomenon. Just like social systems have been
extended, so, too, has intimacy into the noosphere. We can trace these changes historically.
There are several themes related to intimacy that require a final glimpse in the arena of
communication ethics. Chambers noted the rhetoric “that IM, texting and social network sites
are somehow undermining human intimacy and sociality” (p. 14). Part of the issue, she argued,
is that skeptics fail to recognize the importance of “weak ties.” She wrote in more detail:
Weak ties may offer us access to the kinds of resources and varied social groups and
belief systems that close family and friends are unable to supply. Those with extensive
weak ties will have access to information, new ideas and tastes from outlying parts of the
social system. For example, it gives individuals an advantage in terms of the labour
market where employment may depend on knowing of job openings (Granovetter 1973,
1983). (Chambers, p. 15)
Weak ties are not then necessarily problematic and as noted in the chapter, intimacy is not
universally accepted as a standard feature of friendship. Her point at the end about social capital
requires a secondary glance though.
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In a previous section, we were cautioned against utilitarian frameworks that measure
friendships and their quality like this. A more thorough of social capital and its ethical
implications, possibly drawing from Bordieux, would be recommended as an area of future
research. Information-sharing, too, is another arena for further study. In his article “Information
and/or Communication” (2002), Ong cautioned us against conflating information and
communication. He wrote that information “itself does not of itself involve meaning” (p. 505).
He added that “It does not involve human consciousness, or consciousness of any kind” (p. 505).
This is an important distinction as we have discussed the tendency for mediated communication
to depersonalize. Depersonalization is further problematic in an age of information as income.
Chambers did note that:
I suggest that we have entered an era in which ‘friendship’ becomes both a potent
exemplar of individuality and personal choice and a global marketing tool to inﬂuence
our personal tastes and patterns of consumption. (p. 162)
This requires special deliberate effort to avoid reducing what we share and how we perceive it.
In an explanation of how two individuals can build a We-relationship (stream consciousness
together) in an online environment, Zhao (year) explained that the two individuals move through
“mutual biographical disclosure” (p. 119). The pair will “reach back to their memories, unwind
the reduced streams of inner consciousness and bare the contexts of their retrieved thoughts and
emotions to others for examination and reflection” (p. 119). He added, “Such voluntary
disclosure of the innermost part of one’s consciousness” is “common” in the online world (p.
119). He also added in another essay the following argument. He wrote that “In the online
world mutual knowledge is derived from the biographic narrative people supply about
themselves that describe who they are and what they have been through” (2007, p. 147). And
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related to existential mistrust, he reminded us that we must take their word for it. He wrote,
“Since observation of others in a shared living environment becomes impossible, we have no
choice but to base our knowledge of others on what they tell us about themselves” (p. 148). In
Buber’s and Ong’s terms, this requires faith, a leap of faith, and belief.
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